Categoria: English version

It’s a widely held opinion that the Democratic opposition to Trump’s actions appears to be silent. It’s unclear whether the party is in a full-blown internal crisis, having provoked a defeat that had global repercussions, due to poor campaign management, or whether the silence is a deliberate strategy to expose the incompetence and pettiness of the White House president and his ministers. The Democrats’ silence, however, has been halted internationally, at the recent Munich Security Conference, with the clear intention of reassuring European leaders. This reassurance is only potential, as it refers to a desirable, but not certain, victory in the upcoming US presidential elections. The primary intent appears to have been to denounce the American president’s betrayal of his European allies, a clear attempt to establish the Democratic Party as the United States’ only serious interlocutor with Western governments. In particular, California Governor Newsom has presented himself as the leader of the opposition and a possible Democratic candidate in the 2028 presidential elections. According to him, Trump is temporary and will leave in three years. Under current legislation, this will be the case, assuming Trump fails to change the current rules. However, with a Republican confirmation, the current Vice President, Vance, would take office, and he could prove even worse, if possible, than the current White House incumbent. Now, even with a Democratic victory, Europe must not create an excuse for not pursuing autonomy. It is important to remember that, albeit in different ways, starting with Obama and also with Biden, the US has shifted its primary focus to the Pacific Ocean, identifying China as its main commercial and geopolitical rival. With Trump, the nature of relations with Europe has changed, marked by unprecedented arrogance, but the geostrategic objectives are identical to those of the Democrats. The European Union must take precautions at all costs, no longer trusting its American ally, especially when it comes to defense. One of Trump’s achievements has been precisely to accelerate this process and recognize that the “Make America Great Again” values ​​do not align with the founding ideals of the European Union. But the relationship with Europe, also condemned for the Greenland affair and tariffs, is not the only point highlighted by the Democrats: abandoning the fight against the climate emergency, favoring the consumption of energy from oil, gas, and coal, is taking the US back two centuries. This behavior is particularly unpopular in Europe, which is increasingly sensitive to the problem of pollution. Rising economic inequality is also leading the United States to rampant authoritarianism, which does not reassure its European partners. Presenting these arguments to EU countries is an important step towards reinforcing the Democrats’ standing with Western governments. Not that it’s too difficult: the effects of Trump’s policies have brought great instability to international relations, which will need to be remedied if he wins the presidential election. This counter-trend could occur in the midterm elections, undermining Trump’s confidence. In any case, the Democrats’ need to present themselves as reliable interlocutors also serves to reassure markets and establish a fundamentally different foundation with their European allies, starting now: an opportunity that all EU members should also seize.

Two months before the Hungarian elections, incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orban must face the reality that independent polls predict his defeat by his main rival, Peter Magyar. The latest polls show a gap of a full ten percentage points, which would overturn the current balance of power in the Hungarian parliament, which currently sees a qualified two-thirds majority in favor of the incumbent Prime Minister’s party. This finding is contradicted by polls from institutions close to the government, which, on the contrary, show the Prime Minister’s party leading by six percentage points. Election day is set for April 12th, and the time has come for Orban to reiterate the key points of his electoral platform, both exaggerating and exaggerating certain concepts he believes are crucial to his success. While his opponent has promised greater membership in the European Union and a vigorous fight against corruption, Orban has gone so far as to argue that the real threat to Hungary is not Russia but the European Union itself, of which it persists in remaining a member and whose funds sustain the country’s economy it lavishly exploits. Indeed, the Hungarian prime minister, despite repeated attacks against Brussels, has never clearly expressed his desire to leave the Union. However, he has not failed, even in recent rallies, to characterize the European Union as an oppressive machine for his country, which, in fact, has tolerated too much of the illiberal laws enacted during his five terms in office, the last four of which have been consecutive. In reality, Brussels’ condemnations of illiberal laws, especially in the areas of justice, civil rights, and information, have always been insufficient and have failed to produce any change of direction, thus contravening European legislation itself. Hungary remains the EU member state closest to Russia and anti-Ukraine, and particularly close to the ideological positions of US President Trump, especially as the German Chancellor’s recent statement defined Europe as completely at odds with the ideas of the “Make American Great Again” movement. In this role of internal opposition to European ideals, Budapest can count on Slovakia and, more generally, on the sovereignist parties present throughout Europe, which, however, are currently in a minority compared to pro-European sentiments. The impression is that Brussels is awaiting the outcome of the Hungarian elections, without exposing itself too much, hoping for a victory for Orbán’s opponents, who promise greater European integration. Should the current prime minister win, sanctions against Budapest will be necessary, even potentially leading to expulsion from the Union, even if this would require changing existing laws. This eventuality requires a lengthy process, and in the meantime, Brussels’ severity could be felt through the progressive reduction of funding and the reduction of Hungary’s importance within the Union. Moreover, programs designed to find solutions to speed up decisions can only facilitate decisions and heavy sanctions against those members who stray too far from the Union’s goals, merely exploiting its funding without contributing to common development. A Europe that must find its own dimension of autonomy, especially from the US, but also from China, and capable of controlling Russia, cannot tolerate the presence of disruptive elements such as the current Hungary or Slovakia. A possible victory for Orban will inevitably lead to Budapest’s estrangement, and it matters little whether it can return to Russia’s orbit; for Europe, it will be a significant burden lessened.

Trump’s second presidency has highlighted a defense posture that puts Europe on the back burner. The very survival of the Atlantic Alliance as it has been known until now is seriously in doubt. This has all come with tariff threats and designs on Greenland, completely outside the norms of relations between Washington and its allies. Only the START nuclear treaty remained to maintain some order on the issue of military nuclear power. Once this is over, a period of uncertainty begins, and Europe will need to equip itself with its own nuclear defense. The Cold War guaranteed the protection of all of Europe thanks to the United States, but now the conditions have changed: we are no longer in a bipolar context, and, above all, Trump does not appear willing to use American nuclear power to defend the old continent from a potential Russian attack. The first tangible effect for international politics is the end of Germany’s historic opposition to a nuclear shield, albeit not a national one, but one that involves the entire European Union. Other European countries, such as Sweden and Poland, and certainly the Baltic states, are also open to the immediate possibility of using the French nuclear shield. The Ukrainian example is exemplary. At the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kiev was the world’s second-largest nuclear power, precisely because of its proximity to Europe. Having ceded all its nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for a non-aggression treaty evidently violated by Moscow, it has lost its ability to deter attacks from the Kremlin. For Europe, the French and, perhaps, British solution represents only a temporary measure, which must be overcome in order to strengthen the continent’s defenses. This requires massive investments and adequate political will, both central and peripheral, as well as a different social attitude among the people. Accustoming people not to traditional rearmament but to nuclear weapons will only generate strong tensions. Equipping oneself with nuclear weapons is not an instantaneous achievement; it requires years and technical expertise that may not be available within the Union. In the immediate future, therefore, it is impossible to be completely independent of the United States, which must be convinced to continue European defense. However, it is essential to begin organizing now to equip ourselves with a nuclear deterrent. This will certainly contribute to creating a new balance of terror, but will not leave Europe defenseless from geopolitical threats, wherever they come from. Moreover, while the shield is currently provided by France, Paris does not intend to offer this protection free of charge. It requires investments not only from the French Republic, while maintaining the exclusive authority to launch a nuclear attack. However, beyond these limitations, which may even appear legitimate, France’s nuclear arsenal consists of only 290 nuclear warheads, which provide a limited shield compared to Russia’s more than 4,300 and even the US’s 3,700. Now, if we consider potentially hostile states, excluding the US, such as Russia, China, and North Korea, not to mention actors like Pakistan and India, which could have a vested interest in threatening Europe, the need for a common European Union arsenal becomes, unfortunately, urgent and cannot be postponed. The European Union currently has little or no defense against threats of all kinds, and no longer being able to count on American protection, it is highly vulnerable; new agreements must be established with Washington that protect Europe for the limited time necessary to become a fully-fledged nuclear power.

In the current climate of profound international uncertainty, which has developed due to the changing conditions of US intentions regarding global geopolitics, including the presence of war in Europe and profound instability in the Middle East, China is pursuing an internal reorganization aimed at making it increasingly loyal to its President Xi Jinping, to ensure a firm Chinese posture capable of increasing its weight in global politics. The need to standardize the views of the ruling classes is being pursued through a series of internal crackdowns, involving high-ranking military officials and party officials from the highest to the lowest levels. The history of investigations against Chinese military personnel is a constant in the People’s Republic of China and is based on accusations of disciplinary violations; in reality, these have always been cases of insubordination to party directives, and the recent cases, involving the dismissal of two very high-ranking generals, are nothing new: Xi Jinping requires absolute loyalty to avoid compromising adherence to party directives and the potential consequences for the possible methods of fighting. These provisions, however, should not mislead us regarding a possible negative impact on the Chinese armed forces. It is certain that in the long term, which is instrumental in a possible invasion of Taiwan, the changes at the top of the military are an investment in even greater political indoctrination and therefore in the loyalty of the armed forces. It should be kept in mind that Chinese investments in armaments are increasingly substantial: the navy has developed expansion plans that should bring Beijing’s aircraft carriers to nine by 2035, and the growth of its nuclear arsenal will reach at least a thousand warheads by 2030. These developments could accentuate the American disengagement from European territory to focus militarily on the Chinese seas, defending the sea lanes, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. While the attitude on the military front is particularly severe, its attitude towards political and civil society is no less so. In 2025, more than a million people were investigated, formally for corruption, a phenomenon that is still all too present in China’s political fabric, but which has often concealed political misconduct, which must be interpreted primarily as forms of dissent at various levels. The number of people under investigation in 2025 is the highest since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, and the sixty percent increase compared to just two years earlier is particularly significant. A particularly notable feature is that, currently, China is not experiencing a power struggle, but rather that these numbers of people under investigation relate to the Communist Party’s increasingly ironclad efforts to maintain rigid discipline in the country. One cannot help but suspect that this is a tactic fiercely inspired by the President and pursued through his most loyal aides. The impression is that Xi Jinping does not want to be caught unprepared domestically, aiming to maintain an increasingly solid situation at home and thus be able to face international challenges without further ado. This is not a possibility, but a certainty that the West will have to carefully evaluate before undertaking any relationship with China, which will increasingly be a monolith that will be very difficult to undermine.

The current scenario forces Europe to deeply reflect on its lag in the global landscape, where the gap between the objectives to be achieved and those achieved so far is widening dramatically. While the advance of Chinese trade is a worrying phenomenon, albeit one that has been addressed with sometimes effective tools, the Ukrainian conflict and especially the rise of Trump have led to a gradual reduction in Europe’s political role, including economic policy. This, combined with internal political division and military irrelevance, places the European Union in a serious position of dissolution. The decisive factor is the changing posture of the United States, which positions itself as an adversary whose primary objective is precisely the division of the Union, to avoid dealing with a cohesive entity. First the threat of tariffs, then the wavering stance on the Ukrainian war, and finally the explicit threat to the Union’s territory with the specific intent of conquering Greenland, perhaps even using military means. It must be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the Union’s overly diplomatic and conciliatory attitude toward Trump has not achieved any of the desired effects. On the contrary, it has fueled increased hostility on the part of the US president, due to the impression or certainty that he is dealing with a weak and divided partner. This is partly true, and is due to the Union’s inflexible structure, still too conditioned by unanimity, and the lack of decisions and legislation capable of ensuring a government capable of transcending individual interests in favor of the general well-being. To avoid offending the White House, dialogue with China has also been sacrificed, as has relations with Moscow, incapable of seriously sanctioning the Kremlin, through the use of Russian reserves in Europe, leaving the Union in a state of weakness. But the White House’s stance, which is the worst factor for the Union, could have been foreseen. Ever since the Obama presidency, US interests have increasingly focused on the East, and the first Trump presidency and the latest presidential election campaign had presented dangerous warnings of a possible new American stance. There has been no desire to implement an autonomy capable of allowing emancipation, even within the framework of an alliance, from the alliance with the United States. The failure to develop military independence, supported by an adequate presence of a European war industry, still allows for the current subservience to Washington, while internationally, the Union appears too hesitant about potential and closer alliances with partners equally interested in escaping the American yoke, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Equally necessary is reestablishing close ties with the United Kingdom to seek London’s return to the Union, just as it is necessary to involve Canada as a member of Brussels to expand the Union’s borders overseas and on the American border. Such alliances could attract investments capable of developing high-tech industries, making independence from the US a reality that could counteract the desire to impose tariffs on its products, also due to the vast territory available to create trading areas almost completely impervious to American and even Chinese influence. Certainly, the necessary element within Europe to ensure a push toward this situation is the progressive relinquishment of sovereignty, especially over certain crucial matters, such as foreign and therefore military policy, and also over aspects of individual states’ industrial policy. In exchange, this would enable the ability to play a major power role in every international arena and promote democratic ideals by dealing on an equal footing with major powers, without facing threats and disadvantages, as the immediate future seems certain to bring.

What challenges must the European Union face to maintain its expected role on the international stage? Trump’s election, China’s commercial advance, and the war in Ukraine on the Union’s borders have accentuated what everyone knew: the progressive decline of its economic size, its military irrelevance, and the inadequacy of an increasingly divided foreign policy. Added to this is the underestimation of the source of the threats to Europe, which have never considered Washington as a political adversary, which is aiming for the dissolution of the current European order. The lack of progress in relations with China, practical inaction toward Russia, with the dispute over the use of the Russian Central Bank’s reserves in Europe, and finally a lack of decisive response to counter the imposition of American tariffs, have left Brussels with a severely deteriorated image. This, however, is not a situation that arose suddenly: the vested interest secured by US governments in European defense, through direct commitment of investment and personnel, has so far not been overcome, despite the warning signs already present during the Obama presidency, which shifted American foreign interests from the Old Continent to Southeast Asia. This is closely linked to the lack of a European posture capable of proactively emancipating itself from its American ally. Hence the need to promote protective partnerships, which can translate into prevention and deterrence scenarios, also based on a more intense exchange of international cooperation, not only between state or supranational entities, but also between private entities that play strategic roles in well-defined sectors. Alliances, both economic and military, must be conceived and created with potential allies such as Australia, South Korea, Japan, and, of course, the United Kingdom. Canada deserves a separate discussion: thanks to its strong political and cultural affinity, it could be a key player in greater engagement with Europe, even to the point of envisaging Ottawa’s entry as a full member of the European Union. This would expand Brussels’ sphere of influence to the American borders, precisely with a view to containing the US, should other presidencies similar to this one take place. From this perspective, with a G7 dominated by the unilateralism of the White House, which has almost made it its own political instrument, finding alternative solutions could be in the common interest of all countries wishing to combat the American trade challenge based on unfair tariffs. The need to reduce strategic dependencies on goods and services is coupled with the ability to attract investment that will enable significant development in strategic sectors through the creation and development of high-value local industries, such as space, defense, and the medical industry, capable of providing adequate financial returns to investors. The first step is to improve governance procedures, abandoning the unanimity requirement for qualified majority decisions, and ensuring greater selection of incoming and existing members, who cannot influence community policy with values ​​that are clearly contrary to the founding principles and the new challenges that are emerging. The goal must be a supranational organization with a progressive transfer of sovereignty, capable of fostering a common foreign policy, and a single armed force with rapid intervention capabilities. This will gradually move toward an increasingly unified entity, capable of representing the interests of all the peoples of Europe and beyond, and of playing a major role on the international stage.

With his approval ratings plummeting and the self-imposed economic hardship of tariffs, US President Trump must seek to boost his standing with some international political results. The goal would be to secure some sort of agreement on the Ukrainian war, if not a definitive peace, then at least an initial truce that could allow negotiations to progress appropriately. Signs of optimism are being seen from many quarters, from the US negotiators themselves, to the Finnish and Turkish leaders, and to some extent even from the Hungarian president; however, the Russian ambassador to the United Kingdom has stated that there is no peace text with Kiev, only Ukraine’s surrender. The plan agreed upon between the US and Europe would contain nearly 80 percent of the points presented, with the possibility of a change in martial law to allow elections to be held. The biggest obstacle, however, remains Russia’s desire to secure the entire Donbass region. For Putin, only this condition would allow him to achieve the closest thing to victory, even without this conquest being achieved militarily. This objective is irreconcilable with the common feeling of the Ukrainian people, who, in a recent poll, expressed 75% against withdrawing from land, Donbass, which they consider part of their national territory. This is the basis of Zelensky’s refusal to give in even to American demands, which see the cession of Donbass as the primary reason for an end to hostilities. Washington is considering an alternative solution, which would envisage Donbass becoming a demilitarized zone, without the presence of Russian and Ukrainian troops. Kiev could accept this model only with the presence of a foreign military presence in Donbass; this option is rejected by Moscow, which could only accept the presence of its own police and National Guard in place of the Russian army: a solution totally unwelcome to Kiev. A further point of contention is the plan to freeze the current front line, as jointly presented by the European Union and Ukraine. For Russia, still too far behind in its westward expansion, this solution would be tantamount to admitting defeat. Despite the massive military effort and the large number of casualties—around a million Russian soldiers are estimated—the Red Army is struggling and advancing slowly, while forecasts for the Russian economy for 2026 openly point to a possible collapse. Then there is the problem of Kiev’s willingness to secure post-war insurance, whenever and however it will come. For Ukraine, the best solution would be membership in the Atlantic Alliance, capable of averting any possible new ambitions from Moscow. However, Russia categorically rejects this solution, so the Ukrainians are demanding the adoption of a mechanism equivalent to Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance, even outside of the Atlantic Alliance itself. Kiev needs concrete guarantees after its independence and sovereignty, signed by the US and Russia in 1994, were not respected in the Budapest Memorandum, just as the agreement establishing that Russia could never invade Ukraine was not respected after Kiev returned all its nuclear warheads to Moscow following the dissolution of the USSR. Then there is the question of Russian assets in Europe, which, according to Brussels, should be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, and which, conversely, the US would like to control: the EU’s plan is for Kiev to join Brussels in 2027, and this fact, which the majority of Ukrainians approve of, could prove a necessary obstacle but difficult for the Kremlin to accept.

Two facts have come to the forefront in the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian population of Gaza. These are two significant facts that global public opinion should take due account of and seek appropriate responses toward Tel Aviv. The first is the official United Nations declaration of famine in the Gaza Strip, the first in the Middle East, despite its severe history of military disasters. According to the United Nations, as many as 514,000 people, a quarter of the population, are facing food shortages, with the figure projected to reach as many as 641,000 by the end of September. The unique feature of the Gaza famine is that it is not due to meteorological or health factors, but entirely man-made, namely, the actions of the Israeli army. This humanitarian disaster could have been avoided if Tel Aviv had not systematically obstructed aid sent to Gaza’s borders. The Israeli action is even more serious because it is part of a precise plan to weaken civilians, as the Palestinian population must be eradicated by any means from the Strip. The ultra-Orthodox Jewish government’s desire to annex Gaza is, unfortunately, shared by much of the Israeli public. Despite the presence of massive food shipments at the border, Israel’s behavior remains unchanged. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights holds the Israeli government directly responsible, classifying starvation deaths as war crimes of voluntary manslaughter. This consideration introduces the second relevant fact, which concerns the issue. According to a secret report by the Israeli military, the number of civilian victims of the Gaza war is 83% of the total. As can be seen from this data, the low number of combatant casualties suggests a deliberate planning of the Palestinian genocide, so much so that it can be compared to the massacres in Rwanda and the Mariupol massacre. The combination of enforced starvation and deaths from military activity clearly defines the intentions of Netanyahu and his government regarding the Palestinians: to annihilate as many of them as possible in order to create the conditions for their deportation from the Strip. Moreover, a recent survey revealed that a full 79% of the Israeli population supports the indiscriminate repression of the Palestinian population, whom they consider an abusive occupier unworthy of human dignity. Netanyahu, of course, denies these data, or at most justifies them by citing Hamas’s actions against his own citizens. However, the Israeli prime minister’s mindset remains the same: to lie shamelessly and buy time to achieve his goals, constantly accusing anyone who contradicts him of being anti-Semitic and rejecting any interpretation different from his own and that of his government. Regardless of political views and obvious Israeli motivations, the lack of response to these crimes perpetrated against innocent civilians of all ages will remain an indelible stain on every country in the world, but even more so on Western democracies, which have revealed themselves as empty and absent when it comes to defending international law and defenseless populations from the most abhorrent violence, from whatever side it comes. Only recently have condemnations arrived, for their own sake, and even the recognition of the Palestinian state, which is expected to be in large numbers at the next United Nations General Assembly, is an exercise devoid of practical consequences. Israel must be increasingly isolated, its violence must be contained by all means, and the start is heavy sanctions that must affect an economy lacking its own resources. Europe must do at least this, trying to trigger a reaction in other countries as well, especially Arab ones. Certainly, this will require a reaction from Trump, but a consistent blockade capable of isolating Tel Aviv could be a belated but effective deterrent.

One of the foreign policy side effects of Trump’s tariffs is that they have brought traditionally distant nations closer together. The most striking example is the new relationship being established between India and China, traditionally adversaries. The two great Asian nations share thousands of kilometers of border, along which tensions have recurred over time; the Tibetan issue has also contributed to these frictions, and the proximity between India and the US has fueled China’s mistrust of India. In reality, the greatest point of contention has been the two countries’ struggle for dominance of the Asian continent, which China’s significant progress has tilted in its favor. That was until Trump emerged on the scene. Although relations with New Delhi were completely different during the White House’s first term, in his second term India asserted greater neutrality on international issues compared to the US position. It was displeased that Trump took credit for the end of the conflict between India and Pakistan, and finally, the Indian government was displeased that its citizens were displayed in handcuffs, like veritable trophies in the fight against illegal immigrants, a cornerstone of the US president’s policy. While these issues had already strained relations between the two countries, the decision to impose a 50% tariff on Indian goods exported to the US, due to India’s purchase of Russian oil, completely froze relations. This has resulted in an effect that is certainly undesirable, but highly predictable, for American foreign policy: a rapprochement, unthinkable until recently, between New Delhi and Beijing. Now, reversing this process will prove extremely difficult for White House strategists. The renewed relations between the two countries’ foreign ministers promise to be only the starting point for new ties. The first step will be to reopen trade at three Himalayan passes and the resumption of direct flights between the two countries, which have not been available since 2020, as well as the issuance of visas for tourism, business, and information. These initial developments represent only a small portion of the trade potential the two countries can undertake, at least partially offsetting the effects of US tariffs. Even within the BRICS organization, Beijing has already expressed support for India’s hosting of next year’s summit between Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, aimed at increasing trade relations between these countries. A closer form of cooperation between these countries, in trade and finance, leading to an agreement on a common currency alternative to the dollar, could seriously jeopardize the American economy, which is alienating formerly friendly countries for ideological reasons or relative expediency, thus strengthening China’s position as the world’s leading industrial power. It must be noted that India’s closeness to Russia is almost a given, but American action is strengthening it. Its rapprochement with China is a different matter, representing a truly novel development on the global stage and also strategically threatening to create an Asian bloc highly hostile to the US. Since Obama’s presidency, Washington has placed Asia at the center of its political and economic interests to the detriment of Europe. The goal was to isolate China, a doctrine Trump also embraces. However, his actions are favoring an outcome far different from the original intentions. At this point, China has Russia on its side, and India’s rapprochement means depriving the United States of an ally, albeit a not-so-close one, which can only count on Japan and South Korea in that part of the world. The incompetence of Trump and those he has surrounded himself with is causing significant damage to American foreign policy, which is not yet fully understood within the American centers of power, now firmly in the hands of the president’s Republican allies. With isolation, the program of making America great again will fail, and the resulting wreckage will be difficult to repair, not only politically but also economically.

As part of the reactions to Trump’s disastrous tariff policies, India and Brazil are moving closer to boosting trade between the two countries, aiming to exceed €17 billion by 2030. These developments are believed to be the result of telephone conversations between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Brazilian President Lula, thus involving contacts between the two countries’ highest officials. It’s worth noting that the US intends to impose a 50% tax on incoming Indian goods due to purchases of Russian oil, while the 30% tax the White House intends to impose on Brazil stems from the indictment of former President Bolsonaro. The concrete means to reach the €17 billion trade target is to have agreed to expand the Mercosur-India agreement, following the agreement between the two countries at the recent BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro. The challenge for Brazil and India is to overcome the current and upcoming economic phases, which promise to be challenging for all global economies, through the revitalization of multilateralism and greater integration, not only between the two countries, but also as a model to be extended as widely as possible in opposition to Trump’s isolationism. This approach must represent the alternative to be pursued as a global example to those who wish to oppose what Trump seeks to impose: a populist hegemony, which governs on deliberately distorted and often false data, to indoctrinate a public opinion lacking the tools to properly discern counterfeit news. To challenge Trump’s model, action must be pursued simultaneously in two ways: from the grassroots, raising awareness among citizens through the action of social bodies, and from the top down, with concrete actions by governments and institutions. In this context, strengthening democracy is crucial, because instances of centralized power do not favor the role of the opposition and respect for minorities. Unfortunately, the idea that a majority legitimized by the popular vote can impose its views unconditionally, regardless of those who voted differently, is increasingly gaining traction. The next step is to seek to reduce inequality, as a means of combating the ignorance that fosters people’s manipulation. Naturally, without regulation of technological resources and new technologies, achieving these goals appears extremely difficult, as these resources are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, often too close to the powers that be. Trump’s distorted will has imposed tariffs on over ninety countries, distorting free trade and compromising the development of global economies. Creating a coalition of all the countries targeted by Trump seems impossible, as many of them are deeply conflicted. For others, the problem is servility toward the United States, mistaken for an opportunity for privileged relations. However, broad agreements, such as the one between Brazil and India, capable of creating alternative markets to US dominance, seem possible. It should also be considered that, for now, the effects of these tariffs have not yet been felt in the US, but authoritative estimates predict an average increase in prices for US citizens due to the tariffs of over 18%, creating a situation not seen since 1934. This threatens to cause negative surprises for the American president, as the one affected will be precisely a segment of his own electorate, a segment of which will be impossible to fool with false propaganda. This will be a test that threatens to be very severe in terms of approval and appreciation for the White House’s current policies and could represent a destabilizing factor that should not be underestimated. This will facilitate the success of any policies aimed at uniting several countries against the tariffs and Trump’s entire way of understanding the world. Conversely, without unity of purpose at the state level, Trump’s path will be more difficult to navigate.