The agreement signed by the United States, Great Britain and Australia for the sharing of advanced skills on issues relating to nuclear weapons, cyber security, the use of submarines at great distances and artificial intelligence, all matters closely linked to the military sector , indicates the geographical direction and strategic intentions, which Washington intends to favor in the near future; what is reiterated is the centrality of the Pacific Ocean region, where the main intent is to counter and contain the ambition of Beijing, which considers the region as an area of its own influence. Not that Biden’s is a novelty in US foreign policy: Obama, of which Biden was vice president, had already started this policy, moving the American interest area from Europe to Asia, Trump, despite his contradictions , has carried out this strategy and now Biden confirms it, leaving central the question of the domination of the naval routes, but not only, of the Pacific. Certainly the increase in relevance and in the level of confrontation, both commercial and geopolitical, with China, obliges the USA to concentrate the greatest effort on this game, involving, however, other international subjects, who are faithful allies and have direct interests. in the region, Australia, or the need to find new financial solutions, as well as political ones, due to the exit from Europe. Not involving the European Union, but only two countries that have a lower international specific weight, compared to Brussels, may mean that, currently, the White House may prefer a more unbalanced relationship in its favor; after all, American politics, despite the premises of this president, has in fact maintained the distance with Europe almost as in the days of Trump and the unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan was yet another proof of this. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the Asian country, considered a non-strategic objective for the US, will allow Washington to reallocate new financial resources precisely for the direct challenge with China. Beijing is expanding in an overwhelming manner also in Africa and South America, but the US focuses its attention in the Pacific areas, perhaps also in order not to repeat the mistakes of expanding the areas of action too much, where Chinese military power is shown with greater arrogance. In this perspective, the involvement of India, a natural Chinese opponent, in the presidium of the Pacific also reopens disturbing scenarios on the consequences of these international arrangements. US policy on military alliances also involves the war industry, causing havoc within the alliance with Europe and in particular with France: the agreement with Australia provides for the supply of nuclear submarines to the state of Oceania , which has an ongoing contract with Paris on this front; due to the slowdown in supply, Washington has entered the trade relationship and could nullify the French supply. It is understandable that Europe is treated as a secondary ally, a process initiated by Trump irritated by the low economic contribution and the willingness of Brussels to prefer its own war industry, to the detriment of the American one. For the European Union, these are unequivocal signals and the European Commission is doing well to seek its own military autonomy, equipping itself with a first rapid intervention force, the first piece of a possible supranational army. The agreement with London and Canberra therefore involves much more than the geostrategic aspects of the Pacific, which seem to be valid as such only for Australia, but concerns the very vision of the Atlantic Alliance, increasingly reduced to a marginal organization precisely because of will of Washington. The perception is that the United States chooses an increasingly less shared approach to the management of foreign policy on the subject of relations with China, which currently represents the apex of the international scenario; however, by involving Europe and the Atlantic Alliance itself, it denounces a basic weakness, which only confirms the possibility of new tactical errors on the part of Washington. If one wants to maintain international leadership, one cannot privilege a single place of confrontation, but at least preside over the most important areas, an action that China tries to do, sometimes taking the place of the Americans. The game is global and must be conducted as such, otherwise the fragmentation of the West will only be an advantage for Beijing.