Categoria: English version

Currently, the world’s greatest concerns are centered on the social and economic repercussions of the pandemic, but the attention perspectives are scarcely focused on global developments to the advantage of an attention of individual states towards their respective internal situation: it is an understandable vision but extremely restricted, which overlooks and neglects other international emergencies, whose actors are ready to exploit this inattention to turn it to their own advantage. The issue of global terrorism certainly falls within this series, which seems to develop more in two directions, only apparently opposite. The reference is to Muslim religious terrorism, which, despite the defeats suffered on the ground by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, has been able to carve out new spaces, which, although reduced for now, promise interesting developments for Islamic radicalism. The second emergency is the development and consolidation of racist terrorism, which develops thanks to the new diffusion of far-right ideas and movements, often too tolerated, but also supported by government apparatuses for functional reasons. The pandemic emergency has caused a worsening of the global economic situation, the first impact of which concerned, at a global level, less attention to human rights: this issue is intimately connected with the fight against terrorism, because precisely the cultural foundations of respect for rights are the first obstacle, both political and practical, to prevent the spread of Islamic terrorism, which has targeted the vast sectors of the Muslim faith, especially present in the West, which are located on the margins of society, suffering from poor social and economic inclusion. The battleground moves from the Middle Eastern territories to that of the web space, where thanks to the competence of recruiters in exploiting social web, proselytism is increased, with the consequence of creating a high recruitment capacity and potential mobilization in every corner of the world . These practices have been particularly successful in South Asia, in the southeast of the Asian continent, in East and South Africa, in the Sahel and in the Lake Chad basin. These are territories located in key areas for international or strategic trade to regulate potential immigration to the richest areas of the globe. For these reasons it is important to combat the phenomenon of the development of the web of the spread of proselytism of radicalism with cultural tools, capable of making people understand the basic errors that are at the basis of the violent message, associated, however, with practical help practices; this second point is more difficult to implement precisely because of the compression of economic development due to the pandemic: this requires a coordinated effort at a supranational level and by the agreement of several states framed in a multilateral perspective; a need also acknowledged by the offices of the United Nations for the fight against terrorism. But the pandemic has also favored the development of a trend that was still growing, that of right-wing extremism, and which has been able to develop issues such as health denialism, connected with the rejection of the health precautionary measures developed by the states, conveying the anger of entire social sectors severely tested by the crisis and without adequate economic support. Right-wing extremism, also based on racial issues, has been supported by state apparatuses in a more or less evident way, as happened in the United States or in European countries, where free-killing laws have favored the denial of civil, political and expression rights. , creating the conditions for a kind of proselytism in Western democracies. Attention must be paid to this type of underhanded terrorism, which often appreciates the Chinese practice of securing employment and well-being in exchange for rights, because it constitutes a cause of danger precisely to the foundations of Western thought. Of course, the main emergency is manifested by the activity of extreme right-wing groups, often flanked in a semi-hidden way by sovereign and nationalist parties and movements, which recognize in these extremisms their electoral reservoir. This type of terrorism has common ground with Islamic radicalism on the ways of using new technologies and exploiting them for one’s own proselytism: an issue that places on the agenda a way of regulating social media, without however encroaching on censorship.

A few days after Trump’s lapse as president of the United States, the outgoing administration of the White House bequeaths the new President Biden a hostile political act towards China, which cannot help but complicate relations between Beijing and the new administration of Washington. In practice, the Secretary of State, in one of his latest administrative acts, eliminated the restrictions in force between American and Taiwanese officials. Although the US has never formally recognized Formosa, they are its main ally, to which they supply huge quantities of war material, and manage relations with the capital Taipei through the American Institute of Taiwan, a name behind which there is a real unofficial US embassy. The decision to send the US ambassador to the United Nations to visit Taiwan, after the recent mission of the US Secretary of Health, also represents a reason for deep resentment on the part of Beijing; on the other hand, all these measures have the highest satisfaction of the Taipei administration, which sees the end of bilateral discrimination between the United States and Taiwan, conditioned, precisely by continued Chinese pressure. For Beijing, Taiwan is considered a non-alienable part of the Chinese territory and even though Taipei is functioning as an independent state, reunification with the motherland is an indispensable part of the Chinese project to effectively exercise its sovereignty on the island. For Beijing it is a non-negotiable condition to have diplomatic relations with China not to have one with Taiwan, in fact, at the moment there are only seven nations, including the Vatican, that have formal relations with Taipei. Donald Trump, without going so far as to establish the official nature of the relations with the formal steps, which are required internationally, has established very cordial, if not friendly, relations with Taiwan, which must be included in the containment program of the Chinese giant in what Beijing considers its zone of exclusive influence. As it is no mystery the collaboration between the US military and those of Formosa, in addition to the aforementioned supplies of weapons, on the contrary the Chinese tones have risen, to the point of making public the possibility of making an armed option possible for the reconquest of the island. The resulting issues are essentially two: the action of the Secretary of State was certainly carried out without coordination with the next administration and at first glance it appears as a disturbing action, even if framed in the logical political continuation of the program of Trump’s foreign policy. We do not yet know how Biden wants to set up relations on China: from the electoral program there appeared a desire for more relaxed relations, but more or less coinciding on the desire to identify Beijing as the main competitor at the international level and the desire to limit it as much possible. This program includes a new relationship with Europe, to downsize relations between Brussels and Beijing, but also to contain Chinese power right on the line of its borders, considering the great importance of the communication routes on the Asian side of the Pacific Ocean, which cannot be left to Chinese management. The issue is both commercial and geopolitical. An expansion of the Chinese political weight, which could pass from economic to military, cannot be tolerated, neither by a republican politician nor by a democratic one: on the other hand, Obama had already shifted the main attention of the United States from Europe to the Asian regions around China, considering this region much more important from a strategic point of view for the USA. The outgoing Secretary of State apparently would have done an act to the detriment of Biden, but, in reality, he could have accelerated a process that the new American administration would have had to carry out anyway, given that for Washington the alliance with Taiwan appears indispensable precisely because of the Chinese threats, which, if carried out, would deprive the United States of an indispensable strategic position for partial control of the region. It is certainly a highly unstable equilibrium because it is subject to potential and continuous accidents, between two parties whose agreement on this issue is currently impossible.

The riots in Washington, beyond the evident gravity of the facts, which have ruined the American prestige and may influence the judgments of foreign countries towards any US decision in foreign policy, bring to the fore an internal problem, which had remained hidden in the American political debate, because in part undervalued and in part remained in a less important position than Trump’s anomalous behavior. With what has probably been the worst presidency ever seen in Washington, the problem of the Republican party’s immediate and even longer-term future opens up. In this historical phase the dross of the Trump presidency leaves a profoundly divided formation between classic republicans, who prefer a model of the liberal right, but always and in any case within the respect of the laws of the country and populists, who want to impose a retrograde vision of the country , fruit of the pre-eminence of the Tea party ideology, which has taken over the party, and which reject democratic laws, as amply demonstrated, easily influenced by a mixture of religious and racist motivations, surrounded by incredible conspiracy theories, elaborated by skilled political manipulators , with the sole purpose of obtaining easy consent. The main objection to these theses is, that, however, Trump has achieved the record of votes for a Republican candidate and that those who stormed the American parliament and those who share this aggression, do not constitute the total of his electorate: this is true and constitutes the very basis of the dangerous division of the republican party. Currently the risk of splitting is very concrete: there is a split between the leadership of the party, which has suffered and endured Trump due to its inability to express a proper and alternative candidate, and a substantial part of the base, which has radicalized towards the populist ideologies; this radicalization did not come out of nowhere, the so-called deep America had and has characteristics that made it easy for a leader like Trump to conquer, disrespectful of democratic rules, experienced as a prevarication by political and financial elites, often perceived not without reason, as responsible for the profound inequality present in the most backward regions of the country. Also in terms of the number of deputies and senators elected to the US parliament, out of a total of 262 members, 147 have spoken out against the ratification of Biden’s election: siding with Trump they have expressed, out of conviction or opportunity, their adhesion to the wing party populist, playing a kind of gamble on their political future; in fact, if on the one hand, this support can constitute an investment, in the case of a re-nomination of Trump, even outside the Republican party, on the contrary, it probably closes every possibility within the classical republican formation. The question, however, is whether these two sides will be able to have a reconciliation; Trump and therefore his electorate does not seem willing to forgive the behavior of the party from what it considers a weakness towards the elected president, the party, however, will never be able to forgive Trump for the final act of his presidency, represented by absolute contempt towards American democratic rules. The outgoing president seems to have promised his reappointment in four years, which if it materializes, it will not be within the current perimeter, so the hypothesis of a break with American bipartisanship seems to become a possibility; however, if for Biden things appear simpler at the moment, even the Democratic party risks suffering strong tensions between the more moderate part and the left wing, which has increased its weight. Reflection is a must, especially in a time of difficulty in the American system, because it is necessary to foresee possible future scenarios, including the need for alliances outside the canonical political movements, with the consequence of a difficult governability of the most important country of the world on the international stage. The prospect must prepare the other international actors for an eventuality of internal instability in the United States, which cannot fail to be reflected in the maintenance and variation of future international balances.

Parallel to the negotiations for the exit of Great Britain, the European Union carried out an equally complicated negotiation with China, which lasted even longer than that with London; after seven years, in fact, Brussels and Beijing have concluded an agreement to rebalance their trade relations, up to now skewed in favor of the Chinese. The conclusion of the negotiation should finally allow European companies to access the vast Chinese market, also eliminating the discriminatory practices with which the Chinese bureaucracy harassed European investors. The agreement focuses on three main points: Beijing’s commitment has guaranteed greater transparency on state subsidies provided to Chinese companies, to favor greater conditions of fairness for competition, a direction towards a different approach by Chinese institutions to guarantee conditions of parity between local and European companies and, finally, a slowdown in technology transfer, which, until now, has been one of the strengths of the Chinese production system. Undoubtedly, this agreement does not completely resolve the problems of the relationship with the Chinese productive world, but it represents progress in bilateral relations, even if after seven years the result appears lower than expected and does not allow to recover the gap that this time has created precisely in advantage of Beijing; however, access to a huge market like the Chinese one, especially when the economic and financial policy of the Chinese government wanted to privilege the internal market, represents too important an opportunity, in an absolute sense, both in the future and framed in the current moment of economic difficulty. In concrete terms, China opens up to competition sectors such as cloud services, finance, private health care and environmental and transport services, which were entirely reserved for local companies; the agreement also opens up new prospects in the manufacturing sector, which constitutes a share of more than 50% of total European investments in China; also in the automobile sector, which represents ample development margins thanks to electric traction, there will be new opportunities thanks to the gradual elimination of the obligation to create mixed companies: European investments in China in this sector represent the 28% share. of the total, therefore destined to grow with the new regulation. More controversial are the real applications that the European Commission would have obtained from China regarding greater respect for the environment and, above all, with regard to labor rights: in the past Beijing had already committed itself to these issues, without, however, keeping its word date; this time among the reassurances towards Europe, the People’s Republic of China has promised to adopt, albeit gradually, all the conventions of the International Labor Organization, this is an issue that should be decisive for reaching agreements with the Chinese economic superpower, both from a moral point of view and from a pure economic advantage to establish a level playing field for access to the world of work, as a determining component of the economic process. These considerations open a complex reasoning on the convenience of the agreement with China: established that during the French presidency in 2022, extensive assessments will be made on relations with the Chinese country, the doubts, widely expressed, remain for the repression operated by the regime of Xi Jinping in Hong Kong, against the populations of Uighurs, Tibet and against the internal opposition, also through the persecution of journalists and human rights activists. Within the European institutions not everyone is in favor of this agreement, for example the president of the European Parliament for relations with China, has defined the treaty as a strategic error and the main European ally, the United States, has expressed concern; if for the economy the agreement can be considered an opportunity, in a more general evaluation it cannot be said that the country with which this treaty was stipulated is a dictatorship, which has every interest, both economic and political. , to have increasingly secure relationships with the largest market in the world and to try to penetrate more and more into European society. The Chinese model is looked upon with envy by many of the corporate ruling class and this constitutes a strong point for Beijing, which, on the contrary, should be stimulated, especially with the economic lever, to approach Western values: not the other way around.

The agreement reached in extremis between the European Union and the United Kingdom, beyond the opportunist statements of the British premier, who underlined how the bond between the two parties will still remain from an emotional, historical, cultural and strategic point of view, marks the end of the London’s troubled process of leaving the project of united Europe and represents a failure for both sides, which only time will tell what the real effects will be and the relative advantages and disadvantages. The triumphalist declarations coming from London have only a political foundation, naturally functional to Brexit, thanks to the resumption of full sovereignty in London, which without the often unjustified advantages granted by Brussels will have problems of a different nature on the economic level already in the short term. period, but which may become more serious in the medium and long term and cannot be resolved by small bilateral agreements, such as the recent trade pact between London and Ankara. Although the approval of the text agreed with Brussels is very probable, the large part of the population opposed to leaving Europe is represented by the split present in Labor, which, although officially in favor, must clash with strong internal opposition, due to the ‘agreement considered highly unfavorable for the workers, by the Scottish National Party, where the issue of leaving the United Kingdom has returned to the fore precisely because of the abandonment of the Union, by the Liberal Democratic Party and finally by the Unionist Democratic Party. The major disagreements, those that could give more problems, concern the question of fishing, which has kept negotiations blocked for a long time, where the presence of Union fishing vessels in English waters is still considered excessive, a factor that is still perceived as an interference. too strong on British sovereignty; Furthermore, the problem of exports from the United Kingdom is present and very much felt, which have been a much discussed matter since 1973, the year of entry into the European Economic Community, if Brussels intends to apply European regulations, situations of lack of congruity could arise, which would damage definitely the export business. These conditions have fostered in the sector a sense of mistrust in the government, which is accused of lack of commitment on these issues and, essentially, of having betrayed the entire export production sector in order to achieve the result of Brexit more quickly. The greatest weight in the British economy is represented by the financial services sector, an advanced service sector that has prospered thanks to European integration; currently the British stock exchange will be considered in the same way as the main foreign stock exchanges, such as New York or Singapore, no longer enjoying the advantages guaranteed by Europe: the real danger is that on this state of affairs there will not be the change desired by London and this would reduce the turnover of the national financial sector is significantly, which would certainly have heavy repercussions on the national gross domestic product. Finally, the Scottish question is the real danger, because it could favor a dissolution of the United Kingdom, starting from the Scottish territory, which could generate a ripple effect with implications for Wales and Northern Ireland as well. The permanence of Edinburgh in the United Kingdom was determined, albeit with little difference, precisely by the guarantee of permanence in the European Union, once this condition is no longer valid, a new referendum would probably have a different result; for this very reason London refuses a new popular consultation on the subject, a decision reinforced by polls that give 60% of the Scottish electorate in favor of independence. In addition to the traditional need for autonomy, the Scottish public is dissatisfied with the treatment that local products directed to Europe will suffer as a result of the English devolution. With the Scottish parliamentary elections scheduled for 2021, a result strongly favorable to the separatists would put the London government in serious difficulty. As regards the examination that the European Parliament has reserved for itself from the reading of the approximately two thousand pages of the text of the agreement, which will be examined starting from the first days of January, there are several unknowns on the approval due to the unfavorable judgments on the agreement due to the feeling of too many concessions to London, especially from Paris. The possibility of a “No deal” is not completely averted: on both sides, but in perspective the problems in London seem too many for an easy path, even if approved by both parties.

The continuation of the negotiations for the management of the situation after the exit of Great Britain from the European Union are continuing with the attention of the European Parliament, which remains firm on its request to be able to dispose of the final text as soon as possible, in order to be able to evaluate all the technical and legal aspects of an issue that promises to be difficult to understand even for the most experienced bureaucrats in Brussels. Without having the final text available, ratification could postpone after 31 December 2020 and therefore exceed the terms of the transitional agreement; in that case the possibility of a definitive agreement would become more concrete and the relations between the two parties would be governed by the world trade agreement, with the consequence of jeopardizing a turnover, than only for imports and exports it is around 500,000 million euros annually. If the aspects concerning the regulation for the guarantee of measures on competitive competition are moving towards a definition, which could guarantee access to the English companies to the European market in a practically unlimited way, the most difficult point to solve remains: that of quotas. fishing. It is a symbolic matter for the conservative government, with an almost irrelevant impact on the gross domestic product of the United Kingdom, but which in the collective imagination of the party in favor of leaving the Union, represents the maximum exercise of its sovereignty, together with the willingness to manage immigration in a totally autonomous way. On fishing, the European request is to be able to have a transition period, from six to ten years, to be able to allow access to the European fleet, but which concerns to a greater extent fishing vessels from France, to British waters, which ensure a 50% caught by Union vessels. London’s goal is a year-by-year negotiation, which does not allow industrial planning to Europe and above all gives an undoubted advantage to the British, who would have the possibility of substantially reducing access quotas and even reducing them entirely. This is a prospect that is not acceptable to the Union and which would cause an almost automatic reduction in the access of British products to the European market in proportion to the share of fishing rights reduced by London. If these mutual doubts are not resolved by the agreed term, a possible agreement could enter into force provisionally from the first of the year and then be voted on later by the European Parliament. This eventuality, however, is not to the liking of the European Commission, which fears preventive control over its decisions, a decision certainly democratic but capable of slowing down decisions that require a greater speed of decision, also because the agreement with the United Kingdom, in its procedure , should set a precedent for other similar situations. If in this decision one understands the necessity and urgency of the decision, however, the Commission’s fear does not appear justified as regards the future, but rather the need for a clear and adequately regulated process, which can reconcile the need for speed. decision, with the necessary sharing with the parliament, which is always the representative body elected by European citizens. Returning to the negotiations, it is also necessary to pay attention to the balance that a privileged agreement with the United Kingdom would affect: other countries that have separate agreements with Brussels may request to renegotiate the terms of collaboration. It should be remembered that no nation can enjoy access to the European market, the richest in the world, without quotas and tariffs and this privilege would be granted to the British for the first time: if the economic advantages can be considerable, from a political point of view this privilege a concession appears to be a sort of defeat, because it does not sanction those who wanted to leave Europe in the name of a sovereignty that is in full contrast with European principles; the desire to save jobs and market shares is a sufficient justification, also due to the value of the exchanges, but must be the only exception in order not to degrade the weight and prestige of the European Union; then if the United Kingdom continues to continue its intransigence, it is better to abandon all negotiations because the negative repercussions will be greater for London, which will have to return to dealing with positions of inferiority.

The umpteenth deal of an expired administration leaves heavy issues as a legacy to the new tenant of the White House and imposes a series of economic and political obligations on him, which may not be shared. The fourth Arab state that agrees to establish relations with Israel, thanks to American mediation, after the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan is Morocco, which obtains the recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, the former Spanish colony abandoned by Madrid in 1975. . To achieve diplomatic success with the United Arab Emirates, the US has undertaken to finance the Emirati army with a rearmament program costing 19,100 million euros, for Bahrain the cost is political to favor relations with the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia, while for Sudan it is a commitment that concerns both aspects, being the promise, not yet materialized, to lift Washington’s sanctions against the African country, which had been inflicted to strike the previous dictatorial regime. For Rabat, the advantage is that sovereignty over Western Sahara is recognized, it does not matter if, for now, this recognition comes only from the United States, the only country in the international community to carry it out; Trump has spoken expressly that the solution of the Moroccan government is the only viable proposal in the search for a lasting peace process. This appreciation allows Morocco to overcome the 1991 agreements, signed with the Polisario Front at the United Nations, which provided for a referendum for the self-determination of the populations of Western Sahara. This could aggravate a crisis situation resumed on 12 November last, with a confrontation between the Moroccan army and independence activists, after twenty-nine years of truce. It should be remembered that Western Sahara is the largest non-independent territory on the planet and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Republic has the recognition of 76 nations and the African Union and holds observer status at the United Nations. It is understandable that Trump’s tactic aims to divide the African Union and leave Biden a serious responsibility, also because the decision in favor of Morocco interrupts a line that the US had long held good on the issue. If Biden decides to endorse Trump’s decision, it would go against American diplomatic circles on the contrary, a revocation of the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, would imply a cooling in relations between Rabat and Tel Aviv. The proof that uncertainty also reigns in Morocco, beyond the declarations of satisfaction, is that for now Rabat does not intend to open any diplomatic representation in Israel, as if to await the developments of the new American foreign policy. A further reason, then, is the attitude to have with the Palestinians, who immediately appeared very angry. Morocco immediately specified that it does not intend to change its favorable attitude on the solution of a territory and two states, incompatible with Netanyahu’s vision. The Israeli premier at the moment seems to be the real winner, bringing a new agreement with an Arab state as his personal victory, in a very difficult moment on the home front, where the country risks a fourth political election in a short time. Trump continues to play for himself, sacrificing US foreign policy for his own purposes in a moment of handover: what the outgoing president considers successful is the tactic of leaving a very difficult situation to manage for what will have to be politics democratic foreign exchange, with the attitude of several allied states potentially negative with the new president. The plan is broad and aims, first of all, to create a network of states linked to the old president in view of a possible reappointment in four years, leaving difficult situations for the new tenant of the White House, which presuppose the fact of leaving the decisions unchanged. existing, with the opposition of the Democratic Party, or vice versa to overturn them, but having to face the aversion of those who will have to suffer these contrary decisions. A trap that appears to have been created to delegitimize the new president either in front of foreign allies or in front of one’s own electorate. In conclusion, it must be remembered that Trump has not yet formally recognized the defeat and is threatening to lead the most important country in the world towards institutional chaos, which could have very serious repercussions for the whole world.

Israel risks going to elections for the fourth time in two years: the worrying eventuality is due to the decision of the leader of the Blue White party, in government, albeit reluctantly, with Netanyahu, to vote no confidence in the executive, presented by the opposition party which was formed by the split of the Blue White party precisely because of the decision to create the coalition government currently in power. Just seven months have passed since the inauguration of the current executive based on too fragile balances and on which Netanyahu built his umpteenth political survival tactic, with the clear intention of escaping the accusations of fraud, corruption and abuse of power, which have generated three distinct judicial procedures. The political accusation against Netanyahu, which, instead, led to the vote in favor of no confidence, concerns the failure to respect the agreed commitments to keep the coalition government alive. The leader of the party Bul Bianco, the former Israeli chief of staff, however, has left one option to avoid the fall of the government: to allow the budget to be approved on time. This move represents a real ultimatum for Netanyahu, as failure to approve the state budget by December 23 will result in the dissolution of the Israeli parliament. The meaning is to unmask the head of the government, making clear his real intentions to postpone the duration of the government or to opt for a new electoral round that can postpone the judicial troubles. Netanyahu’s attempt to keep the government alive appeared to be a mere exercise in rhetoric: appealing to tasks to be completed, impossible to complete in an electoral climate, his will to keep the government alive did not appear entirely convinced. , on the other hand since the last electoral campaign the distance between the two sides was very wide and only the need not to appear in front of the electorate as irresponsible political formations, had led the parties that form the executive to support a government in which they had not strongly believed. Netanyahu could also seize a political opportunity from new elections, especially from those circles that see his activism in foreign policy in a positive way, capable of bringing Israel out of regional isolation thanks to agreements with Arab states, not only in an anti-Iranian function. , but also with potential commercial developments capable of opening new markets to Israeli exports; However, it will also be necessary to verify the weight of the growing opposition to these contacts and the ever-present problem of the colonies. The change that will occur in the American administration will be a further factor that could be decisive in a possible new vote. However, for the current Israeli prime minister, new elections seem like a gamble, a not exactly calculated risk, because the vote of no confidence in the country’s main party would prevent further political alliances, albeit in an electoral framework that risks being blocked once again. There are also practical reasons that prevent the continuation of the collaboration: the Blue White party has repeatedly stressed how the premier has blocked the renewal of the highest offices of the state and has conducted recent foreign policy actions, such as the meeting with the prince. Saudi hereditary, heavily criticized around the world for his actions, without warning his allies. However, Netanyahu’s behavior is not new and does not escape his already applied logic towards the Palestinians, made up of functional postponements and stop and go strategies in negotiations aimed at buying time to take advantage of better opportunities. Also this time the premier continued with a similar behavior, however employed in internal politics, evading the commitments made with the government partners and confirming the total unreliability towards other subjects than himself; the main international conjuncture given by the change in the White House threatens to be the worst obstacle in his path, even if it is true that he managed to survive Obama, ultimately demonstrating his tactical shrewdness. In an increasingly divided country and with ongoing judicial investigations, the fall of the government and subsequent elections could put an end to Benyamin Netanyahu’s political career; unless you find yet another expedient to stay.

In foreign policy, one of the most significant repercussions of Trump’s electoral defeat will be the possible rebirth of the Atlantic Alliance, as a rediscovered tool of Western politics. President-elect Biden’s attitude is certainly the opposite in nature to that of his predecessor, but some of the criticisms that Trump has made of his European partners, especially about the nature of financial investments in armaments, will remain current. If the request for the measure of two per cent of gross domestic product seems to be confirmed by the new tenant of the White House, at least in intentions, it will be interesting to see how the destination of the expenditure will also be evaluated: Trump had the aim of strengthening the American industry, that equipment and the European decision to finance its own armaments industry, albeit still within the perimeter of the Atlantic Alliance, had to be strongly opposed by the United States in its role as the largest shareholder of the organization. On the other hand, Trump’s willingness to detach from the Atlantic Alliance, which probably would never have been granted by the American Congress, had favored the birth of a discussion within the states of the European Union, for the creation of a common armed force: an essential tool for practicing one’s own foreign policy and preparatory to a more stringent political union. The intention was certainly not to leave the Atlantic Alliance, but a subject of such weight would have or will have the possibility of exercising a different political weight in the relationship with Washington. This determination must not fail even with Biden’s presence in the role of president of the USA, but, on the contrary, his best disposition and greater political tact must be exploited to begin rethinking the Atlantic Alliance in the context of profoundly changed geopolitical structures, which Trump did not substantially take into account. Reconciling the European Union with the United States can pass from a different role of the Atlantic Alliance, no longer more functional to US interests, but as a guarantor of Western values ​​in the theaters already present and which will emerge from global confrontations. For the moment, however, it is necessary to prepare for the possible damage that Trump will want to leave to put the organization in difficulty, starting with the desire to withdraw American soldiers from essential scenarios for world security, such as Afghanistan; these days remaining to the outgoing president could be used to put the Atlantic Alliance at a serious disadvantage and with the future need to start again from a more difficult point for reconstruction. Moving on to the most relevant specific cases, it will be interesting to see how the relationship with China will be set up, which is increasingly emerging as the main adversary, also due not only to the huge investments in armaments but as a global competitor in industry and technology. If with regard to the United States the policy of hard confrontation with Beijing should not undergo substantial changes, for a revised and corrected Atlantic Alliance, space could be created to dampen the clashes on the diplomatic level, thanks to a possible greater weight of Europe. This does not mean abdicating Western needs but only creating the possibility of a different approach. Another case that must be dealt with urgently is the role of Turkey within the alliance: Ankara opted for a policy that did not comply with the transatlantic agreements, entering into agreements to supply arms from Russia; a factor that cannot be separated from Turkey’s foreign policy conducted in open conflict with American and European interests. The attitude that will be held with Ankara will mark a line of conduct that must then be maintained in a coherent manner within the relations between the members. Finally, the deadline, February 5, of the 2010 treaty to limit nuclear warheads, signed with Russia, represents an urgent need that cannot be postponed, also due to the Russian president’s willingness to renew, which could pave the way for a new type of relations with Moscow. The need for a greater use of diplomacy seems to be shared by both the new president and the European members, this approach will be essential to approach crisis situations in a more reasoned way, without however renouncing the need for supervision and actions where it will be necessary for maintenance. of peace and the protection of Western interests.