Categoria: English version

In the first six months of this year, asylum applications to the twenty-seven countries of the European Union, added to Norway and Switzerland, reached the figure of 519,000 applications, marking an increase of more than 28%, compared to the reference period of the last year. Of these requests, 30% concern Germany, 17% Spain and 16% France. With these data, the figure of over one million requests could tend to be reached, a number similar to the record figure of 2016. 13% of asylum requests come from Syria, equal to about 67,000 people, with an increase compared to the same period last year, by 47%. The causes of this real migration are to be found in the worsening of the civil war, which caused the worsening of economic conditions and the hostility of the Turks, who in past years had absorbed a large part of the emigration from Damascus, against the Syrian population. The migratory route most followed by Syrian citizens is the Balkan one and this affects the nations that collect asylum requests, such as Bulgaria, with 6%, and Austria, with 10%, even if these destinations increasingly represent transit solutions to Germany, which has a percentage of requests of 62%, thanks to the roots of the Syrian community, favored in previous years by Chancellor Merkel. Immediately after Syria, the second country for asylum applications is Afghanistan, with 55,000 applications; despite being a migratory basin that has always ensured substantial quotas of migrants, the US decision to abandon the country has favored the return of the Taliban, who, once in power, have considerably reduced human rights and practiced a disastrous economic policy, which it has aggravated an already difficult situation, forcing the country to rely almost exclusively on international humanitarian aid. While the origin of migrants from African and Asian areas does not come as a surprise, there is an increase in requests from areas of Latin America, such as Venezuela and Colombia, which together reach 13% of the requests, in their totality practically directed towards Spain, thus explaining Madrid’s second European position in the ranking of asylum requests. These very worrying data are recorded shortly after the closure of the pact on immigration and less than a year after the European elections. The now customary resistance of Poland and Hungary to the distribution of migrants aggravate the internal situation of the European Union and highlight the lack of effectiveness and foresight of policies to regulate the inflows. The June agreement between EU foreign ministers provided for a sort of tax, in the amount of 20,000 euros per person per year, for those countries that refuse to contribute to the distribution of migrants and was conditioned by the vote against of Budapest and Warsaw; in Poland, in October, a referendum will be held on the issue of welcoming migrants, called by the right-wing government in office. Once again Brussels presents itself with internal divisions and without sanctions capable of dividing the migratory load, presenting itself to world public opinion as weak and easily blackmailed by anti-Western dictatorships, which use the migration issue as a real weapon of pressure for the ‘Europe. This state of things determines, in a period where Western cohesion is increasingly necessary, a vulnerable side to the detriment not only of the Union, but also of the Atlantic Alliance. Agreements such as the one between the European Union and Tunisia, in addition to being ineffective, are signed with dictatorial regimes, which take advantage of the individual weakness, in this case of Italy, and the global weakness of an institution that cannot be united and which allows the prevailing of national rather than supranational interests. The Italian case, a real southern border of Europe, clarifies the situation even more: 65,000 arrivals equal to 140%, if compared with the same period in 2022, yet Rome receives very little aid from the members of the Union, worried about safeguard their own individual situations. Until this logic is overcome, with an increasingly serious situation, due to wars, famines and climatic emergencies, Europe and the West will always be under blackmail.

The next G20 summit, which will be held in New Delhi, India, registers, even before starting, a very important absence, that of Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is the first time that this has happened because, for Beijing, the G20 meetings have always been considered as important occasions to present a modern image capable of representing the only alternative to US hegemony and, precisely for this reason, the presence of the highest Chinese authority was considered essential for the participation of the People’s Republic. Many speculations and hypotheses have already been made about this absence, which, however, do not fully explain the reasons for such a significant absence. Some experts have provided the explanation that the Chinese president, with his absence, wanted to devalue the institution of the G20, seen as a Western emanation, to get closer, also from a diplomatic point of view, to the emerging economies of the southern hemisphere and to even more relations with Russia. This explanation, however, appears to be in contrast with the Chinese needs to maintain commercial relations with the richest areas of the planet: Europe and the United States, despite significant differences of views. If it is true that Chinese expansion is developing in Africa, Beijing cannot give up the outlet of its goods towards the most profitable markets, especially in a phase, such as the current one, where the contraction of the internal economy generates compensation needs, that can only be found in the richest markets. Even the question of relations with Russia, which undoubtedly exists, must be framed in a diplomatic context, which serves to balance geopolitical relations on a global level with the West, in a non-symmetrical framework, however, with Moscow, which appears to be the weak partner of the alliance. The most correct answer to Xi Jinping’s absence must instead be sought, in the relations between China and India, in a historical moment where Beijing feels its historical enemy approaching where the overtaking of the population and the expedition to the Moon represent only the cases more recent than the comparison. The absence of the highest Chinese office is intended to diminish the relevance of the Indian G20 and deprive it of any possible visibility that could highlight it, such as the meeting with President Biden, who had to compare their respective positions on commercial and geopolitical relations and which will probably be postponed in November to San Francisco, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. It should also be remembered that the top officials of China and India recently met in South Africa at the BRICS summit and that at the time the meeting with Narendra Modi had not been boycotted, precisely because it was in neutral territory. On the other hand, the Indian president was hoping to obtain a great advantage in terms of international image, precisely because of organizing the G20 and the absence of Xi Jinping, potentially, can invalidate a good part of these expected consensuses. It must also be added that, precisely in the South African meeting, the tensions between the two personalities were exacerbated due to the age-old issue of borders in the Himalayan area. Despite these strategic reasons, China cannot completely snub the G20 summit, also to accurately preside over the meeting, which will focus on issues of primary importance: thus it will be Li Qiang, number two of the regime, who will represent Beijing; this choice is meant to be an unequivocal signal, both for the West and for India itself, with which Beijing intends to demonstrate that it still wants to be at the center of the discussions that will be the center of the summit.

Viktor Orban made an ideological speech, which places him more as a potential ally of Putin, than an actual member of the European Union, after all his electoral program, which allowed him to win, was focused on the opposition of the European Union, of which, however, Hungary enjoys robust contributions. The lack of coherence of the Magyar politician seems to coincide with the majority of his fellow citizens, who exploit the absurd regulation of the Union of the approval of measures on the basis of unanimity and not of the majority. Orban prophesied predicting the dissolution of the European Union and the fall of the USA; if the second seems like a wish, for the first the solution would be easy: do like Great Britain and get out of Brussels. However, this eventuality does not fall within Orban’s plans, who, perhaps, has given himself the political task of facilitating the dissolution from within, with his absurd behavior totally contrary to the founding values of the European Union. For Orban, the West is a collection of rich but weak states, which have no intention of facing competition with world powers. If, from a certain point of view, this statement has parts of the truth, it seems equally true that characters such as the Hungarian politician contribute not a little to a common vision, which can raise the qualitative level of Brussels against the major world powers, in fact Orban’s vision defines Europe as a sort of economic, political and cultural ghetto with a future of decadence without any hope, despite high consumption, which will lead it to a destiny of desolation. The juxtaposition with the forecast of the International Monetary Fund, which provides for the exit from the top ten economies in the world and the passage of Germany from fourth to tenth by 2030, with the supposed degradation of the Union, summarized in the values: migration, LGBT and war, appears an unfortunate rhetoric, which goes against world trends and a low-level replica of what is said in the Russian places of power; even the persecutory attitude, implemented with the opposition to the entry into the Atlantic Alliance of Sweden and Finland, carried forward only because the two countries contested the populist drift of Orban’s government, well frames the low political value of the character. The aversion to the United States, seems to replicate Putin’s reasons, the alleged loss of Washington’s position as world leader towards China, could risk bringing the world into conflict, without remembering that his friend from Moscow is putting world peace in much greater danger. The Hungarian position is the only one in Europe to be correct, because it rejects hedonistic values and does not intend to proceed with the replacement of the population with immigrants who reject Christian values; not only that, he reserves increasingly insistent criticisms of Romania, because more than 600,000 Magyar-speaking people faithful to traditions reside in Transylvania, covertly threatening another country’s right to this territory. There is enough for the leaders of the Union to intervene, as they should have done a long time ago, in a harsh manner against this character and the majority of the country, which, despite everything, supports him. It is not possible to allow politicians who do not share the principles on which the Union is based to allow such arrogance, which follows the denial of democratic rules in their own country, with the introduction of censorship and the denial of the judiciary to exercise its function autonomously. It also seems useless to recall how Budapest, together with other countries of the former Soviet bloc, has rejected the principle of mutuality and solidarity in the division of migrants and has been in total disagreement with the European policies approved by the majority of states. Such a presence constitutes a brake on common political action and automatic and immediate solutions must be envisaged, which can sanction from the pecuniary penalty of funding, up to suspension and even expulsion from the European assembly. The current challenges must be faced on the basis of the founding ideals of the Union, without allowing these to be altered by contrary and retrograde visions, if all the members cannot be kept together it is better that those who do not share the common political action are removed.

Poland’s military deployment on the Belarusian border unnerved Putin, who threatened Warsaw, even quoting Stalin; for the head of the Kremlin, the threat to Poland is due to the fact that the Belarusian country forms the supranational alliance between Russia and Belarus with Moscow. The Polish military deployment is seen as a tangible threat to the very existence of Belarus, because it is operated by a country of the Atlantic Alliance. The reason for the fear of Warsaw lies in the presence in the Minsk area of the Wagner private militia, who after the failed coup d’état, took refuge in Lukashenko’s country with his authorization. An unfortunate joke by the Belarusian dictator, about the possibility of crossing the border with Poland, has triggered a very high state of tension, which brings ever closer the possibility of a clash between the Atlantic Alliance, of which Poland is a part, and Russia, of which, in fact, Belarus is more a vassal state than an ally. Of course, Putin specified that an attack on Minsk would be equivalent to an attack on Moscow. The Russian president also hypothesizes a joint dispatch of Polish and Lithuanian soldiers within Ukrainian territory, in the Lviv area. According to Putin, the intention of the two ex-Soviet countries that have become adversaries would not be to lend aid to the Ukrainians, but to deprive them of territory: this is, evidently, an attempt to bring disorder to the coalition that supports Kiev with information capable of destabilizing relations between the three governments. In reality, these statements have no international credit and are rather aimed at Russian public opinion, in an extreme attempt to revitalize the popularity of the population towards the special military operation, which seems to be receiving less and less consensus. Always identifying new enemies and giving particular prominence, even by distorting history, with narratives constructed for one’s own use and consumption, reveals that the isolation of Moscow is increasingly tangible even within the walls of the Kremlin. The emphasis that is given to the next visit of Lukashenko, certainly not a leading international actor, but a character dominated by Putin, constitutes further information on how Russia accuses its international solitude and tries to circumvent it, exploiting every slightest opportunity. From a military point of view, however, it is a fact that Warsaw’s decision, however legitimate, because it was made within its own borders, constitutes an aggravation of the situation, due to the concrete possibility of an expansion of the conflict, both in terms of the number and entity of the actors involved, and also due to the enlargement of the territory involved. A development of the war in the northern part of the Ukrainian country, the one on the border with Belarus, could ease the pressure of Kiev on the Russian army, which is struggling to contain the breakthrough of Zelensky’s army in the areas occupied by the Red Army. Now an expansion of the conflict in those areas could also involve the border with Poland, while the possibilities of an expansion towards the borders of Lithuania and Estonia are more remote. The Western fear is that this is a strategy that Putin intends to adopt, using his Belarusian ally and the Wagner militia, currently engaged only in training the soldiers of Minsk, but which could rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Kremlin, becoming the protagonist of actions against Ukraine led by Belarus. A possible scenario, from which Ukraine could hardly emerge victorious; however, in this possible scheme, the weak point is precisely the proximity of Poland, which could not tolerate the presence of invaders within the regions of Ukraine close to Polish territories near its borders. Herein lies the dilemma, what will be Putin’s willingness to carry out such a risky plan as to oblige the Atlantic Alliance to be directly involved in the conflict. It is a hypothesis that risks being ever closer and leading to the outbreak of the third world war, with all the imaginable consequences. For now, the USA is silent, but to prevent the conflict from advancing westward, it will be necessary to maintain the greatest possible balance in a scenario that is certainly not easy, where the guide must be that a world war cannot be beneficial to any actor involved.

Historically, relations between Japan and South Korea have been difficult due to the issues that occurred with Japan’s occupation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945 and the enslavement of more than 800,000 Koreans as forced laborers in Tokyo factories. and forcing at least 200,000 women to become sexually abused on behalf of Japanese occupation soldiers; moreover there have been disputes over some islets, controlled by Seoul after the defeat of the empire of the rising sun. The Korean Supreme Court brought these issues back to the fore when it ruled in 2018 that the Japanese companies involved should compensate Korean people who are victims of slavery, which resulted in Tokyo’s restrictions on imports of Korean products, which undermined relations between the two states until the dialogue is blocked. One of the points of Shinzo Abe’s program was to change the pacifist constitution, as a first step towards an approach that could allow China to be contained, in this perspective also the relationship with South Korea had to become collaborative, both from the point of diplomatic point of view, and from the economic one, precisely to fight Beijing also on the production level. Abe’s work was only started, but which, for relations between the two countries, was fundamental and which, in the current scenario, allowed the start of a reconciliation between the two nations. In this context, the first official visit of a Japanese head of government, since 2011, to South Korean soil takes place. Of course, the threat from Pyongyang is the primary urgency of the discussions, because the atomic threat has not been defused, but other topics will be on the table at the meeting. To further facilitate the resumption of contacts, the Tokyo government has planned a project to compensate enslaved workers, as requested by the Korean Supreme Court and this has determined the new judgment of Seoul, which has defined the Japanese state from a militaristic aggressor to a partner who shares universal values from south korean country. This increasingly relaxed atmosphere had already favored the visit of the president of Seoul to Japan, which took place last March and after twelve years of absence. The normalization of diplomatic relations has made it possible to address issues of common development such as defence, the economy and finance. At the moment, what worries the two executives the most is mutual security, given the threat of North Korea’s growing ballistic and nuclear capability, but also the attitude of Moscow and the expansionism of China, which has made large investments in military sector to strengthen its war apparatus. Behind this rapprochement, as well as the reasons already stated, there is the diplomatic action of Washington, which has for some time placed the contrast to China for the supremacy of the eastern seas at the center of its international interest, both for Japan and Korea South, the USA represents the major ally, but the distance between Seoul and Tokyo has not so far allowed a synergy to develop a closer trilateral relationship, especially against the more immediate threat represented by Pyongyang; but also the developments of the Ukrainian war, with Russia openly against the Western bloc, is a serious cause for concern, considering Moscow’s progressive rapprochement with Beijing. If North Korea is the closest threat, the real bogeyman are Chinese ambitions, which with a potential action against Taiwan would jeopardize the already fragile regional balances, risking dragging the two countries into a conflict; beyond these concrete threats, the general attitude of Beijing, increasingly determined to establish a zone of influence under its control, must be the decisive argument for putting aside the distances between the two countries and convincing them to establish ever closer relations to unify efforts to safeguard their mutual safety. From China’s point of view, the resumption of dialogue between the two countries will not be seen in a positive way, because it favored its policy in the area, even if indirectly, on the contrary now, Beijing will also have to deal with the synergy with the United States and it will certainly not be welcome: this could cause displays of force in the eastern seas, raising the level of guard in a region repeatedly in the balance due to possible incidents between the armed forces of countries with opposing interests.

Chinese activism regarding the conflict between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates how Beijing is interested in being recognized as a protagonist in the affair, officially in the name of reconciliation between the parties. In reality, the Chinese peace plan is not made to be taken seriously by both opposing parties and is therefore a strategy which hides other objectives behind the desire to represent a peacemaking action. Certainly there is also the will to be an active part in a possible halt to hostilities, the certification of an active role in the search for peace, but this is only the outward appearance, which hides a well thought-out plan, which falls within the opposition with the USA and with the West, more generally. The reasons are different and the attempt to identify them can only represent a simple conjecture, however, there are several concrete facts that can support these theories. The need to create a greater selection of the polarization of the confrontation, to avoid the current multipolar situation on the international scene, prompted Beijing to plan to make Moscow in a situation of vassalage of China, a task facilitated by Russia’s need to break the isolation, political and economic, in which it finds itself. The Chinese action could serve to allow the Kremlin to buy time for its own reorganization, above all military, a factor to be paid dearly, with a sort of undeclared submission to Chinese wishes. This fact would allow China to expand its zone of global influence with a partner equipped with atomic strength: a significant deterrent in the future of relations with Washington. If this factor is of an international order, there is perhaps a more worrying one of an internal order, for China, constituted by the question of Taiwan. The Chinese ambiguity on Ukraine, despite the disaster for Beijing’s exports and the worsening of the world economy, is due precisely to the precedent of the current conflict undertaken by Moscow to regain territories that it has always considered part of its nation. Beyond some impromptu and extremist utterances by Chinese officials on the legitimacy of the Russian action, President Xi Jinping has tried to officially maintain a cautious attitude on the conflict, while not liking the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance up to the Moscow border, but he has repeatedly warned that the question of Taiwan cannot be treated in the same way by the West, because the island of Formosa is considered an integral part of Chinese territory, despite having never been part of the People’s Republic of China; at the same time he has intensified military exercises and trials of strength, as real threats, against Taipei and against any Western ambitions. The Atlantic Alliance took action by responding with the presence of ships, as well as American, also French, English and Italian, but it is understood that this purely military strategy is not sufficient if not supported by a much stronger political action. Despite all the risks that this may involve, the time has come to officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and to open diplomatic representations with it, not only as a tool for establishing official and concrete relations, but as a defense against all possible forms of violence against Taipei. Surely if this possibility were to occur, China would protest very heavily and increase its policy in favor of Russia, to threaten the West, but it could not go too far in retaliating, because Beijing’s main concern, above all others, is economic growth which is used as a tool to avoid drifts against the government of the country and to keep dissent at a very low level. Losing the richest markets on the planet would be a backlash capable of putting the regime in difficulty, much more serious than failing to annex Taiwan; certainly the recognition of Taiwan could create diplomatic problems with China, but if it is carried out en bloc by the whole European Union, together with the USA, the United Kingdom and other Western members, such as Australia and Japan, for the People’s Republic of China it will be very difficult to counter diplomatically and also military mobility and, consequently, the threats to Taiwan should be reduced and Chinese ambitions could end. Conversely, such a move could accelerate and unleash a military escalation against Taipei, but in that case the Chinese economy would effectively remain isolated immediately, with no longer the possibility of seeing its gross domestic product grow to the figures necessary to continue to contain dissent .

The visit of the Secretary of the Atlantic Alliance to Kiev immediately assumed considerable importance, both for the fact itself and for the reassurances, even if not immediate, that the place of the Ukrainian country will be to become a member of the Western coalition. The Ukrainian president seemed more focused on the problems of the present, asking the Atlantic Alliance for ever greater military support to allow his country to contain Russia and maintain its national unity. The Secretary General’s visit to Kiev provoked harsh reactions in Moscow, which recalled that one of the reasons for the conflict, indeed for the special military operation, is precisely to prevent the integration between Ukraine and NATO. The purpose of Stoltenberg’s visit was to reiterate support for Ukraine, in the face of world public opinion, both in the past, in the present and also in the future when there will be problems of reconstruction to be addressed, however behind the purpose official, there was a need to agree with Ukraine on full operability with the Alliance in terms of military standards and strategic doctrines, to replace Soviet technologies, which still formed the basis of Kiev’s military equipment; all to ensure a more effective response to Russian attacks. To make up for the shortages of its armaments, Ukraine received ex-Soviet materials from the Iron Curtain countries, which were better suited to Kiev’s armaments technology, but as the war progressed this was progressively replaced with armaments NATO, for which special training is required. If the contiguity between Ukraine and NATO is increasingly intense on the military field, the Ukrainian president has also claimed greater political involvement and has asked to be invited to the next Vilnius summit in July: something that was ratified precisely in Stoltenberg’s visit. Moscow experiences this integration with apprehension, but was almost completely responsible for it; now it is to be understood whether this accession will be able to cause a slowdown or an aggravation of the conflict: because it is one thing to threaten Kiev not to enter the Western area of influence and another thing to fight against a country increasingly within the Western sphere. This step removes a possible factor for interrupting hostilities, which was identified precisely in a sort of impartiality of Kiev, configuring the Ukrainian country as a sort of buffer nation between the West and Russia. With Stoltenberg’s visit this scenario seems to be, by now, without any possibility, even if the full entry into the Atlantic Alliance can only be postponed, to avoid a direct entry into the conflict of Western troops on Ukrainian soil. The fundamental fact, however, is that the future can only be that unless Moscow manages to win the war completely by conquering all of Ukraine, with no part excluded: something that does not seem possible given how the country has developed conflict. The future should therefore see NATO troops right on the border between Ukraine and Russia and not only on the borders with Moscow and the Baltic countries and Finland. It is understandable how Putin has already failed in any attempt to remove the Atlantic Alliance and therefore the USA and Europe from his own border line and how his greatest nightmare is materializing, the one to be averted by launching the military operation, which it is ruining the country economically and causing a large number of casualties among Russian soldiers. From this progressive rapprochement between Brussels and Kiev, Moscow emerges weakened both internally and externally, because the projects of its leader are all failing and even a crystallization that stops at the conquered territories implies Ukraine by now definitively entered and permanently in the western orbit, with all that will follow for the prestige of the Russian president.

The Chinese president’s visit to Moscow is presented by the Beijing media as a trip for peace; in reality this visit has only one value for the two countries involved. China seeks to gain credit as the only subject capable of producing an effort for peace and capable of breaking American hegemony in the international arena; for Russia it is yet another effort to get out of the isolation that the special military operation has caused. From the point of view of possible results, the chances are slim if not none of reaching peace with a sketchy and abstract plan like the Chinese one. The political relevance is represented by the fact that China and Russia appear ever closer, above all in an anti-American function, in the sense of wanting to create a multipolar alternative to Washington’s power; however, this alliance between Moscow and Beijing does not appear equal: Russia needs too much recognition as the main alternative country to the United States and is clearly subordinate to China from every point of view, political, military and, above all, economic. Putin has shown interest in the twelve points of the Chinese plan, declaring himself willing to negotiate; this availability, whose sincerity should be ascertained, hides a combined political calculation, which has, as its ultimate goal, the material aid of China in the form of military supplies. For the moment this does not appear to be happening, while it seems strongly certain that Beijing supplies complementary equipment (such as components and electronic boards), without which the Russian bombs could not function. The Chinese hesitations always remain those of compromising their market shares in the most profitable territories for their products: the USA and the European Union; however, China cannot miss the opportunity to undermine Washington, which it considers, in any case, the main adversary. The peace plan proposed by China, in this sense, represents a novelty because it derogates from the main rule of Chinese foreign policy: that of not interfering in the internal politics of other countries; in fact, if it is true that the pronouncement of respect for national sovereignty seems to move within the general rule, the non-recognition of the Russian invasion cannot fail to be read as an interference, even if not highlighted, precisely in a question of national sovereignty , both towards Ukraine and towards Russia itself; in short, Chinese balancing act cannot convince to an equidistance only announced between the conflicting parties, which is not found in the official document. The attempt is clumsy and also acts against Moscow, which is forced to sell its oil to Beijing at decidedly lower prices, for now receiving only international recognition in exchange and little else. China shows itself to be opportunistic, providing an exemplary lesson both to Western countries, fascinated by the Silk Road project, and to African ones, repeatedly exploited by Beijing’s expansionism. Reality shows a country that should not be trusted, which is also true for Russia, which has now become subordinate to the Asian country. The great suspicion, which goes beyond the contingent situation, is that the Chinese power system wants to continue with the project of affirming its political system as more capable than others, essentially democracy, in developing the economy and strengthening its state: arguments on which Putin and his nomenclature are, for now, certainly in agreement, while the prospect may be different when Beijing collects the credits with Moscow. From the Western point of view, the question will be to contain the alliance, because this is a trade, albeit unbalanced, between Russia and China: diplomatic pressure will have to be exerted on Beijing so that no arms are supplied to Moscow, to avoid increasing capabilities Russian wars and determine prolongations of the conflict; after all, Western and Chinese diplomacies can find common ground on this issue, because war is a block for their respective economies and for Beijing the aspect of economic growth remains central to its political scheme, at the same time for the West this blatant exposure of China, alongside Russia, must be a signal to undertake a work of containment of Beijing’s activism.

The function of the World Trade Organization no longer seems to benefit from that sharing between states, dictated by the need to encourage the process, which dates back to the nineties of the last century, of world globalization, understood as the will of the major economies to favor a complex of rules capable of guaranteeing free trade. It was a direct action against statist protections and the consequent desire to interrupt government aid to companies and the partial cancellation of customs policies, based on duties and taxes on goods and services from abroad. The revival of nationalisms, both political, military and, above all, economic, seems to have shelved the process of market liberalization, leaving only the worst parts of the effects of globalization: such as the compression of wages and the consequent increase in inequality, both on internal level, between the social classes, and on the international one, based on the profound difference in the wealth of nations. There are those who blame the politics of the United States, because of the Trump presidency, before, and that of Biden, now; however, the action of the USA arose from the behavior of China, which, in order to achieve the growth objectives it had set, based its economic action on a strong statist policy, characterized by a great authoritarianism, which could not be reconciled with the commercial structure built on democratic systems. It remains true that Biden, an internationalist by name, blocked the functioning of the World Trade Organization, preventing it from appointing officials to the WTO’s appellate body, which has precisely the function of adjudicating disputes. The central point is that the World Trade Organization can authorize the introduction of trade tariffs, only in the case of national security issues, but Washington contests this approach, arguing that this attribution belongs only to the White House, in the case of American sovereignty . One of the conditions for the functioning of the world trading system, which should be guaranteed by the WTO, is precisely the tacit agreement between states not to resort to the argument of national security, if this fails the entire system will have to be reworked. On the other hand, China’s institutional set-up does not allow for control such as the one that the WTO can exercise over democratic states, where the process of relations between the state and companies is completely visible, while in the Chinese state the mingling of public and private is less distinguishable and the subsidy system and protectionist practices are more difficult to ascertain. The American behavior, also condemned by Europe, is essentially a reaction to Beijing’s protectionist tendency, which, in fact, results in the paralysis of the World Trade Organization, unable to fulfill its role as arbiter; this causes a return to the past with international trade increasingly blocked by national tariffs and protection of international products. In practice, the evolution of international trade will meet a series of regional agreements, based on economic and political conveniences, with disputes regulated, no longer by a supranational actor, but by political and commercial negotiations, which will take place on the relative parts involved, without affecting the global scenario. Probably the ones that will be triggered will be unbalanced power relations in favor of actors with greater capabilities to the detriment of small countries: a scenario that indicates that more and more supranational bodies are needed, based on geographical criteria or even on reciprocal common interests, capable of balance the power of large subjects such as the USA or China or, even, the European Union. This will imply a political effort for the countries that are not included in these actors, aimed at promoting common actions under the aegis of already existing organizations, such as, for example, the Union of African States, strengthening their international value. The concrete risk is that these issues could cause new international tensions, going to increase the factors of global crisis, in a historical phase that is already heavily affected.

The welcome of the countries of the European Union, bestowed on the Ukrainian president, Zelensky, provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow, irritated by the treatment of a defense hero of the attacked nation. There are basically two aspects that annoy Putin: the first is the international significance that Zelensky’s visit to Europe made it possible to give to the Ukrainian question and its invasion, allowing the world to understand that Europe it supports Kiev in a practically compact manner, an aspect that is not very welcome in a Kremlin that is increasingly isolated on an international level; the second, much worse from a military point of view, was the promise of further military aid, which could go as far as fighter planes. The retaliation was a massive bombardment with cruise missiles fired from Russian ships stationed near the Crimea and eastern Ukrainian territories, occupied by Russian troops. Despite the communication from the head of the Ukrainian forces, no missiles have crossed Romania, a country belonging to the Atlantic Alliance, which has in any case been grazed by the passage of a carrier just 35 kilometers from its borders, causing the alert of NATO procedures. To be crossed by at least one Russian missile was the nation of Moldova, which is a candidate country to join the European Union. As usual, Putin threatens the Atlantic Alliance closely, coming close to the error capable of causing the conflict and invades the airspace of a nation not involved in the conflict. On the other hand, the Kremlin considers the supplies and training provided by Western countries to the Ukrainian armed forces an indirect participation in the conflict alongside Kiev. In addition to the capital Kiev, the bombings hit other important cities in the country, and had the dual purpose of destroying vital infrastructure, such as power plants and energy distribution networks, continuing the policy of aggravating the situation of civilians to generate from internally an opposition to the current Ukrainian government: a failed attempt and with little hope that it will achieve its goal. The massive use of missiles has forced the Ukrainian anti-aircraft to a high numerical quantity of anti-aircraft missiles, which has intercepted 70% of Russian missiles, but, at the same time, has emptied the arsenals, another factor has contributed to this: the interception of Iranian-made drones, which were 80% annihilated. The Russian strategy may be to weaken the enemy’s countermeasures in anticipation of the much feared spring attack. Precisely for this reason Zelensky’s trip was necessary to request urgent supplies of new weapons, for the West the defeat of Russia is necessary to limit the head of the Kremlin and bring him to any negotiations in an unfavorable position. However, it remains among the possibilities that the confrontation between the West and Russia could become direct, above all, if Moscow fails in its intentions and will be forced to use short-range atomic weapons, thus determining the response of the United States and the his allies.