Categoria: English version

The possibility of the resumption of negotiations on Iranian nuclear power enters a decisive phase thanks to a series of preliminary meetings which took place indirectly between the representatives of Washington and Tehran following diplomatic pressure exerted by both the two sides and the European Union. The goal is to restore the document signed during the Obama presidency and unilaterally canceled by Trump, but without the consent of the other signatories. For the US and the other signatories it is important that Iran respects the nuclear deal and for Iran it is essential that the United States lift the sanctions and allow the Persian economy to restart. If materially the meeting between the two delegations did not take place, the commitment of European diplomacy has concretely allowed remote dialogue. The current situation is to be ascribed to Trump’s erroneous strategy, which, by withdrawing from the treaty, favored the conditions for Iran’s return to uranium enrichment and, at the same time, created the conditions for Tehran to deem it groundless to sit at a table with the US, without Washington withdrawing the sanctions. From a political point of view, Iran’s position would be unexceptionable were it not that it too substantially withdrew from the agreement by enriching uranium. The current situation is stalemate: Biden wants the agreement back, but will not withdraw the sanctions until a new Iranian fulfillment, vice versa Tehran first demands the withdrawal of the sanctions to sit back at the table with the US and then get to ensure the ‘ interruption of uranium enrichment processes. This blockade situation could be removed by a demonstration of goodwill by the Americans, as the American spokesman also stated, who considers it necessary to stop the sanctions in order to restart the negotiations; words received positively in Iran, which suggest a positive solution. The latest preliminary meetings have resulted in the establishment of two working groups that will respectively regard the methods to interrupt the American sanctions and the path to restore the conditions of the agreement in the Iranian country. Washington, while preparing itself favorably for the development of the situation, maintains a low profile in the face of the possibility of a success of the negotiation, given that the time frame for the restoration of the agreement does not seem to be short. The US refuses the logic of first proceeding with the sanctions block to arrive at the consequent Iranian action, rather they prefer a synchronous modality with Tehran in the joint renunciation of the current conditions. For this purpose it is important that the two parties establish a procedure marked with certain times in the various steps, even if it is difficult to foresee a certain timeframe to reach the end of the process. The common goal of Washington and Brussels is to arrive at a solution before the Iranian elections in June, so that even a government of a different direction from the current one finds a situation already defined, however, several analysts believe it is highly unlikely to conclude the process by the date. election and this could cause a new start of negotiations with new interpreters and conditions. For the White House it is important to avoid a rapprochement of Tehran with Beijing, also caused by the common interest of weakening the dominance of the American currency in the world, a factor that has been at the basis of the success of the American sanctions, not only against Iran but also against other international entities. This argument, however, can be the basis of a project with a medium or long term, in the immediate future it is not feasible and the needs of the short term for Iran are to revitalize its economy, which is suffering, beyond the sanctions , the bad domestic and international economic situation and the effects of the pandemic. These practical reasons could be the decisive factor in giving an even greater impetus to the negotiations and resolving a situation for Washington that can divert American attention and resources to allocate them to scenarios considered more decisive, such as that of Southeast Asia, while for stability regional Iran without nuclear weapons would also mean the lack of proliferation by Saudi Arabia and a more cautious attitude by Israel.

At a time when relations between the European Union and the United States with Russia are at a very low point, an old cause of friction is adding as a factor of aggravation of the crisis. Not that on the Ukrainian conflict there were particular illusions of a resolution convenient to all the parties involved, but the stalemate allowed us to believe that this conflict remained in a latent situation so as not to contribute to increasing the conflicts. On the contrary, the resumption of fighting over the last two weeks has seen an intensification such as to be defined as the worst in recent months. So after seven years of fighting and about 14.00 victims, according to the tragic statistics of the United Nations, the question is still far from a resolution and the movements of Russian troops near the border with Ukraine and the strengthening of the military presence of Kiev along the eastern frontier, indicate that a peaceful definition appears increasingly remote. Moscow, to justify its provocations, uses the usual predictable tactic, which consists in accusing the Ukrainian country of carrying out provocations along the border line to which it is necessary to respond with a military deployment to protect Russia; now it must be remembered that Moscow has always denied its participation in the conflict in the Donbass, where effective without uniforms, but attributable to the Russian army, acted ambiguously that well describes Putin’s operating methods and that is part of the disinformation system justify the behavior towards Ukraine. But if the most immediate recipient of the Kremlin’s threats is Kiev, the message is also addressed to Brussels and Washington, which, within the Atlantic Alliance, frame Ukraine as a geostrategic frontier for the containment of the former Soviet country. It must be considered that after the change in the White House, the American administration is more compact in considering Russia as an opponent and less well disposed than when Trump was president, Biden in fact immediately showed his adversity to Putin, bringing the level back up. of the verbal confrontation. It is no mystery that Moscow would have preferred Trump’s continuity over the current situation and a possible explanation of some analysts for Russian behavior in Ukraine is that Moscow has no real intention of forcing the situation, as much as that of carrying out a showdown. with the aim of verifying the American reaction. This interpretation does not seem risky because it responds to the logic of the provocation to which the Kremlin has accustomed several times, understood as an instrumental means to be exercised in foreign policy. A further reading of Moscow’s behavior is that of exerting, through threats against Ukraine, pressure on Kiev’s western allies to obtain political concessions that can ease the sanctions to which Russia is subjected for the annexation of Crimea. At present, both the US and the European Union have assured their support for Ukraine, but from a military point of view, without a concrete commitment, which must go beyond the political one, Kiev would be destined to succumb in the face of supremacy. Russian and it is difficult to hypothesize the presence of American and European forces alongside the Ukrainian soldiers; Moscow certainly knows that it would have an immediate result in the event of an attack against Ukraine, but in the medium and long term it would face international isolation and sanctions so harsh as to put the Russian country in great difficulty. An attitude that is always on the edge of provocation is more credible, but for this reason it is potentially very dangerous because it can degenerate even in the most trivial accident. It must also be analyzed that this Russian activism takes place at a time when the level of relations between Moscow and the West are particularly low and destined, at the moment, to be increasingly deteriorated, which may hide the Kremlin’s fear of ever-present involvement. greater than Ukraine in the western camp, which would have the main effect of having the troops of the Atlantic Alliance directly on the Russian border. This eventuality can be a solution to make the Russians retreat but also to exasperate them in a dangerous way: it must be remembered that the first objective of Moscow is to keep Ukraine within its area of ​​influence, but, if this were not possible , at least prevent it from joining the Atlantic Alliance. Diplomacy can support this Russian objective if Moscow withdraws its military, real or hidden, from areas under Ukrainian sovereignty and begins to respect international law: this will be the first starting point for the resumption of dialogue.

The question of the independence of the Polish judiciary officially becomes a matter of dispute between Brussels and Warsaw; in fact, the European Commission has referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with the aim of protecting the independence of the judges of the Polish nation. The central argument of the dispute is the law that entered into force in Poland on February 14, 2020, which, according to the European Commission, appears to be incompatible with the primacy of EU law, because it affects the necessary independence of judges from the executive . A particular aggravating factor of the legal provision under discussion is also the prohibition, for judges to directly apply the provisions of European law, which precisely want to protect the independence of the judiciary, by activating disciplinary procedures against judges. provision is made for the prohibition on delegating preliminary decisions on the issues of the independence of the judiciary to the Luxembourg Court, in accordance with the provisions of the treaties also signed by Warsaw. If the appeal of the European Commission were to be accepted for the Polish government it would be the second sentence, after the modalities on the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Poland were found to be contrary to European law. The justifications of the Warsaw executive concern the fact of having greater efficiency in the judicial system, also to eliminate the traces still present of the legislation prior to 1989, when the country was governed by the communist dictatorship. The excuse, however, appears inconsistent since the government in office appeals to the elimination of rules in force under a dictatorial regime, wanting to replace them with a law that does not respect the independence of the magistrates, a behavior, therefore similar to what one wants to fight . The independence of judges is a fundamental requirement of European law that Warsaw has voluntarily accepted and is not negotiable for Brussels. Even more serious is that the violation on the same subject is repeated for the second time and at such a short distance, given that the first sanction dates back only to last March 2. A new condemnation would further distance Poland and its reactionary government from the founding principles of the Union and would confirm, if needed, an accession of the Polish country due to the sole purpose of obtaining the economic advantages coming from the Union, which both weigh on the country’s budget. The problem is well known: the countries of the Visegrad Pact do not yet seem to have accustomed themselves to Western ideals and are governed by right-wing executives who still exercise power with the communist ways and forms in force when they were under the influence of the Soviet Union. . In the institutions of the former socialist countries, in particular Poland and Hungary, there has not been an adequate maturation towards democratic respect for the exercise of government and the opposition; in practice, not only was that system of checks and balances not built, which must guarantee democratic confrontation, but, on the contrary, the direction was taken to destroy all those powers that can oppose a single governmental action, be it the judiciary, with its necessary independence, and the freedom of the press, increasingly compressed, with the consequent decrease in the guarantee of civil rights. The question is whether it can be tolerable to have as members of the European Union nations so far behind in their rights that entry and stay in Europe should instead have progressed and guaranteed. The presence of nation states that reject any obligation and application of norms that they themselves have freely signed and that too freely transgress no longer appears tolerable in a supranational forum that wants to aspire to achieve, sooner or later, a political union characterized by the guarantee of law . If these minimum rules are not accepted, access to the advantages that the Union guarantees is also not allowed and it is not enough to impose fines and not allow access to European budgets, because a repentance in the face of these threats is only an insincere repentance, which favors the repetition of the violation at the first available opportunity. It is necessary to have the courage to define these countries as unnecessary burdens to the process of European integration and, consequently, to have the courage to take drastic actions such as expulsion from the Union: at least, European funds will not be squandered unnecessarily in financing without any purpose.

The repression in Myanmar is assuming ever greater dimensions, both for the violence carried out and for the tragic accounting of the victims, including children and minors. The extent of the force deployed by the military, functional to a repression, which aims to erase all forms of dissidence, reveals a fear that has generated a reaction beyond all reasonable expectations, especially in the ways. The fear of the military is undoubtedly due to the democratic path that the country had undertaken and which threatened the autonomy of the armed forces, especially from an economic and financial point of view; the production structure of the former Burma, in fact, is practically totally managed by the military, who divide the various industries of the country into the various armed forces. It is understandable how this leads to a strong inequality and the productive fabric is conditioned by a bureaucracy with a high rate of corruption. It is possible that even the small transfer of political power, which took place with the partial democratic restoration, had, among others, the consequence of an increase in control over the management of the economy: this was experienced by the military as a invasion of the field which provoked an angry reaction and the cancellation, by means of futile reasons, of the democratic threats. The European Union, through the High Representative for Foreign Policy, has condemned the merciless violence of the Burmese armies against their own people, which has assumed even greater proportions than in past days; Brussels also said it was working to stop the violence. The US president, Biden, also condemned the Myanmar army for causing unnecessary deaths and announced sanctions against the army and military junta of the former Burma, also guilty of the coup that dismissed the legitimately elected government. Therefore, the Western reactions against the Myanmar military by the two major Western subjects have been fast and very relevant from a diplomatic point of view, which will certainly be followed by sanctions that will hit, from a commercial and financial point of view. the wealth managed by the armed forces; however, there is an equally serious cause for concern, because it accentuates the growing difference between the western part of China and Russia. The high symbolic value of the declared support for the military junta of Myanmar by Beijing and Moscow seems to be a factor of no return for China and Russia in relation to the possibility of establishing a dialogue on a common basis with the US and Europe. The two countries, one ex-communist and one openly communist, but with a particular appreciation of the market without rights for workers, are getting closer and closer, discovering ever greater affinities in the denial of civil rights and also recognizing merits to the other international subjects who undertake this path. Supporting a bloody dictatorship has a particular significance, which goes beyond the intention of co-opting a country in one’s own zone of influence, and which wants to affirm the right of a government to repress internal dissent in any way: a common situation for both China. , which for Russia. The message that must reach Washington and Brussels is simply this, but it must be taken into account that for China, from the point of view of foreign policy, it is a question of breaking its taboo of non-interference in internal affairs: by manifestly supporting the junta putschist, makes clear his position to consider legitimate any form of repression that is used to contain and cancel internal dissent. If this is true, and there is no element to be able to believe the contrary, both Beijing and Moscow have made an advance from which they do not seem to be able to go back and, at this point, the West must reflect on any contact and relationship. intends to keep and maintain with these two countries. The diplomatic path is always the best, but in the face of such provocations, a decisive removal, even in commercial and economic relations, seems to be the best solution, also to escape any form of contamination, albeit apparently economically convenient, coming from the two countries. . The use of Chinese soft power and Russia’s vaccine policy must not condition the judgment of two governments that approve and support violent repression as a form of policy against dissent: it is better to seek autonomy in the Western field and not take any risks. resulting from the relationship with these nations.

After Trump’s four years, the relationship between the US and the European Union, which represents the fulcrum of the strategy in Washington’s western camp, is in the process of improving, to return to the levels prior to the penultimate tenant of the White House. The repeated meetings, those already held and the next ones, signal a common desire of both parties to strengthen relations, especially in a very delicate world phase marked by the worsening of relations with China, Russia (which affirms the strategic need for cut ties with Brussels), Turkey, Iran and other potentially dangerous situations capable of profoundly changing the current structures and balances. Despite the importance recognized by all members of the Union regarding the renewed ties with the United States, the debate in Europe continues, already compulsorily begun during the Trump presidency, of the need for greater autonomy of the main organization of the old continent, in order to achieve the aim of effectively affecting world scenarios with an autonomous strategic and military capacity, but to be integrated, especially with the arrival of the pandemic, in a productive independence, both in the field of medicine, telecommunications and other industrial capacities to be conquered in order to reach a position of autonomy and independence from other subjects: be they allies or adversaries. The question has no easy solution, because the vision of the members of the Union is not univocal and the decisions, which should be rapid, are conditioned by unanimity mechanisms, which constitute the means to exercise vetoes and mutual blackmail functional to the interests of individuals. states to the detriment of the common interest of the Union. There are essentially two major orientations, which differ in the different attitude on this issue, which is central to the development of Europe. On the one hand, the one led by Germany, who lean towards the continuation of American protection, through the Atlantic Alliance and, on the other, the French idea, which considers it essential to find European autonomy, albeit, always within the Western camp. . The German vision seems too conditioned by the particular interest of Berlin, which does not want to give up sovereignty to protect its economic independence, with which it conditions and commands the Union as the majority shareholder. The opinion of Paris follows the French grandeur and wants to transport it to Europe to make the old continent a protagonist capable of autonomously influencing global issues. It must also be said that if with the Biden presidency we return to a situation pleasing to Germany, the Trump experience has highlighted that there are no acquired position rents and the need for European strategic autonomy becomes indispensable if Washington adopts behavior of isolation even from his usual allies. So at this stage Germany can have a wait-and-see attitude, but it remains true that even with an optimal situation like the present one, the Union moves without its own identity to spend on the international scene, because it is always under American protection and this is what it wants. mean giving up on advantages and being able to effectively emphasize your position. Faced with these two trends, the governments of Spain and Holland are looking for an alternative way that can allow intervention in global issues, certainly through a common armed force, but also with an autonomous capacity in the industrial sector, to be pursued no longer with the unanimity, but with the majority of member states’ adhesions, that is, through a new definition of sovereignty, which can allow rapid and uncoupled responses from the supranational organizations in which Europe is inserted, but which often have conflicting interests with Brussels and functional to current interests of major partners. This is a solution that needs to be pursued, but which traces a clear path, even for those who remain in Europe only to have the funding, without sharing its aims. The renunciation of substantial parts of sovereignty appears to be an indispensable requirement and in open contrast to the French and German visions and also the relations between northern states with the Mediterranean ones are an obstacle because they conflict with their respective interests. able to subvert the current hierarchies, it appears as a unique and indispensable opportunity to make the most coveted market in the world also an undisputed protagonist, capable of spreading and affirming its own vision in competition with the international subjects who now have the monopoly.

The ferocious repression of Turkish-speaking Chinese of Islamic religion, a majority ethnic group in the Chinese region of Xinjiang, has resulted in sanctions by the European Union; the sanctions target four citizens and officials of the People’s Republic of China for protracted human rights violations perpetrated through mass deportation, arbitrary arrests and degrading treatment, held against ethnic Uyghur Chinese citizens. The Chinese government’s policy of assimilation, with no respect for humanitarian rights, of this part of the population has been in place for some time, but the European sanctions are only now coming and have the distinction of being the first since the Tiananmen massacres in 1998. Throughout this period China has taken on a role of strategic partner in the European economy, which it was better not to contradict. In reality, these last sanctions issued are in any case more symbolic than effective, given that they have affected only four Chinese citizens and not China as a national entity; however, it is implied that the message for Beijing was a heavy criticism of its sovereignty: an inconceivable insult to the Chinese government, which regards its internal affairs as an inviolable matter. China’s official response was an out-of-proportion retaliation, which aimed to hit the European institutions directly, sanctioning ten people, which include parliamentarians and officials from Brussels. The European Union has consistently applied what it has already applied to Russia and other countries for the repressions that have resulted in human rights violations. European action was joined by the USA and the United Kingdom, who did not want to miss the opportunity to show Beijing the renewed Western cohesion, especially for Washington it is essential to show itself on the front line against what it considers the greatest systemic opponent of this. historical phase, both for economic and geostrategic reasons. The Western compaction has caused greater closeness between China and Russia, with Moscow now, however, in a subordinate condition to Beijing, while it cannot fail to be noted that Chinese activism has attracted the enemies of the USA to a personal area of ​​influence, including the other Iran and North Korea, with which it has commercial relations despite American and European sanctions. Regarding the European sanctions, it is necessary to make some reflections, since the decision of Brussels is correct in an absolute sense, it will be necessary to verify how this situation of diplomatic tension will evolve, that is, if it will also have repercussions on too many commercial relations between the two parties and which, without ‘other, they suit Europe, but more and for various reasons, including not only economic ones, they suit China more. The situation that has arisen in the Western field and, above all, with the change in the White House, could loosen the ties, on the part of Brussels, with China and thus allow greater autonomy, economic and productive in favor of Europe. . If you want to take the path of protecting human rights, even outside your own territories, decrease trade relations with China and its way of being, i.e. distance yourself from it in a significant and not only symbolic way, appears to be an obligatory path. . If the intentions and also the European behaviors regarding the protection of rights seem necessary and acceptable, the rapprochement with Turkey appears less clear, however, which certainly has instrumental reasons on which one can only give a strongly negative judgment. Financing Ankara to keep refugees going to Europe on its territory can be a practical reason but one that is in contrast with the desire to defend human rights: a contradiction too obvious not to look at Chinese sanctions with different eyes; moreover, to get closer to a regime that massacres the Kurds, towards whom Europe, but also the entire West, should have only feelings of gratitude and therefore of protection and which goes towards the disavowal of the Istanbul treaty against female violence, appears a contradiction even without wanting to set themselves up as defenders of human rights. The perception is that of a European institution with a wavering attitude, which is unable to maintain a straight line, a behavior consistent with its aims: according to this, Turkey should have the same treatment as China and it would still be little (moreover the sanctions against China are, it has already been said, little more than symbolic). The hope is not to encounter a disappointment, which for the subject matter could have consequences on the trust of citizens, which cannot be recovered.

Since his arrival in power Boris Johnson has had the intention of carrying out a review of the security of the United Kingdom in the face of changes in the international political scene and the new threats deriving from the variation of geostrategic interests that have followed the different structures of power mainly caused by globalization. This intention was influenced by the exit from the European Union, which required a new design of the defense strategy by London. Although the pandemic has slowed this process, the main threats that the British government assesses as the most dangerous remain Russia and China, and both are nuclear powers. This consideration is the basis of the new British will to change its nuclear non-proliferation policy and to move towards a strengthening of the atomic arsenal. While remaining within the Atlantic Alliance, as one of the main members, the exit from Brussels forces London to act as one of the main countries with a defense strategy not coordinated with other supranational organizations, but based on its own independence and singularity . This does not mean that London does not intend to collaborate with its Western allies, but that, in the first instance, in the event of threats, it wants to have decision-making autonomy and the availability of weapons capable of responding even alone to potential attacks. The forecast is to increase its nuclear warheads from 180 to 260, to also increase a preventive deterrence, which recalls the strategy of the cold war, here, however, applied beyond the bipolar logic. London undertakes not to use atomic weapons against those states that signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, however this commitment may be revised in the event of threats against it from countries with arsenals containing similar atomic, chemical, or nuclear weapons. biological or in any case of comparable capacity deriving from future technological progress. The United Kingdom identifies China and Russia as the main threats, but London’s attitude towards Beijing seems more cautious: even if the People’s Republic is seen as a systemic challenge to British values ​​and principles, commercial relations between the two parties must continue. as long as mutual cooperation can be compatible with British interests and this should not preclude common challenges such as that against climate change. Relations with Moscow are worse, with which the battleground has been on the activity of Russian secret services on English soil, repeatedly implicated in violations, murders and attacks, according to London. On this front, the increase in the nuclear arsenal does not seem to be an instrument aimed at averting the Russian desire to operate with its questionable methods, however the value of deterrence, even symbolic, that London wants to take to warn its rivals is undeniable. . If the desire to carry out nuclear proliferation is always bad news, even for the US, Washington cannot fail to appreciate the desire expressed by London for greater collaboration and cooperation, especially after the replacement of President Trump, a personality who it has often caused clashes with the British prime ministers, with Biden, considered a more reliable interlocutor. The decision to increase the nuclear arsenal has produced heavy criticism in the UK, because it disrupts a long line of prime ministers, both Conservative and Labor, who have committed themselves to reducing nuclear weapons. One last consideration is still necessary: ​​that a controversial and often unpredictable personality like Boris Johnson has an even larger nuclear arsenal at his disposal, is not good news for the world order and their balance; finally, the credibility of one of the members of the Iranian nuclear treaty, which increases its atomic power, takes on a very equivocal meaning: if Tehran said it wants the atomic bomb as a deterrent against what it considers threats, what could London stand up to?

The Iranian nuclear treaty, signed in 2015 by Iran, the European Union, Germany and the permanent members of the United Nations: USA, China, France, England and Russia was intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Islamic Republic, guaranteeing Tehran less pressure from the economic sanctions already imposed by Washington. With the election of Trump, the US reversed its behavior by adopting the unilateral abandonment of the treaty, with the consequent reinstatement of new energy and financial sanctions against Iran and against those who would have maintained commercial relations with Tehran. The change in American attitude, conditioned by Trump’s strategic proximity to Israel and Saudi Arabia, was characterized by the so-called maximum pressure strategy, which, according to the former president of the United States, should have led to the elimination of the will to possess Iranian nuclear weapons. , through a tougher sanctions policy. In reality, Tehran, despite being subjected to a particularly heavy situation due to the increase in inflation, the depreciation of its currency and a severe recession, caused by the attitude of the White House, has undertaken a policy of enrichment of uranium, developing a technology, which, although it has not yet been able to arrive at the creation of the atomic bomb, has created serious apprehension, both regionally and globally. The failure of Trump’s US strategy, and of his Israeli and Saudi allies, also included the raising of the level of tension caused by the attacks in which Iranian personalities involved in research programs for uranium enrichment died. The new American President Biden, right from the election campaign, has included in his foreign policy program the possibility of the US re-entry into the Iranian nuclear agreement, negatively evaluating the consequences of the exit which resulted in an international isolation of the United States and in the greater precariousness of regional balances. Biden has called for a change in the preventive attitude of the Iranians, with a reduction in nuclear activity, in exchange for which Iran has proposed a first reduction in sanctions, as a tangible sign of good intentions for the continuation of the negotiations. To this end, the resumption of dialogue between Iranian officials and the Atomic Research Agency will also be essential to facilitate inspections of nuclear power plants; to this end, a series of meetings will start starting from next April to mutually establish the rules of inspections; meanwhile, the Iranian president has autonomously decided to suspend operations for the enrichment of uranium, which led to the withdrawal of the no-confidence motion of some European countries against Iran, precisely at the Atomic Agency. The signs of détente seem to indicate the possibility of the practical resumption of the agreement, thanks also to the impetus of the action of states such as Germany and Russia, which have set out to restore the situation prior to Trump’s rise to the White House. however the positive development could only be guaranteed by the permanence of Biden or in any case of a Democrat in the highest US office. As demonstrated, in fact, by Trump’s absurd behavior, the unilateral withdrawal from the agreement did not entail any sanction for which this withdrawal carried out, contravening the signature and the commitments undertaken by his own, without an ascertained violation by Tehran, but only for a different political evaluation of the agreement itself. This situation, therefore, can guarantee four years of maintenance of the agreement, but cannot prevent the situation that has arisen with Trump. Despite this consideration, which must in any case be kept in mind, it will be necessary to favor a different approach with Iran in this period of time, allowing its economy to grow, in order to favor the creation of a network of ties, both diplomatic and commercial, capable of guaranteeing a different way of considering the atomic weapon by the Iranians. If Tehran adheres to respect for nuclear non-proliferation throughout this period, it will achieve sufficient credibility not to provoke a unilateral withdrawal, even in the face of a re-election of Trump or an emulator of him. While substantial differences and contrasts in foreign policy with the West remain, the goal of not having a new atomic bomb in such a delicate region of the world must be achieved with absolute priority.

The Turkish armed forces have penetrated into Syrian territory, without declaring any state of belligerence against Damascus, since 2016 with the official reason of opposing the militias of the Islamic State, which, it is suspected, had been used by Ankara in an anti-Assad function, with reasons that can also be traced back to the opposition between Shiites and Sunnis. In reality, it immediately became clear that the goal was to avert the Kurdish danger on the Turkish borders; the presence of the inhabitants of these areas, until that moment was characterized by a majority of Kurdish ethnicity and by the presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an organization considered as terrorist, not only by Ankara, but also by Brussels and Washington. The fact that the Kurds had represented the troops operating on the ground against the Islamic State, which made it possible not to involve Western soldiers directly on the ground, was not enough to gain the protection of the Americans, who sacrificed them to an alliance, like that with Turkey, on which there are many doubts about the real opportunity, given the recent developments taken by the Erdogan presidency. In any case, the United Nations data speak of more than 150,000 Kurds forced to leave their lands since the actions of the Turkish army, together with the Syrian national army, a set of Islamist militias opposed to the Assad regime, in 2018, they developed in the areas close to the border with the territory of Ankara. The ethnic composition of the Syrian national army is interesting because it is made up of about 90% of Arabs and the remaining 10% of Turkmen and fits perfectly into the Turkish strategy of replacing the original Kurdish population with ethnic groups more favorable to Ankara, a practice similar to that exercised by Beijing in Tibet and Xinjiang, where the local population that has not assimilated to the integration process is replaced by the Han Chinese ethnic group through deportations and forced re-education practices; moreover, the militias of the Syrian national army, according to various humanitarian organizations, were guilty of war crimes, including kidnapping of Kurdish officials, who would later end up in Turkish prisons. It should be remembered that the Turkish military forces occupy about 60% of the Syrian territory that is on the Turkish border and the replacement of the population, with Syrian refugees of Arab ethnicity, is the logical consequence of the strategy of securing their southern borders, a program that it allowed Erdogan to overcome internal political problems, such as the economic crisis and the protest against the Islamization of society and who enjoyed, albeit with different nuances, the support of both the extreme right in the government and the opposition forces. From the international point of view, the Turkish presence is seen in various circles as a deterrent to the presence and action of Russia and Shiites, essentially a stabilizing factor in the Syrian question. Turkey has not limited itself to a military commitment, but has invested huge sums in the construction of infrastructures, such as schools and hospitals and has connected its own electricity grid to that of the occupied territories, while the currency in circulation has become the Turkish lira. It is necessary to specify that the Turkish action is encountering several positive opinions, which must be placed within the favorable sentiments for the pan-Islamic action of Ankara, which increasingly coincides with Erdogan’s project of a new Ottoman course, which sees the Turkey at the center of a system beyond its borders, on which to exercise its influence, even as an alternative to Saudi or Egyptian prestige in the same Sunni area. The Kurdish territories now occupied, according to international law, will not be able to enter into the effective Turkish sovereignty, however it is reasonable to think of a positioning on the model of the Turkish part of Cyprus and Azerbaijan, which are in the sphere of influence of Ankara. The question is how far Turkey is willing to go ahead with these practices and how much this does not affect the judgment of Ankara’s retention within the Atlantic Alliance, whose aims have now too often appeared at odds with Turkey. There remains the profound negative evaluation of Ankara’s behavior towards the Kurds, as an example of transgression of the norms of international law, to which, sooner or later, an adequate sanction will have to be found at a general level.

President Biden’s willingness to receive the Japanese prime minister as the first guest of a foreign government reveals the high symbolic value that the White House gives to the meeting. The visit, which will take place in the first half of April, clearly represents a signal towards the foreign policy intentions of the new American administration and, at the same time, a sort of warning to China and its expansionist intentions in the eastern seas. The political significance of this invitation is concretized in the maintenance, in continuation with Obama’s policy, of the priority in foreign policy of attention to the Asian Pacific Ocean region, due to its economic and strategic importance, functional to American interests. The process of strengthening relations between Washington and Tokyo is central, for both sides, within the project to be able to achieve the freedom of the East Asian seas. The meeting also takes on the particular significance of wanting to bring activities related to US diplomatic initiatives back to normal, which the pandemic has certainly made more difficult. Biden, former vice president of Obama, repeats, with this meeting, what had already been done by his democratic predecessor, who met the then Japanese prime minister as his first foreign guest: in the repetition of the first international summit after the election, we see that the Biden’s intention is to resume Obama’s speech on the centrality of the Asian region; after all, Japan has been considered, since the end of the Second World War, an ally of primary importance for the USA. In terms of multilateral relations, the United States has also called a forthcoming four-party summit, with the participation, as well as the United States, of India, Australia and Japan itself, which underlines the desire to place diplomatic action at the center attention was paid to the East Asian region, proceeding in harmony with other partners in the Western area interested in Chinese containment. It is very significant that this summit was inaugurated in 2007, for the coordination of aid following the Japanese earthquake, but was subsequently suspended due to the joint Indian and Australian desire not to offend Chinese sensibilities; however, the growth of Beijing’s military spending coupled with its willingness to exert its power over the eastern Pacific area, considered as its exclusive zone of influence, has caused new reflections in Canberra and New Delhi. For India, then, the rivalry that has never subsided with China, essentially based on geostrategic and economic arguments, has increased for the disputed territories on the Himalayan border. New Delhi thus joined the joint submarine warfare military exercises carried out by the US, Australia, Japan and Canada and strengthened its military cooperation with Washington, causing Chinese resentment. This scenario, it must not be forgotten, is grafted onto the already existing trade war between Washington and Beijing, which remains one of the few points of contact and continuity between the Trump presidency and that of Biden: it is clear that this provokes feelings of aversion in the Chinese country. which could favor dangerous consequences of a diplomatic and military nature capable of altering the precarious regional balance. Beijing also feels encircled by the resumption of activities of the four-party summit, which it has condemned as a dangerous anti-Chinese multilateralism and this could accelerate some initiatives of the People’s Republic that have been repeatedly threatened, such as the question of Taiwan, on which Beijing has never ruled out armed intervention to bring the island back under full Chinese sovereignty. So if American activism appears justified by the Chinese initiatives themselves, the hope is that the Biden administration, while firm in its own intentions, will be endowed with greater caution and experience than its predecessor.