Categoria: English version

Beyond the unspeakable behavior of the new US President and his vice president, Europe’s surprise at the new situation cannot be justified at all. The feeling of disorientation and urgency at being excluded from negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, precisely because of Trump’s will, over the Ukrainian issue is a significant blow to Brussels’ authority and the reasons and requests to sit at the negotiating table seem to be of little value, despite the possibility of raising defense spending and, to a lesser extent, sending a peacekeeping contingent made up of European soldiers. The European Union had the experience of Trump’s first presidency, where the uselessness of the Atlantic Alliance had already been declared and with it the end of the Western system, as it had always been known, and of the subsequent period: the four years of Biden’s presidency, where it was possible to arrive at an advanced, if not definitive, point of a common European military force, capable of guaranteeing the autonomous defense of Europe; on the contrary, it was preferred to postpone the problem, hoping for the election of a democratic exponent, who could carry forward Western politics, as it has been since after the Second World War. A defense of Europe fundamentally delegated to the American presence, capable of making up for European shortcomings. Now this is no longer the case and the military defense policy is only the most immediate problem, which is intimately linked to the lack of a common foreign policy and to unitary intentions also in terms of the economy, which makes the Union weak in the face of the threats of American duties. A series of problems capable of uniting the entire European Union with Great Britain, which has awakened further away from the traditional alliance with Washington and much closer to the fears of Brussels. Europe is trying to start again with the proposal of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, not to count the share of money destined for military spending in the budget restrictions. Although this is a very delicate matter, due to the various sensitivities of the nations that make up the Union, this solution appears to be a starting point, albeit late, for a strengthened defense policy, which will have to be followed by effective integration policies of the individual armed forces towards a common army, capable of defending the territory of the Union even without the support of the USA. This is an ambitious but more necessary objective: Washington, since the time of Obama, has directed its gaze towards its needs to protect the Pacific Ocean, in the context of competition with China and now Trump has decided to accelerate in this direction and this explains his commitment to the immediate involvement of Russia in the definition of the Ukrainian question; however, a negotiation where one party in the war is excluded is a negotiation that starts badly and Europe has done well to claim the presence of Kiev at the table of any negotiation and also of its own presence, precisely as a guarantee of Ukraine and of itself. A defeated Ukraine would only precede a possible Russian advance certainly towards the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania, which is Putin’s real project to restore the status of a great power to Russia. Trump has a vision contrary to Western democracies, considering their values ​​outdated, but it is a very short-term vision towards what is still the richest market. Brussels must be able to move with this awareness, even re-establishing ties, which could go beyond commercial ones, with other very important subjects on the international scene, certainly China, but also India and Brazil up to the Central Asian republics, often eager to distance themselves from Russia. The first step, however, must be a total involvement of the members of the Union, without holding restricted meetings that leave out countries directly involved in contingent situations, such as the Baltic countries in the meeting called by Macron. To do this, in addition to what has already been said above, the Union must equip itself with faster regulations capable of overcoming the absurd criterion of the totality of votes for the approval of community laws and decisions and the ability to expel countries opposed to the unitary direction of European politics, such as Hungary. Ukraine’s accession to the Union is a necessary fact and an insurance against Putin’s policies, but it must be supported by an armed force capable of breaking away from the USA, an Atlantic Alliance less dependent on Washington, also in its ability to produce the armaments it could use.

Trump’s protectionist policy, the cornerstone of his electoral program, is taking shape, for now only with announcements and proclamations. After the duties against China last week, the new threat, which has also been announced, is to impose 25% tariffs on incoming goods consisting of steel and aluminum, without any exceptions or exemptions. For Europe, it is a question of seeing whether the existing duties, precisely 25%, will only be confirmed or will even reach 50%. The declared aim is to increase American wealth. In addition to Europe, the main targets are Canada and Mexico: the duties towards these two countries are in clear violation of the free trade agreement between the three states. This violation represents a very bad signal of the direction of the policy of the new US administration, in relation to the approach with existing international treaties. For Canada, the duties will weigh heavily on a sector that earns 11.2 billion dollars from the supply of steel to the USA; However, the prediction is that this measure will backfire on US manufacturers, from the automotive industry to producers of carbonated beverage containers. On the contrary, the White House predicts a favorable trade balance, thanks to the greater benefits that the duties will bring to local steel and aluminum industries, compared to the losses of other industrial sectors. In Washington’s vision, heavy industry is considered strategic to stimulate other sectors as well, acting as a driving force for the US economy. Trump has declared that the duties will affect a rather wide range of products, a factor that could trigger a trade war, with unpredictable consequences at a global level. With regard to Mexico, however, the tariff measure has been suspended for a month, in exchange for greater border controls to prevent migrants from entering the US. This suspension could mean that the duty measures could be a threat to obtain something else, for example for Europe greater military spending and greater commitment and involvement in operations, such as to allow a different deployment of US troops on the world stage. Even for Canada, the threat has been suspended with the commitment to stop migrant trafficking and the export of fentanyl-based drugs to the USA. The commitment requested from Canada seems mild, perhaps because Ottawa had drawn up a list of products to hit with customs duties, mainly from Republican states, which supported Trump the most. In any case, hitting Mexico hard, which has replaced China as the main supplier of the USA, with goods for 505.851 billion dollars and with a trade imbalance, in favor of Mexico City, of 171.189 billion dollars, will represent an intrinsic problem for the American manufacturing industry, presumably struggling with increases in supply costs. The trade war with Beijing has already started and both countries have already applied duties respectively. Even more interesting will be the evolution of relations with Europe, publicly called out by the vice president for the excessive trade constraints present on its territory, which do not facilitate easy reciprocal relations. Implementing a trade policy that is too rigid on the richest area in the world can have seriously harmful effects for US industry, especially since Brussels is looking for concrete alternative outlets for its products, thinking about new trade agreements with China; if we were to go in this direction, after Biden’s policy had managed to reverse the trend, the effects of the duties would have the double negative consequence of losing market shares of American products in Europe and that these shares could be replaced by Chinese products; and the extemporaneous declarations of the new American president, about the creation of a riviera in Gaza, but without Palestinians, and of a Ukraine that will once again be Russian, do not help the dialogue with the Europeans, allergic to certain attitudes, despite the growing presence of Trump’s supporters, even in the governments of some countries. If the military issue can be a lever that Trump will not hesitate to use, the White House must take into account that these provocations could push Brussels to slowly but progressively detach itself from its American ally.

During Trump’s first presidency, the situation had become very clear: the US no longer had any intention of supporting the majority of military spending to defend the West and this had been a missed opportunity to fill the inconsistency of European defense with a targeted program of military spending, capable of bringing the structure of the European Union to defense autonomy, always within the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Trump, both in his electoral program and in his inauguration speech, reiterated the concept again, because he found himself faced with an unchanged situation, albeit within a profoundly changed international context. These criticisms were also recognized as true by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the Union, who stressed that the time has come to invest, because, as Trump states, Brussels and its members do not spend enough. During the annual conference of the Defense Agency, the figure emerged that represents the average expenditure on military spending for the states of the Union, for 1.9% of the gross domestic product, when Russia, the closest danger has invested 9% of its gross domestic product, although in a situation of war conflict. The scarcity of spending is a dangerous signal for potential aggressors. Currently the minimum expenditure established by the Atlantic Alliance provides for 2%, but reasonable estimates foresee an increase to at least 3-3.5% of the gross domestic product. The direction claimed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Estonian Kalla Kallas, is to make Europe adopt a more decisive position with regard to military spending, in order to be able to assume a greater direct share of responsibility for the Union, with regard to its own security. The appointment of the Estonian politician is a clear and unequivocal signal from the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, because she is a representative belonging to a nation bordering Russia and who fears its actions, in addition to the fact that her country, Estonia, contributes 3.43% of its gross domestic product to NATO spending. Even the Polish President, Donald Tusk, who with his country contributes 4% of the Atlantic Alliance’s military spending, argues that Trump’s provocation should be understood as a sort of positive challenge, because a stronger ally has a more consistent voice in relations with the US and can move towards greater autonomy and security, towards the geopolitical challenges that could potentially arise.

What the Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance did during his speech to the European Parliament seemed like a real appeal for collaboration between the countries of the Union. Almost a request for help, which could not have been more explicit. The imminent arrival of Trump represents a decisive aggravation of an already difficult and complicated state of affairs. The current situation is not one of true peace, even if there is not even a state of war; however, the Ukrainian conflict is at Europe’s doorstep and the situation of the economic commitment of EU members is still far from that two percent of the gross domestic product, which is now considered insufficient to maintain the Atlantic Alliance at an adequate level to respond to the potential critical issues present on the international scene. If Trump’s request to bring the gross domestic product of each individual member of the Alliance to 5% seems like a figure rounded up a lot, a reasonable value could be three percent, that is, one percentage point more than the current one, which is also reached by only a few members. If today the situation is considered more or less safe, after the Trump presidency, it may no longer be so. Even if the president-elect’s threat was to abandon the Atlantic Alliance, this eventuality, especially for economic reasons, is considered remote, but more likely it is considered possible that the US could implement a disengagement, so as to focus on the issues of the protection of the Pacific area, an essential area to fight China. Europe, even in a general framework of presence of the Atlantic Alliance, must make a greater contribution and respond to the agreements signed to bring military spending to 2% of GDP; but too many states are still far from this objective. In addition to the need to reach the established quota, greater rationalization is needed in the way of spending on military purchases, making joint purchases, capable of guaranteeing greater economies of scale and increasingly efficient integration between the various armed forces, in the absence of a supranational military component, which appears increasingly necessary, to have a greater range of maneuver and autonomy, albeit always within the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, it is necessary to develop those tools to counter hybrid warfare that are necessary to counter the actions of entities such as Russia, but also China, which tend to influence the political and social life of European states. Disinformation is a weakness of Europe, just as the weapon of irregular immigration functions as a factor of internal and external destabilization, to the point of putting European institutions in difficulty in their command centers. The Ukrainian events have interrupted a stalemate, where the reason for the existence of the armed forces, in European countries, had changed towards the use of peacekeeping forces and interposition in critical areas, but still far from European territory. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the defense ministries realized the inadequacy of the approach of their armed forces, which had gone beyond the concepts of war on the field, with the consequence of also changing their respective arsenals. The economic cycles that have been repeated in recent times have never been positive and characterized by axes of growth, a situation that has favored the contraction of military spending, leaving very low defense potential. If, on the one hand, one can understand the reluctance to spend in the military sector, also considering the theses of the pacifists to the bitter end, it remains a fact that the Russian threat represents a concrete fact, which it is impossible not to take into account, also due to Moscow’s dangerous alliances with North Korea and Iran and therefore with areas contiguous to international terror. What must be faced is not only a clear threat, but an opaque universe of indistinct enemies, against which effective strategies must be developed. The French proposal to make military spending towards European companies has a direct value to favor a greater cohesion of European countries, but it could meet resistance from Trump, therefore it will be necessary to find a balance capable of satisfying political requests, but also legitimate European aspirations, because in the long term, also for the USA, a more militarily autonomous Europe, will be an advantage also for Washington and not only for Brussels.

Moscow’s retaliation for the Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory took the form of air strikes on fifteen provinces of Kiev. At least 17 Russian strategic bombers were involved in the air offensive, which had as its main objective that of hitting the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The estimate of the Russian missiles used exceeds two hundred, which targeted the cities and surrounding territories of Lviv, Dnipro, Cherkassy and Kiev. The new damage caused to energy infrastructure must be added to an already difficult situation in this sector, targeted as a strategic target in view of the winter season. According to some analysts, the large-scale increase in bombings would be a response to the invasion of Russian territory, and in part Moscow’s action can also be read in this way, but it is undoubted that the strategy is part of the desire to hit the Ukrainian energy system, to make the situation more difficult for the population; in any case, as the Ukrainian president pointed out, the need to eliminate restrictions on Western weapons is now urgent. An adequate defense cannot be organized without hitting the supply depots that the Russian army uses on its own territory, interrupting the supply lines appears to be the best preventive defense. The Ukrainian request, addressed above all to France, the United Kingdom and the United States, appears to be justified by the preponderance of the Russian air force, which, at the moment, is the only factor capable of making the difference. Stopping Moscow’s incursions into Ukrainian skies and the protection provided from above to the Russian forces occupying Ukrainian territories would represent the solution capable of reversing the forces of the conflict and arriving at possible negotiations in a very different way for Kiev. If we analyze what has been defined as the Russian response to the invasion of its territory, the first legitimate question to ask is why Moscow has not chosen to carry out an equivalent action in the province of Kursk against the Ukrainian occupying forces and retake its territory. On the ground, the advance of more experienced Ukrainian soldiers against Russian conscripts was quite easy and led to the conquest of about a thousand square kilometers, with twenty-eight inhabited centers, which forced the Russian authorities to evacuate about 121,000 civilians. A situation that had not occurred since the Second World War, however, the Kremlin’s choice was to maintain positions in Donbass, without moving more qualified soldiers to reconquer the lost ground, and even the choice to use bombing directly in Ukraine raises some doubts. The questions concern the capacity of Russian troops to mobilize, meaning selected and trained soldiers, which seems to have reached the end of their availability, as well as the arsenals of missiles and bombing devices, on which a choice had to be made that left out the occupied territories of the Kursk province. The opportunity for the West, if it wants to have any chance of reaching negotiations, seems to have to be exploited and this can only be done with an increase in military supplies, especially in the anti-aircraft sector, and with the end of the restriction of the use of Western weapons against Moscow’s territory. What must be passed, both among Western governments and parliaments, is the idea that the use of Western weapons used only on Ukrainian territory halves their effectiveness, also becoming a useless economic waste. The concept of defensive war does not imply the use of weapons only on the territory to be defended, but also on the territories from which the attacks come, even if these are under another sovereignty. At the moment Western rules favor Moscow, which, it must be remembered, is the entity that has broken every rule of international law, and for this very reason must be stopped as soon as possible by making it as harmless as possible. The Kremlin’s forces appear tired and vulnerable, as demonstrated by the Ukrainian maneuver in the province of Kursk and are based mainly on air dominance; By breaking this predominance, Russia will have to retreat and sit at the negotiating table, certainly not from a position of strength. The West has the duty to help Ukraine because that is the best help to itself.

The decision, probably Israeli, to eliminate the political leader and negotiator of Hamas, Ismail Haniye, has led to his replacement with Yahya Sinuar, the military leader of the organization and considered the one who planned the attack of October 7 and, for this reason, the most wanted by the Israel Defense Forces. This forced changeover at the top of Hamas represents a response towards Israel, which appears to be a sort of retaliation against Tel Aviv and which is meant to signify a clear distancing from the peace negotiations and a shift towards an even more violent attitude in the war in Gaza in particular, and in any case against any possible agreement with the Israelis. The two-state solution is also moving away, because both leaders of the two parties, Sinuar and Netanyahu, now agree precisely on their opposition to this solution. Hamas’s choice can be understood but not shared, because it will mean even greater pressure on the civilian population of Gaza, with more victims and health and hygiene situations, if possible, even worse than the current ones. The impression is that Hamas has fallen into the Israeli trap, whose intention in eliminating Haniye was precisely to replace him with Sinuar. The turning point, with the appointment of the military head of Hamas, will further increase Israel’s repressive activity, both in Gaza and in the West Bank, giving a sort of justification to preventive military actions, which could allow the conquest of other areas; it appears clear, in fact, that the massacre of October 7 is now a pretext to wipe out the Palestinian population from the territories still inhabited by the Arab ethnic group, which the Israeli government, composed largely of religious nationalists, considers its own. Netanyahu, after all, has always followed a wait-and-see tactic, since the installation of the first government, which took place in 1996. The Israeli prime minister has repeatedly deceived international politics, about the possibility of the creation of a Palestinian state; in reality it never really envisaged such a solution and now it is taking advantage of a politically incorrect and above all reckless action by Hamas to put an end to the two-state project, despite it being the solution most supported by most countries in the world. This can happen because the US continues to support Tel Aviv, even despite the senseless massacres of civilians in Gaza and the activity carried out on the territory of other states in contempt of every rule of international law and Europe, beyond the facade declarations, has never undertaken a concrete policy of sanctions to stop the violence. The Palestinians certainly cannot count on the uselessly brought support of Iran, Hezbollah and Houthi, who, indeed, risk with their attitude, to cause collateral victims of their initiatives. The Sunni Arab states maintain a detached attitude, due to their interest in new relations with Tel Aviv and do not go beyond mere pragmatic declarations. The matter of the appointment of the military leader of Hamas as political leader of the same organization, moreover, is not the result of an electoral consultation, but of a self-referential maneuver of which the Palestinians are victims and which, for them and perhaps for the world, does not appear to be a convenient choice. The possibility of an influence on this decision by the actors most hostile to Israel and considered by Hamas to be the only reliable allies: Iran and Hezbollah must also be evaluated; in the context of a retaliation, now considered increasingly probable for the assassination of the political leader of Hamas, which took place in Tehran, the appointment of the military leader as political leader of Hamas could mean a greater commitment for Israel in Gaza, coinciding precisely with the start of the Iranian retaliation. The Israelis could be more consistently engaged in Gaza, attacked in the North by Hezbollah and hit by the Iranians and by the actions of the Houthi drones. The result would be a military pressure, perhaps never seen before, to which Israel would be subjected. Meanwhile, American naval assets are already deployed and the danger of a widening of the conflict is increasingly likely and the nomination of Hamas only increases this possibility even more.

The physical elimination of Hezbollah’s number two, which took place in Lebanon, was followed by that of Hamas leader Hanieyh in Tehran. The common feature is that these murders took place on foreign soil, belonging to the sovereignty of the respective states; the point is important because the responsibility for the assassins, in the first case, was claimed by the Israelis, while in the second case Tel Aviv is silent for now; however, several international actors agree in attributing responsibility to the armed forces of Israel. Claiming an attack on Iranian soil means admitting a dangerous violation of Tehran’s sovereignty, which would justify a response from the Shiite country. In reality, there are objectively few doubts about the instigator of the rocket that hit the victim’s house. The rocket did not come from inside the Iranian country, but arrived there from abroad, a clue that does not speak in favor of Tel Aviv. If this were the case, the consequences of the Israeli strategy would concretely risk frighteningly widening a conflict that has already risked becoming lethal for the entire world too many times. Tel Aviv presents itself to the world with a conduct that is contemptuous of international law and without any desire to seek a true peace that is not functional to its own expansionist goals, both in Gaza and in the West Bank. An aspect that plays a decisive role in Israel’s conduct are the useless threats from Europe, which does nothing to put an end to the Israeli massacres, and the substantial support, albeit with criticism, of the United States. If the condemnation and the consequent threats, from the Iranian side appear to be obvious (among other things, the killing of the Hamas representative occurred on the occasion of the investiture of the new president of Iran), the reactions of other nations and organizations have also been particularly violent. Turkey has defined the assassination as despicable, Erdogan had already heavily condemned Tel Aviv for the killing of the Hezbollah leader and in this instance he has doubled the dose, the attitude of the Turkish president is functional to regain consensus in view of the presidential elections, setting himself up as a defender of the Palestinian people. The Turkish question is particularly important, because Ankara is part of the Atlantic Alliance and its political line differs significantly, especially from that of Washington. Naturally Hamas has threatened Israel, but the current military conditions are less worrying for Israel than kamikaze attacks by isolated members, just as the situation in the West Bank risks dangerously worsening, where popular unrest will start with strikes and demonstrations against the Israeli government; more problematic, from a military point of view, are the retaliatory actions promised by the Houthis, who have already demonstrated that they can hit Israel with their drones. Iraq has also condemned Israel, while the US has assured Tel Aviv of protection in the event of an attack, words that do not help to cool the situation. Tehran, for its part, has stated that the fact will bring the Shiite country even closer to the Palestinians, what this rapprochement will be like is a central question, because if it materialises with military aid or interventions in support of the belligerents in Gaza, tension between the two states will probably rise to levels never seen before. In any case, it is unthinkable that Tehran will not respond with an action at least equal to that of Israel, if this succeeds it will reopen the race for retaliation, with obvious repercussions on the talks and on the peace process for the situation in Gaza. In the general context, the reaction of Qatar, personally involved in the peace talks, is particularly effective, having underlined that in a negotiation where one party kills a representative of the other it has no chance of achieving success; this is probably exactly what Israel and its government of irresponsible people want.

Biden’s speech about his decision not to run was marked by his resignation as an act of generosity and protection of American democracy, essentially a personal sacrifice to avoid leaving the country in Trump’s hands. Biden rightly claimed the results, especially economic ones, of his presidency, promising not to leave the most important office in the US early, as his political rivals have repeatedly requested. In reality, the justifications for his withdrawal, while including the right defense of American democracy, must, by necessity, focus on the lack of appreciation by the Democratic leadership, the low value of the polls, a state of health that does not seem to allow the adequate conduct of a possible new mandate and the flight of investors. The truth is that Biden, without physical impediments, would have deserved a re-candidacy precisely for the results of his mandate, especially obtained in the domestic field, increasingly difficult to manage compared to foreign policy; the outgoing president, on the other hand, appeared weaker in foreign policy, with the disputed decision to abandon Afghanistan, not having achieved substantial progress on the Pacific flank, not having sufficiently countered China from a commercial point of view and not having obtained a solution to the Ukrainian question and having maintained an insecure attitude towards Israel. These issues, unfavorable to Biden, have obtained for Trump, reasons to attack his former opponent, obscuring the merits of the results obtained with economic growth and the reduction of unemployment. The Republicans have focused against Biden’s chronological age to which were added the evident difficulties after the electoral confrontation, but it must be specified, that, if humanly it was legitimate for Biden to be re-candidacy, the party has lacked a serious examination of the candidate’s situation and of the real capacity to sustain the effort of the electoral campaign. The signs, quite evident, have been present for some time and there has been a lack of action, even courageous, to question the opportunity to re-present the outgoing president to the voters. This is also considering the fact of how Trump would have conducted the electoral campaign, with particularly violent and mystifying tones. Of course, it is not easy not to renew the candidacy of an outgoing president, however, the poor management of the party situation has generated profound uncertainty in an electorate that was in any case pressed by a Republican action that was a crescendo of consensus. The Democratic Party was divided into clans and was characterized by an immobility, which if prolonged, would have guaranteed Trump a real plebiscite. Only the fear of an authoritarian drift, caused by the excessive power of the Republican candidate, moved the party leaders towards an alternative solution. Although it was not a timely decision and, above all, an unusual one, the choice of replacing the candidate appears to be the only way to effectively counter Trump, however, it should not have reached this point and acted much earlier to avoid Biden the humiliation of withdrawal; in short, if the Republican Party has lost all its original characteristics, becoming a hostage of Trump, the Democratic Party is not much better either. It is clear that the American political situation is at a sort of standstill, because it is held hostage by incompetent people who only want to secure as much power as possible for themselves, deceiving an increasingly individualistic and disinterested electorate. In this context, Biden’s step back must be greatly appreciated, the outgoing president emerges as a sort of political giant, capable of sacrificing his own ambitions in order to avoid handing the country over to a new Trump presidency. Now the Democratic Party must know how to give itself an organization capable of leading its candidate to victory. Biden’s act must provide the impetus for a reconstruction of the electoral machine capable of overcoming internal divisions to try to win and avoid the USA and the world repeating the disaster of a new Trump presidency.

The targeting of the Iranian consular headquarters in Syria and the organization that brought food to the Gaza Strip are two episodes which present similarities that should not be underestimated in the medium-term Israeli strategy. In the war, so called by proxy, between Tel Aviv and Tehran, having struck an Iranian headquarters in foreign territory represents a new level for Israel; one of the main objectives may be to seek an expansion of the conflict that implies greater US involvement in favor of the Israelis, especially after President Biden has distanced himself from the methods practiced in Gaza; Although Washington claimed not to have been warned of the Israeli attack, the Tel Aviv government appears to have used this attack to induce the Iranians to condemn both Israel and the US, in order to force the Americans into forced support against the regime. Iranian. This tactic presents the clear intention of stalling while waiting for the US election results, where a possible affirmation by Trump is seen as more favorable to the Israeli cause, however the risk of an expansion of the conflict is implicit in Tel Aviv’s action and this entails further even greater trade problems in the Persian Gulf, for which Israel will, sooner or later, have to account. Not only that, it is conceivable that other actors will be involved, both indirectly and directly, in a widening of the Middle Eastern crisis. It must be remembered that Syria’s major ally, in addition to Iran, is Russia, even if in the current situation it is not a direct involvement of Moscow seems possible, an increasingly closer link between Tehran and Russia appears possible, with ever greater collaborations, especially in the armaments sector, with direct effects on other ongoing conflicts. One of the most predictable developments is the increase in the actions of militias close to the Iranians, both against Israel and against American bases in the Middle East. The doubling of the front, in addition to that of Gaza, also the Syrian one, against which Israel will have to measure itself, is functional to the government in office and to its Prime Minister, who does not want elections, which he would certainly lose and which would give rise to judicial proceedings in which is implicated. What is sacrificed, not only to Israeli interests, but to specific partisan political interests is peace in the Middle Eastern region and also in the world, creating the conditions for total instability. If, to keep the USA apprehensive, they did not hesitate to go against international law, striking the error of having struck a non-governmental organization in a third country, albeit an ally of the Iranians, on the Gaza front, it appears equally functional to the interests of Tel Aviv: in fact two other organizations have announced that they will leave the Gaza Strip, due to the situation being too dangerous for their staff; this means the subtraction of large supplies of food from a population already severely affected by the scarcity of food and in precarious health and hygiene conditions. The situation, which is worsened by the absence of non-governmental organisations, affects not only the civilian population but also Hamas, which, in addition to its ever-increasing distance from the inhabitants of Gaza, cannot benefit from international aid; however, this element is only an addition to the normal conduct of Israel, which has undertaken for some time, well before the events of October 7, a policy of managing food resources to be allocated to the Gaza Strip, with clear downward regulatory intentions. In 2012, following a human rights organisation, Tel Aviv was forced to publish its own document from 2008, which set out the calories for people to be given to the inhabitants of the Strip, foods that excluded those deemed non-essential. Despite the forced apologies of the Israeli armed forces, the ways in which the vehicles of the non-governmental organization were hit leave many doubts about the voluntariness of blocking a mission, with the obvious repercussions, which promptly occurred. It is of little use to say that the outcry caused is due to Western victims, in similar ways, which caused more than 30,000 civilian deaths, there were not even any apologies. Civilized countries should sanction Israel for this unpunished conduct.

The judgment of the Washington Court of Appeal does not consider immunity valid for Trump, for having tried to change the election result, after the outcome that led Biden to be the new US president. The ruling of the court, composed of three judges, arrived unanimously, refuting Trump’s defense, which aimed at total immunity from the law, even for acts carried out in cases where his power has been extinguished. This defense, the court refuted, presupposes that the office of US president is equivalent to an absolute sovereign, that is, not subject to any earthly law; furthermore, the defense thesis calls into question the natural recognition of the electoral response and of the separation of powers itself, because it would place the presidential office above the regulations. An aspect to underline is that one of the three judges has a conservative background and was appointed by Trump himself. A fundamental aspect of the ruling is that the US president can be accused of crimes committed during his period in office: this is a very relevant resolution from a legal point of view, because it is the first time it has been adopted in US law and that establishes that immunity belongs to the presidential office and not to the person, so once they have expired, immunity is no longer enjoyed. There are two options for Trump’s defense to appeal the ruling of the Washington Court of Appeals: the first would consist in filing the appeal with all the judges of the Washington Circuit, technically defined as “appeal en banc”, however this solution appears unlikely , because according to jurists a change in the sentence would be unlikely, or, and this is the second option, the appeal can take place at the Supreme Court, made up of six Republican and three Democratic members. This choice would also have a tactical political value, given that the Supreme Court, for this session, which will end in July, should no longer accept cases, leaving the question pending, a solution preferred by Trump himself; however, it could also be probable that, given the seriousness of the issue, the President of the Court will include the probable appeal in the current session. In any case, both the sentence and the appeal generate doubts about the legal future of Trump, who remains the most likely candidate for the Republican Party in the elections on November 5th, also because there are already two appeals from the former at the Supreme Court president relating to the decisions of the states of Maine and Colorado, which banned Trump’s candidacy, again due to the events following his 2020 electoral defeat. A possibility recognized by some jurists is the possible rejection of the decisions of Maine and Colorado, by part of the Supreme Court, but the confirmation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals of Washington, which contains legally relevant arguments against Trump and which could bring him to trial, precisely because his attitude interfered in the process of counting and verifying the votes, a matter completely outside presidential competence: this would represent an attack on the structure of the state; a charge that is difficult to refute. In the meantime, however, Trump’s presidential campaign is proceeding triumphantly and the only candidate still present, Nikky Halley, has very little chance of bringing the Republican Party back to its traditional political path and therefore of seriously competing for Trump’s presidential candidacy . The legal question arises in a context of profound division and radicalization between the two electorates, where the contending parties have further distanced themselves on all matters, both domestic, economic and international politics. Furthermore, the precedent of the Capitol insurrection identifies Trump supporters, certainly not all, as capable of violent gestures in open conflict with federal laws. On the other hand, postponing the decision on the decisions of the states of Maine and Colorado and on the ruling of the Washington Court of Appeals could raise serious doubts about the real impartiality of the Supreme Court, generating an institutional short circuit capable of paralyzing the country, in a moment where the international situation requires quick decisions. If the result with Trump as candidate is in the balance, perhaps with another Republican candidate a situation could arise that would impose a renewal even among the Democrats, but time is running out, putting the entire Western balance at risk.