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With the closure, by the Algerian authorities, of its airspace to all Moroccan civilian and military aircraft, the level of tension between the two states is raised, aggravating a difficult diplomatic situation that could degenerate in a dangerous way. The question between the two North African states concerns the situation of Western Sahara, south of Morocco, controlled by the Polisario Front which is fighting for independence from the government of Rabat, claiming the sovereignty of the territories inhabited by the Sahrawi people and for this reason recognized by the United Nations, as the legitimate representative of those populations. These territories include huge deposits of minerals and phosphates, a material used for fertilizers, which is the real reason why Morocco refuses to grant the Polisario Front a referendum for independence. To remedy the situation of the annexation of these territories by Morocco, which took place in the seventies of the last century, the Polisario Front decreed the birth of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose government in exile is hosted in Algeria, which, in fact, it has become the patron country of this cause. The Moroccan country is supported for its cause by the US and Israel, this as a consequence of Trump’s promise to support Rabat in the event of recognition of the Israeli state, so Washington recognized the sovereignty of Morocco over the territories claimed by the Polisario Front; recently Algeria was hit by fire by the Moroccan armed forces, which operated using an Israeli-made drone. Rabat, during the year, opened two diplomatic crises with European countries: the first with Spain, for having welcomed a leader of the Polisario Front to give him medical treatment, the second with Germany, which defined Western Sahara as a territory occupied by Morocco and to have asked the United Nations for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to request the holding of the referendum on the independence of Western Sahara. Morocco responded to these international solicitations by counterattacking with an action against Algeria, asking the United Nations itself for the right to self-determination of the Algerian region of Kabylia with a Berber majority. Algiers had previously classified the movement that supports the autonomy of the Berber region as an Islamist terrorist and the failure to withdraw the Moroccan proposal resulted in the withdrawal of the Algerian ambassador to Morocco. Contributing to this diplomatic tension was the discovery of Rabat’s use of Israeli software capable of spying on Algerian officials and the alleged Moroccan involvement in the fires that devastated northern Algeria and caused at least ninety victims. The suspension of flights with the Moroccan flag over Algerian skies wanted by the Algiers government is part of this scenario of respective rudenesses, which denote a confrontation of low military intensity, but with high diplomatic tensions, which also affect economic relations: after the withdrawal of its ambassador Algiers announced the interruption of the export of its gas to Spain through Morocco: for Rabat this means a loss between 50 and 200 million euros, due to the 7% share of the total value of the gas that arrives on Spanish territory; and the ban on overflight also affects the Moroccan tourist industry, which bases arrivals in its country through air traffic. At the level of a global analysis of the southern Mediterranean region, there is a fear of further destabilization, which, if added to the Libyan situation, where the civil war has also extended to Mali and involves great powers, more or less directly, can bring the whole coastal strip to a state of uncertainty that could be reflected in the European countries bordering the Mediterranean; moreover, Islamic radicalism could take this situation as an opportunity to infiltrate local crises and exploit uncontrolled migrations to reach the West. In fact, it should not be forgotten that one of the means, however not new, used by Morocco to exert pressure on Spain, was precisely that of leaving its borders uncontrolled to encourage a migratory flow towards the Spanish country. This situation is also the umpteenth confrontation of the USA with the European Union, which each support the opposing contenders, underlining the profound difference of views that has arisen in the Western field.

As might be expected, the military agreement between the US, Great Britain and Australia has caused deep resentment in Europe. This is a real affront to Brussels, kept in the dark about the terms of the alliance, if it is part of the relationship within the so-called Western world. The greatest irritation is recorded in France, which, due to a clause in the agreement, which obliges Canberra to purchase American atomic-powered submarines, loses a substantial order with Australia for the supply of diesel-powered submarines. A very important detail is that this order was confirmed again on 31 August last by a videoconference meeting between the military leaders of the two states, with a joint signature, which did not foreshadow any rethinking, however, never officially communicated. But beyond the legitimate French resentment, the European Union suffers an evident diplomatic wrong, which threatens to have serious consequences in the relationship with the United States, held to be the real culprits for the provocation. The greatest disappointment is represented by President Biden, who started with a profoundly different attitude from his predecessor, but who turned out, in fact, even worse towards his European allies: first the unscheduled withdrawal from Afghanistan and now the creation of an alliance that leaves the European Union out without any explanation; or rather the explanation could be the consideration that Europe is now a secondary theater compared to Asia, the true focal point of current American interests. After all, already with Obama this supremacy of Asian centrality over the old continent was beginning to take shape, Trump has continued it and Biden further strengthens it. Furthermore, Biden seems to add to himself the desire to shift the main US attention towards Asia, typical of Obama, with Trump’s desire to put the United States in front of everything: this is the only way to explain the diplomatic rudeness of the White House, where London and Canberra are only supporting subordinates. However, there is also the need to take into account the European Union’s desire for ever greater autonomy from its main ally, a factor, however, amply justified, as this story demonstrates. A further element may have been represented by the position of the European Union, which while remaining faithfully in the Western camp, has sought a balance between Beijing and Washington, to avoid a too dangerous degeneration of relations between the two superpowers. At this point, the European intent seems to have failed, with China openly accusing the US, Great Britain and Australia of opening a new season of increasing armaments with the Chinese country as its objective. The crux of the matter now is the poor level of relations between Washington and Brussels, which, despite the absence of official statements, seems even lower than when Trump was president; certainly Biden enjoys a caution, which his predecessor did not benefit, perhaps due to the hope of a tangible sign of repentance, but if this is the European tactic, the hopes seem vain: the path taken by the White House points to a marginal Europe as an element geostrategic, a factor that could also have repercussions on commercial relations. Washington has also filled the void created by Brexit and has operated a tactic capable of linking London more closely with the opposite side of the ocean; this detail should not be underestimated because it could exacerbate relations between the United Kingdom, always looking for expedients favorable to itself in the game of post-Brexit agreements, and Europe. This is how the scenario that Trump had pursued without being able to materialize came about, now it will be necessary to see the ability of the Union to react not to be overshadowed and to conquer the position that it has long sought in the international field and which is frustrated with this agreement. , which ultimately sees her as a loser and betrayed, but in the same field as her: the Western one. The defeat, that is, is even heavier because it does not come from an opponent, which could have been Russia or China itself, but from the country, which despite everything, was considered the greatest ally. Caution and prudence must be at the basis of the next moves of European diplomacy, but with the right distrust of unreliable and even treacherous allies. The political and military autonomy of Europe is increasingly important, now on a par with economic strength, above all to manage opponents who have a lot in common and are not politically distant like China and Russia.

The agreement signed by the United States, Great Britain and Australia for the sharing of advanced skills on issues relating to nuclear weapons, cyber security, the use of submarines at great distances and artificial intelligence, all matters closely linked to the military sector , indicates the geographical direction and strategic intentions, which Washington intends to favor in the near future; what is reiterated is the centrality of the Pacific Ocean region, where the main intent is to counter and contain the ambition of Beijing, which considers the region as an area of ​​its own influence. Not that Biden’s is a novelty in US foreign policy: Obama, of which Biden was vice president, had already started this policy, moving the American interest area from Europe to Asia, Trump, despite his contradictions , has carried out this strategy and now Biden confirms it, leaving central the question of the domination of the naval routes, but not only, of the Pacific. Certainly the increase in relevance and in the level of confrontation, both commercial and geopolitical, with China, obliges the USA to concentrate the greatest effort on this game, involving, however, other international subjects, who are faithful allies and have direct interests. in the region, Australia, or the need to find new financial solutions, as well as political ones, due to the exit from Europe. Not involving the European Union, but only two countries that have a lower international specific weight, compared to Brussels, may mean that, currently, the White House may prefer a more unbalanced relationship in its favor; after all, American politics, despite the premises of this president, has in fact maintained the distance with Europe almost as in the days of Trump and the unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan was yet another proof of this. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the Asian country, considered a non-strategic objective for the US, will allow Washington to reallocate new financial resources precisely for the direct challenge with China. Beijing is expanding in an overwhelming manner also in Africa and South America, but the US focuses its attention in the Pacific areas, perhaps also in order not to repeat the mistakes of expanding the areas of action too much, where Chinese military power is shown with greater arrogance. In this perspective, the involvement of India, a natural Chinese opponent, in the presidium of the Pacific also reopens disturbing scenarios on the consequences of these international arrangements. US policy on military alliances also involves the war industry, causing havoc within the alliance with Europe and in particular with France: the agreement with Australia provides for the supply of nuclear submarines to the state of Oceania , which has an ongoing contract with Paris on this front; due to the slowdown in supply, Washington has entered the trade relationship and could nullify the French supply. It is understandable that Europe is treated as a secondary ally, a process initiated by Trump irritated by the low economic contribution and the willingness of Brussels to prefer its own war industry, to the detriment of the American one. For the European Union, these are unequivocal signals and the European Commission is doing well to seek its own military autonomy, equipping itself with a first rapid intervention force, the first piece of a possible supranational army. The agreement with London and Canberra therefore involves much more than the geostrategic aspects of the Pacific, which seem to be valid as such only for Australia, but concerns the very vision of the Atlantic Alliance, increasingly reduced to a marginal organization precisely because of will of Washington. The perception is that the United States chooses an increasingly less shared approach to the management of foreign policy on the subject of relations with China, which currently represents the apex of the international scenario; however, by involving Europe and the Atlantic Alliance itself, it denounces a basic weakness, which only confirms the possibility of new tactical errors on the part of Washington. If one wants to maintain international leadership, one cannot privilege a single place of confrontation, but at least preside over the most important areas, an action that China tries to do, sometimes taking the place of the Americans. The game is global and must be conducted as such, otherwise the fragmentation of the West will only be an advantage for Beijing.

The fall of Kabul, due to the unilateral decision of the United States to withdraw from the country, a decision taken independently by Washington and not agreed with the allies, highlighted the imbalance of bilateral relations between the USA and Europe, with Brussels at a clear disadvantage and with a state of substantial dependence on the White House. This poses serious questions to Europe’s geopolitical prospects and highlights, once again, the need for an autonomous European military force. In the last informal meeting of the Union’s foreign ministers, the creation of a rapid intervention battalion, made up of about 5,000 personnel, able to intervene promptly in any crisis theaters, was evaluated. It would not yet be a European army, but it would be a start towards a strategic autonomy, necessary for Europe to play a leading political role on the world stage. This need is also seen as a unifying factor between European countries, but the Baltic countries and Poland have always preferred the defense organization through the Atlantic Alliance, an organization towards which, precisely due to the pre-eminence of the USA within it , several European countries have started to be wary. Even if it is not a question of leaving the Atlantic Alliance, it has been acknowledged that its room for maneuver is increasingly limited and functional to American interests, rather than to collective ones; this awareness, which was already present before the unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan and, above all, due to Trump’s attitudes, has not changed with Biden, from whom he expected a change, which has not arrived. To overcome the resistance of skeptical countries to European military autonomy, which will have to provide for a financial commitment, the German foreign minister proposed to create the rapid intervention force with a qualified majority, overcoming the threshold of unanimity, with supply of troops only by the voluntary countries. The question thus risks being yet another divisive factor between convinced Europeanists and Europeanists for convenience and represents a further factor of reflection on the advisability of continuing to keep together nations that do not share European presuppositions and raises the concrete question on the meaning of the presence of countries skeptical of the European institution. Biden, on which so many hopes were pinned by the Europeans, albeit in different ways, seems to want to continue, albeit in a mitigated way, the policy of isolation of the United States and turns out to be a less reliable partner than expected: this consideration is associated with urgent issues concerning Islamic terrorism present on the European borders, both in Asia and in Africa. The need to combat this phenomenon, which after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan is destined to increase, clashes with the awareness that Europeans will be alone in the fight against Islamic radicals to defend their security. To do this, Europe needs to change its attitude towards itself, ceasing to consider itself only a financial aggregate where the glue is only the market, but accepting to structure its own foreign policy unrelated to the interest of individual states, but functional to the interest general; to do this requires an effort by nations towards a transfer of sovereign shares and also new decision mechanisms, capable of overcoming the now absurd rule of unanimous voting. As can be seen, the decision to create a European rapid intervention force, the first possible step towards the common army, involves a much greater and much more important amount of arguments, capable of being able to vary the current structure. It could be a test to see who really wants to commit to a united Europe and find the countries ready to get only the positive aspects, among which the financial ones are in first place; conversely, a renunciation of the participation of Eurosceptic countries could restrict the territorial extension, but allow a better allocation of resources and more shared plans and programs. The time has come to resolve the undefined conflicts within the Union, especially in relation to the emergency dictated by the expected resurgence of terrorism, which will have Europe as one of the main objectives of the Islamic radicals. this need for defense requires quick and shared decisions, which cannot include useless positions that are inconsistent with supranational interests; from here, Europe will be able to move towards the concrete launch of the European federation project.

The satisfaction of Pakistani leaders that the Taliban have broken the chains of slavery is yet another confirmation of how Islamabad is an unreliable country in the fight against terrorism and an ally with very different purposes than the United States. This is not new news, but which takes on a different significance with the fall of Kabul in the hands of radical Islamist forces. The support of the secret services of Pakistan has been continuous and constant and parallel to the fight waged with Washington against Al Qaeda, but the time has come to clarify, both within Islamabad and the United States, the relations of mutual collaboration and the future. relations between the two countries. The White House owes it to its own country, but also to its Western allies, who have always followed their commitment in Afghanistan, with the present threat of the Pakistani attitude; certainly the danger to be assessed is that of leaving too much space for China in Pakistan, in the event of worsening of relations: but this is a risk to be calculated, also to put Beijing in crisis, towards which the Pakistani attitude, in the Afghan question, it will certainly not change. However, it is also necessary to carry out an analysis within Pakistan itself, which, as the first and most immediate problem, is facing a huge exodus of refugees fleeing Islamic extremism, after having experienced significant improvements, thanks to the American intervention. ; this aspect is closely linked to the probable international grievances due to the lack of respect for human rights, discrimination against women and the proximity to radical and violent Islamist groups. These considerations must necessarily be present in the assessments that Islamabad must make towards the cost and benefit ratio, relating to the relationship with the Taliban, which is considered strategic in an anti-Indian function: an Afghan government favorable to Pakistan, in this perspective, it is considered extremely functional to the interests of the country’s geostrategic policy; however, this has allowed the development of a Pakistani Taliban movement, judged by various analysts to be a possible factor of national destabilization, precisely because of the increased power of the Afghan Taliban. The impression is that Pakistan has lost control over a phenomenon that it believed it knew how to control and which now forces the government to make concrete reflections, both on relations with the new Afghan order, both on internal problems and on the dialectic with the United States. Regarding the tribal origin of the Afghan Taliban, it should be noted that the Pashtun component is in the majority, but it is also very present on Pakistani territory. The issue alarms, and not a little, Islamabad’s other main allies, as well as, of course, the aforementioned United States; Saudi Arabia and China concretely fear the export of terrorism, which has already spread beyond the region with the expulsion of the Taliban from the Afghan government in 2001. The real fear is that the enthusiasm for the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan, it can act as a stimulus for radical Islamist groups operating in other countries; hence the probable pressure from Beijing and Riyadh on Islamabad to prevent the support of the new Afghan power for armed groups with potential targets outside the borders of Kabul. It is clear that these pressures can materialize in economic measures, capable of putting a country with serious deficits on its economic data in great difficulty. For all these reasons, the enthusiasm for the Taliban conquest of Kabul and the Afghan country was officially contained, so much so that an official recognition of the Taliban was carried out, on which the definition of a terrorist group remains by the United Nations. The government of Islamabad, regarding the recognition of the Taliban, seems to be oriented towards a consultation that will have to include, not only the regional powers of the country, but also the international authorities. Beyond these considerations, which seem vitiated by hypocrisy, the role of Pakistan remains central to the influence of the new government in Kabul, when it has been able to form it, but above all in relations with the Taliban and, consequently, on the relations that Islamabad will be able to do. have with the entire international community.

The downward evolution of American foreign policy, culminating in the hasty retreat from Afghanistan, is a downward trend that brings the North American country ever closer to the loss of world leadership. Although Washington is still the first world power, the gap, not only of China, with other superpowers is decreasing considerably. We went from a bipolar scenario in the Eighties, with the USA competing with the USSR, to a phase, following the collapse of the Soviet giant, of a substantial role as the only major planetary power to an upcoming multipolar scenario, where the House Bianca, is unlikely to have a decisive influence on all international issues. The USA will probably remain the first world power, but with China very close and with a series of regional players able to make their role felt in more restricted areas, but where the specificity of exercising their own weight will represent an obstacle. to those who want to play a role of planetary supremacy. This is true both for geopolitical strategies, which include military assets, and for economic ones, often inextricably linked to balances of a political nature, where the religious component is also emerging. The American decline began evidently with Obama, who did not want to engage in the Syrian conflict, Trump continued with his vision of leaving foreign policy, with the idea of ​​diverting resources into the domestic economy, miscalculating and vision, that in order to be the first, it is also necessary to engage in external theaters; in the end Biden arrived, who thwarted years of fighting terrorism, with a withdrawal that was supposed to stabilize his consensus, obtaining, instead, the unexpected result of a general aversion to this decision even within his own party. Three presidents, one after the other, were wrong because they evaluated the weight of the polls too much, adapting to the general trend of the short-term vision, they did not stimulate the allies effectively, they fossilized on exclusively military tactics, without considering the adequate importance of social infrastructures and the involvement of the good part of the local populations, an attitude that has favored an ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy. These mistakes have not been made just once, but have been repeated in various intervention scenarios and protracted over time and clearly denounce an inadequacy of both the American political and administrative class: shortcomings that a state that wants to exercise world leadership cannot afford. ; however, these errors are even more serious in a greatly changed international situation, which has seen the arrival of new competitors capable of shaking American supremacy. Certainly China is the main competitor: Beijing’s economic advance, however, had to prevent the US from remaining in a state of lack of variation, characterized by a lack of clarity and foresight, that is, a small-scale coastal navigation which has made one lose sight of the whole whole and has determined a closure in itself, which has also compromised for long stretches relations with the main allies, the Europeans. But Europe itself proved to be a weak link in American foreign policy, not that this was an unknown aspect and that it had also been convenient for the Americans, only that in the changed context, having allies that are always too dependent has proved deleterious. The US needs Europe and vice versa, if only to try to slow down the Chinese economic advance, but this goal is too limiting if Western values ​​are to prevail, and it is on this issue that the US must ask itself: to go beyond its immediate interests to collect more in the future, also from a geostrategic point of view, as well as an economic one. Only by further integrating the action of the US and Europe can a supremacy be reaffirmed, no longer American but Western. A great deal of mediation work is needed because the challenges and scenarios will be multiple and not all of them will be able to impose a synthesis that is not always reachable, but this is the only way to be able to try to contain terrorism and dictatorships and find new ways for the affirmation of democracy, even in different forms but such as to overcome political and religious dictatorial forms, which want to infiltrate our imperfect democracies.

The European Union is alarmed by the possible consequences, especially at the internal level, of migrations from Afghanistan, which are expected to be very substantial in number. Potentially a very complicated situation is expected to manage: the immediate concern is the management of migratory flows, but the evolution of relations between European states, many of which have already stated that they have no intention of hosting, is considered to be much more worrying. refugees and indeed to operate rejections and repatriations. In the short term, the intention of Brussels is to strengthen the economic support to the nations that will be immediately involved in migratory movements, with the intention of favoring the permanence in those countries immediately involved, but this is obviously a solution that does not has a long-term vision; the aim is to take time to develop tactics and strategies capable of reconciling the needs of all European members, while neglecting, however, the principles of solidarity between states, at the basis of the very stay within the Union. The country with the largest number of Afghans on its territory is Germany, which has said it is unwilling to increase migrants from this country. At the moment the foreign ministers of European countries, with the exclusion of Hungary and Hungary, have signed a declaration, together with the USA, which should allow all Afghan citizens who intend to leave their country to do so, through borders of neighboring countries, but it is a declaration of principle, which does not provide for a material solution for the shelter and assistance of migrants fleeing the Taliban. A hypocritical position, even if the American responsibilities are evident: the behavior of Washington, in addition to abandoning Afghan civilians to the religious dictatorship of the Taliban, exposes the neighboring countries first and Europe later, to a significant migratory impact, which is the tragic he replies of what happened with Syria, when the sloth of the Obama administration allowed a tragic war, which spread to a large part of the Middle East. Europe risks a new suspension of the Schengen treaty and Biden should reflect a lot on this element, after what seemed to be a favorable attitude with his old allies. These considerations must take into account the issue within Europe, represented by the forthcoming German elections, which will decide the successor of Chancellor Merkel: in Berlin the debate on the choices of the Atlantic Alliance proved to be very critical with Washington and this could become a problem for Biden, which could worsen with the migration issue. As usual, Brussels follows Berlin and, albeit in a less harsh way, condemns the American action, supported by the data that the US withdrawal will produce: it is estimated that the 12 million of the Afghan population who already had difficulty in finding food under the old regime , will increase to 18 million inhabitants, with the Taliban in government. Thus, the migratory emergency will not only be political but also food and the relative short distance, 4,500 kilometers, which separates the Afghan country from Europe will turn into a new refugee route. In this scenario, the role of countries such as Iran and Pakistan becomes crucial in offering support to migrants and avoiding dangerous developments in relations within Europe. At the moment Iran hosts at least 3.5 million refugees and for this reason Brussels finances Tehran with about 15 million euros, if the Iranian role becomes even more important to reduce migratory pressure, as well as a necessary increase in funding. , it is not excluded that Tehran cannot also demand a revision of the sanctions, causing a collision between Europe and the USA: an argument that the White House should not underestimate. The Pakistani role is also important, hosting another 3 million refugees and has already received 20 million euros in 2020 and 7, so far, in 2021. The concomitance of inadequate United Nations funding requires Europe to raise funding to countries that allow them to alleviate their migratory pressure. Of course, a tactic solely set up in this way exposes Brussels to potential blackmail and the international weakness of the Union does not help to overcome this danger: one more reason to set up European politics in a different way, in order to become a political subject of the first magnitude, beyond the current purely economic role.

It seems all too obvious to declare that the reconquest of Kabul and of the whole of Afghanistan is one of the heaviest Western defeats and with dangerous repercussions on balances that go beyond regional ones, because they concern the general aspects of terrorism and geopolitical issues. It is a fact that to reach this conclusion it was better not to start even an occupation that resulted in a tragic death toll and literally wasted financial expenses with a retreat that the American military and politicians will have to deal with for years. There is a concurrence of underestimated facts that contributed to an approximate management, which is at the root of the bankruptcy; meanwhile, the initial approach of the US and Great Britain, oriented towards a more military operation, seems to be the tragic repetition of what happened in Iran; on the contrary, the other European allies would have preferred a more peace mission approach, but failed to impose their own vision, playing important but substantially secondary roles. The withdrawal issue was a sort of tacit agreement between the White House, formerly with Trump and then with Biden, with the American public, which by now did not understand the Afghan occupation due to the many deaths between American soldiers and the a lot of public money spent on this long adventure. American politicians have failed, even for their own lack of conviction, to convince the majority of the American population of the need to preside over a state, which in the hands of the Taliban, will become the base of various terrorist groups, which will have their own territory at their disposal for train new generations of terrorists, who will target the West. Underestimating this danger is very dangerous, but by now it will be better to think about adequate countermeasures to contain what threatens to become one of the next most serious emergencies. In this regard, the presence of allies not exactly loyal such as Pakistan must be assessed within the question: relations with the Pakistani government’s Taliban are certain, just as the involvement with Al Qaeda is certain, the terrorist formation that is predicted will have the greatest benefits from the return of the Taliban to power. Some analysts have talked about Biden’s tactic to leave the management of the problem to China: there are no official confirmations or denials, but this thesis appears unlikely, first of all because Beijing’s dogma in foreign policy remains that of not meddling in internal matters. then there are unequivocal signs, which, on the contrary, would demonstrate how China is ready to exploit the American disengagement in its own favor. The first is the historical link with Pakistan, born in an anti-Indian function, according to the Taliban, although they are Sunni Muslims, they have never condemned the persecutions of Beijing against the Uyghurs, the Chinese Muslims. China can, with Pakistani help, offer its technology to a backward country in exchange for a regional peace and the concession to enter Afghan territory with the agreement of mutual non-aggression, plus the prestige resulting from the replacement. of the Americans is considered a matter of prestige for the Chinese, who could also export their political system, more easily into a dictatorship, albeit a religious one. Russia’s attitude will also have to be followed: Moscow is one of the few capitals that does not intend to close its diplomatic representations, precisely to establish friendly ties with the Taliban, considered potential allies against the US. So both China and Russia would like to fill the void left by Washington, precisely in an anti-American function; however the behavior of the Taliban is never linear: at this stage they need foreign resources and international recognition, which certainly cannot come from the West, but once their power is able to settle, the attitude towards potential new allies could undergo variations deriving from their fundamentalist religious vision. The most immediate problem, however, is of a humanitarian nature: the population is going to the end and the threat of famine and very serious health situations is almost a certainty, while the refugee issue represents a further threat to the stability of Europe, which will soon will have to face a mass of refugees among the member states of Brussels, which threatens to trigger new tensions on matters of common competence, but rejected by some states: a problem, which linked to the new terrorist threat can lead to a state of serious crisis in the within the Union.

The difficulty, already accentuated by the respective positions in the geopolitical and commercial fields, between the US and China, risks a dangerous worsening due to the concerns expressed by Washington for the nuclear proliferation carried out by Beijing, in the context of the strengthening of the nuclear weapons of the army Chinese. China’s great power aspirations, according to the Communist president and government, can also materialize through the increase of the nuclear arsenal, which has become central to the country’s military tactical policy. American analysts have identified the construction of a series of silos for the launch of nuclear warheads, located in various Chinese regions. Currently, Beijing’s nuclear warheads would be estimated at about 350 units, a quantity still much lower than the availability of countries such as the United States and Russia, in particular Washington would be in possession of about 4,000 warheads, equal to 90% of all nuclear weapons present on the planet; however, according to the Pentagon, the Chinese increase would be considerable, given that until a year earlier there were 200 Chinese heads: an increase, therefore, of 150 units in 365 days. One aspect that worries the American Congress is the way in which China is secretly proceeding with its nuclear weapons development plan, a matter that Beijing considers strategic for being able to compete globally, especially with the US, but also with regional adversaries such as the ‘India. This situation, which places China at the center of international political attention, comes at a time when Moscow and Washington are preparing to meet for negotiations on how to avoid a new run-up to nuclear weapons. If, to the already present difficulties among the major nuclear powers to find a solution to the non-proliferation of atomic weapons, we add the growing Chinese activism, we can understand how the future situation is potentially very dangerous. In the presence of a third actor that increases its arsenal beyond any rule, both the US and Russia could feel free of constraints and develop new weapons. The Chinese tactic is now predictable, the accusations against the US are now a boring repetition: that of seeing an imaginary enemy to divert attention from its internal problems. China says it is open to bilateral talks on the issue of strategic security on condition that they are held on an equal footing and this appears impossible given the great imbalance of the nuclear arsenals in Washington’s favor. If the US sees a real potential danger, the individual Chinese reasons, observed by a neutral observer, appear justified by the desire to recover at least part of the lost ground on nuclear weapons; reversing the view it is legitimate to ask how the United States, but also Russia (always ahead of China), would respond to a request from Beijing to reduce its arsenal. The question is that we have come out of a logic of general reduction of nuclear warheads, because these weapons, in this historical moment, represent again, as during the Cold War, a psychological deterrent for a balance, but of much more difficult management in a world no longer bipolar but multipolar, even if characterized by two main powers, in any case surrounded by regional powers of great strategic importance. The real challenge would be to include China in global talks on the issue of disarmament, but not as a supporting actor, but with the right dignity of a great power that Beijing desires at the political level; this certainly will not solve the problem of proliferation but could allow the start of a dialogue on this issue, also with the aim of improving the respective relations. Seen from the Western point of view, Chinese nuclear proliferation cannot fail to be a highly worrying factor, given that it is still a country governed by a dictatorship and which through the soft power exercised in other areas of the world has shown a willingness to export its own political model; certainly this cannot work with the West and the suspicion that behind the increase of its military arsenal there is the intention to exert pressure is almost a certainty. But for this very reason it is important to avoid any possible drift and further worsening of relations: otherwise the risk of tense situations will be more and more likely.

Today records a positive change in relations between the two Koreas: in fact, the borders have been opened again, closed for thirteen months with a unilateral decision by North Korea, in retaliation against what had been judged, by Pyongyang, propaganda activities of Seoul anti North Koreans. Diplomatic activities continued thanks to the personal commitment of the two leaders, who have had an epistolary relationship since April, precisely to improve the ties of their respective countries. The first tangible development in the improvement of relations between North and South Korea was identified in the reopening of cross-border communications between the two countries. If we look at the normal attitude of Pyongyang, marked by mistrust and closure, the result appears very significant, even if it could hide difficulties on the part of the North Korean regime, which accuses the negative effects of the pandemic, especially for health and hygiene aspects and for the difficulty in procuring sufficient food needs for their own population. From the official point of view of the North Koreans, particular emphasis has been given to resuming contacts, the North Korean news agency talks about progress made by the two sides for the recovery of mutual trust, providing a clear certificate in Seoul, also certified from the sure positive effects that the resumption of relations will have on the improvement of relations and on the expectations of both populations of the resumption of Korean ties. The diplomatic work concerned, in particular, the search for the progress of reconciliation to be able to foster trust between the two parties and put relations between the two states at the center. Also on the South Korean side it was underlined how the process of detente was followed in person by the two leaders, thanks to a close exchange of letters, which took place on several occasions; this public appreciation by Seoul appears as significant as that of Pyongyang, it should be remembered that North Korea blew up the liaison office in June last year, cutting off border relations and this aroused much outrage in South Korea This interruption of relations blocked a diplomatic activity initiated since 2018 between President Moon and Kim Jong-un, who had three meetings that allowed the achievement, among other things, of the decrease in military tensions. These latest developments are considered favorably by analysts for the creation of a detente, if not permanent, at least lasting between the two countries: the commitment of Seoul should favor collaboration between the two parties and also the attitude of the White House seems oriented towards favor this process as much as possible, with a view to making a decisive contribution to regional stability. Already a summit between Moon and Biden, which was held in Washington in May, confirmed the will of the USA and South Korea to maintain the agreements between the two Koreas and the United States, just as a tangible sign to foster dialogue with North Korea. It should be remembered that Pyongyang had withdrawn from the US after the failure of Trump’s attempt to reach an agreement with Kim Jong-un. Despite the good news that these developments provide, it is useless not to hide at least a small dose of mistrust towards North Korea, which is certainly worthwhile, like South Korea, to find a climate of relaxation with the neighboring country, also from the point of view economic, but the current state of need in Pyongyang should certainly not be underestimated, which at this moment sees its economy prostrate and in great difficulty, so much so that there are considerable suspicions of the presence of famines in the peripheral areas of the country and also the future prospects they leave no room for any improvement. The Chinese role has yet to be fully evaluated: it could be the inspiration for the current North Korean will, a sort of role that the US has played with Seoul; for Beijing, as for Washington, there is no interest that Pyongyang alters the fragile regional equilibrium and could skimp on aid precisely to favor an almost obligatory pacification for North Korea with South Korea. Limiting personalistic, individual and outside the box it is a common interest of the two opposing powers, who prefer a reciprocal confrontation, without external influences, often not controllable.