Categoria: English version

One of the most important international repercussions that will occur with the invasion of Ukraine consists in the blocking of the export and production of wheat. In rich countries this fact translates into a substantial contribution from the increase in inflation, caused by the increase in raw materials destined for the food industry. The problem is deeply felt and the governments of the industrialized countries have room for maneuver to try to limit the damage, especially for the poorest segments of the population. A very different order of problems, however, occurs for poor countries or even for those whose national wealth has been greatly reduced due to the sum of the contingencies of the pandemic and the time of war. Several African countries, for example, are running out of grain reserves and the prospect of additional reasons to the already present to cause new famines, is becoming more and more concrete. By invading the Ukrainian country and submitting the ports of Kiev, through which grain exports transit, Moscow is creating the conditions for generating a global food crisis; it should be remembered that this factor aggravates previous situations that were already difficult due to the shortage of water and highly unstable political situations, which in fact do not allow food autonomy for many countries. It is hard to believe that these results are merely side effects of a war that was badly thought out and conducted worse. It seems easier to believe in a functional political plan to create a favorable situation for the Kremlin towards Europe. Putin must have been inspired by the various dictators, who used emigration to the European continent, as a form of pressure on Brussels: the tactic has almost always been successful, because it has created deep divisions among the members of the Union, especially on the modalities and amount of reception. Surely the Russian strategists cannot have escaped this possibility, which can become a weapon aimed directly at Europe, however the implications go beyond the geopolitical reasons and contingent on the war itself: the responsibility of starving millions of people must not be underestimated by the enemies of Putin and Russia, as is currently happening, with this factor that seems underestimated and which is not given the necessary political and journalistic prominence. The issue is above all humanitarian: blocking exports of Ukrainian wheat causes the deprivation of basic foodstuffs in most poor countries, triggering processes of food scarcity, which can lead to malnutrition, with the consequent worsening of sanitary conditions, but also linked to political stability, in many cases already precarious in various poor countries. As can be deduced, the implications are so intense that they are no less than the current situation on the Ukrainian battlefields, with the large number of deaths and displaced persons that the Russian invasion has generated. What risks materializing is a number of victims even much higher than those of the calculation of the special military operation; in this sad count must, in fact, be included those who died from food shortages, those due to the effects of hygienic and sanitary conditions resulting from malnutrition, those relating to the probable popular uprisings due to lack of food and, finally, the victims of migration caused by the impossibility to feed. Therefore, if Moscow is to answer to the international courts for the atrocities committed by its soldiers, it will also have to answer in the same offices that it was the cause of having starved millions of people, with all the consequences set out above. While realizing that the world chancelleries are focusing on crimes on Ukrainian territory, the question of the responsibility to starve poor countries does not seem to be treated adequately and with the right relevance. In parallel with the necessary military aid to Kiev, Western countries need to start thinking about strategies that can allow the Ukrainian country to export what they have managed to produce and collect, integrating with food aid the countries that will be most affected by the food famine. : this with the dual purpose of canceling or at least mitigating the effects of Putin’s strategy, averting the negative effects on European countries and creating the conditions to effectively combat hunger in the world. This will also serve to give a new image of the West to counter Russian and Chinese actions in African countries.

The statement by the Russian defense minister, relating to the fight against the transport of weapons in favor of Ukraine, risks being a further element capable of raising the tension between Moscow and Brussels. The leading exponent of the defense department of Moscow has expressly declared that any means of the Atlantic Alliance that will transport weapons and ammunition for the Ukrainian army will be destroyed; convoys arriving in the Ukrainian country carrying armaments will be considered legitimate targets. These statements, although not new, because some convoys have already been hit, are very serious because they are addressed directly to the Atlantic Alliance, which cannot react passively to the threat of having become an explicit target. For the moment we are still at the stage of threats, which, in a certain sense, is a political situation, albeit at the limit; very different could be the case of an Atlantic Alliance convoy hit by the Russians, especially after these threats. Certainly it is not to be anticipated that Brussels will renounce arms supplies to Kiev, also due to the substantial allocations already foreseen by Biden and, at the same time, it is certainly not possible to think of possible reprisals, in case a convoy is hit. With the current situation, any retaliation would be entrusted to the Ukrainian army itself and not carried out directly by the forces of the Atlantic Alliance, however it is easy to identify opportunities for Moscow to threaten NATO members, which border on Ukraine and increase the possibilities of a clash capable of triggering the third world conflict. Moreover, Moscow has already repeatedly threatened Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries because they host American military bases and the instrumental search for an accident would be a functional move to proclaim itself an attacked country. In the meantime, Helsinki has again reported an incident involving the trespassing of a Russian military aircraft, which entered the Finnish territory for at least five kilometers; this border breach represents the second episode in just under a month and aims to threaten the Nordic state for its willingness to abandon its status as a neutral country to join the Atlantic Alliance. As we can see, even on this front Moscow is always close to creating an accident capable of precipitating the current state of things towards even more serious consequences. The Russian tactic is probably part of an attempt at attrition, which seems to be a wrong calculation, such as the one that NATO and the European Union would have split up and which has led the Russian country to become a sort of international pariah. From a diplomatic point of view, the actions and declarations against the aggression of Moscow are multiplying: the Portuguese Prime Minister, announcing his visit to Kiev, requested a greater capacity to react to the European Union, especially on the issue of emergencies concerning the Ukrainian people, but also for financial and military support, even independently of the Union accession process. During the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to Rome, Japan and Italy reiterated the need for the defense of the world order, based on the rules of international law, an implicit condemnation for Moscow, but also a warning for China, because international rules must also apply to maritime issues, to which Tokyo is particularly sensitive due to Beijing’s violations in the neighboring sea. The fear of Japan and other international subjects is that the violation of international law perpetrated by Russia will set an example for resolving other international issues with the use of military means, rather than with diplomacy. Moscow has violated a custom that could still be broken in similar ways and it is the duty of the international community to work to ensure that this does not happen again; this theme will be central for a long time and must also concern a necessary revision of the functioning of the United Nations, too conditioned by the vetoes of permanent members; a similar problem that concerns the European Union bound by the unanimity rule in the decisions of the measures. The issue of the decisions of supranational bodies becomes increasingly central in the contrast between the actions of countries where democracy is little or no and authoritarianism has the advantage of the speed of decisions.

As things currently stand, Moscow places its objectives as essential factors for any peace negotiations: the Kremlin, in fact, does not intend to withdraw from the acquisition of sovereignty, and therefore of the relative official recognition, of Donbass and Crimea as belonging materially and formally to the Russian Federation; despite this, the negotiations with Kiev seem to continue, albeit difficult, even if on premises that do not provide any guarantees. On the part of Ukraine and the western international community, a yielding on these issues, even if justified with the aim of ending the conflict, would provide Putin with a sort of proof of weakness, with the aggravating circumstance that Russian promises could easily be disregarded. It remains to be assessed how the military confrontation can continue, after the concrete possibility exists that there is an enlargement of the Ukrainian border to the West, with the involvement of Transnistria, a Russian enclave between Moldova and the Ukrainian country, which could be assimilated by Putin in the same way of Donbass and Crimea. Raising the tension is a sort of political diversion from Moscow, which suffers from military aid to Kiev, because it allows the Ukrainian forces an increasingly effective defense; the Russian foreign minister explicitly accused the Atlantic Alliance of already being at war with Moscow, precisely because of the supplies of military equipment; the reasoning is that a third world war represents much more than an eventuality, but that it is becoming a concrete possibility, especially after the claims coming from the United Kingdom, which has supported the legitimacy of an attack on Russia. The risk of a nuclear escalation is possible, but Moscow has expressed the concept that an atomic war is unacceptable, being well aware of an unpredictable result, however, the latest Russian rocket launches have hit areas very close to Ukrainian nuclear power plants and an eventual impact with a reactor could trigger consequences equal, at least, to the use of tactical nuclear devices, that is, of short range and less destructive potential; on the Russian hesitation to use atomic force, in one way or another, it is good not to trust too much, especially after the massacres perpetrated by the Kremlin military, in disregard of international conventions and with armaments in turn prohibited by the same agreements. Kiev reacted to the Russian threats of a third world war, as a sign of the weakness of Moscow, which expected a quick and painless conquest of the Ukrainian country, without reactions from Kiev and the West: on the contrary, Putin managed to compact the Western allies, to restore value and political importance to the Atlantic Alliance and to combine the Ukrainian country in the defense of its territory. In reality, the reading of the Ukrainian government appears to be acceptable, because it shows a military and political difficulty of Russian action, which seems to find ever new difficulties at every level, this impression, however, reinforces the idea that Putin has put himself on a path without exit and that this risks making it more and more unpredictable and dangerous. The move to threaten a widening of the conflict beyond Transnistria, to involve Moldova already appears to be a consequence of the Kremlin chief’s difficulties in getting out of the current impasse. Moreover, even the attempts of the Secretary General of the United Nations have not brought results, if not highlighting his slow reaction, given that he moved well after the war had started two months ago; questioning about the real usefulness of the United Nations now appears superfluous: without an adequate and radical reform, the emptying of the powers and effects, even if only potential, of the United Nations is a sure fact on the international scene, which determines the absolute unreliability of supranational body, now a mere facade. The poor results of the diplomatic action, meanwhile, prevent the creation of humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to escape to safety, but behind this block there is a precise Russian tactic, which intends to use the population as a hostage in a way that is functional to its own modalities. of combat. Meanwhile, Moscow’s action focuses on bombing the railways, identified as the main carrier of arms transport, thus creating an additional obstacle for civilian escape.

With international attention entirely focused on the Ukrainian conflict, there is a real risk that Islamic radicalism will exploit this situation to regain ground, both from the point of view of terrorism and from that of the occupation of territories devoid of international protection. This fear is confirmed by the statements of the new spokesman for the Islamic State, who did not miss the opportunity to urge supporters of Islamic extremism to exploit the situation that sees the confrontation of states usually deployed, even if from different positions, against terrorists and the Islamic radicals. The danger is the concentration of resources and attention on the Ukrainian conflict, which could allow greater freedom of action, both in Europe and in Russia. At this time, despite the threats aimed more at the western part of the European continent, the nation that appears most vulnerable is Russia, because it is directly involved in the conflict and with troops, often used against Islamic terrorists, engaged in the Donbass areas. ; however, the current situation could lead to singular and temporary alliances capable of fighting against common enemies. The unscrupulousness of some of the actors involved could study unconventional and violent retaliation against Western countries, guilty of supporting the Ukrainian resistance in various ways. Dangerous precedents could be created, especially if one side is forced to suffer increasingly heavy sanctions and to prolong a war that it believed would end quickly. From the point of view of Europe, but also of the United States, it appears essential to monitor one’s own territories, but this is not enough since it is necessary to prevent a new advance of the Islamic State on territories that have characteristics capable of favoring this scenario. If in Asian countries the threat has been limited, but the phenomenon must not be underestimated, the situation in the sub-Saharan areas of the African continent appears more worrying, where Islamic radicalism manages to impose itself by filling gaps, than the financial shortage of the states. national does not allow to fill. Now the concentration and financial effort to supply Ukraine with the necessary weapons, coupled with the ongoing diplomatic effort to stem the conflict, can divert the already scarce resources to preserve the central African strip from terrorism. It is also necessary to remember the situation of countries such as Afghanistan, where the American abandonment has created favorable conditions for the settlement of terrorist bases or the attitude of formally allied countries in the fight against terrorism, where the ambiguous attitude of governments continues to allow dangerous contiguity with Islamic radicalism. More sheltered from this possible resurgence of terrorism, also by virtue of its political system, China appears on its territory, but which cannot fail to be involved in a state of apprehension in the many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which have been the subject of substantial funding. . One of the most concrete dangers, in a phase of economic regression and scarcity of resources, exchanges blocked by sanctions, is a further contraction in growth, precisely caused by actions against African extraction and production centers; the increase in food crises and famines caused by the interruption of the exposure of Ukrainian wheat and Russian fertilizers may also contribute to this. The possibilities of action of Islamic terrorism therefore have a variety of tools, which go far beyond traditional practices, based almost exclusively on the use of violence: to attract an ever-growing audience of followers, thanks to the ever-increasing state of poverty. of a substantial part of the African population; for this reason it is important not to abandon African countries and to maintain military garrisons capable of supporting national armies for the protection of local communities. We must not lower the control and the contrast on the economies that favor terrorism, such as the trafficking of human beings and the trade in drugs and arms. If support for Ukraine is fundamental for the survival of Western democracies, no less important is the continuous fight against Islamic terrorism, which, albeit with different methods, has always the objective of countering the very fear of maintaining democracy, in particular. this is certainly no different from what the head of the Kremlin is aiming for.

One of the unwanted and unexpected effects for Putin caused by the invasion of Ukraine was to restore vitality to the Atlantic Alliance, which, during Trump’s presidency, was heading towards a conclusion that has now been announced. The brutality of the special military operation combined with evident geopolitical causes have, on the other hand, strengthened the unity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance, providing the organization with new impetus and vigor. Putin’s first tactical and then strategic error was the result of a poor analysis, which demonstrated the scarcity of Russian international analysts. It was believed that the division between Europeans within them and between Europeans and the United States were by now irremediable and in some ways this analysis had valid foundations and had the possibility of coming true without causing any situation capable of changing the course of things. In Putin’s assessment, the head of the Kremlin judged the effects caused by the invasion of a foreign country as irrelevant to this game. This evaluation, however, had the opposite effects and it cannot be said that for Russia there were no signs to interpret the new situation: the agitation of the Baltic countries and of Poland, against Russian activism should have been enough for a greater caution not to sacrifice a geopolitical situation, all in all, not unfavorable in the face of the conquest of Ukraine in open violation of international law; that, then, the military result is bankruptcy must increase even more the recriminations by the Russian government for having placed itself in a situation that, at the moment, seems to have no way out. As for the state of health of the Atlantic Alliance, which the Russians wanted to a minimum, the situation appears very unfavorable for Moscow. The possible decision to interrupt their neutrality by Finland and Sweden will lead Russia to add a new side of its border where the Atlantic Alliance will be present, precisely one of the reasons that led to the invasion of the Ukrainian country. Although Ukraine has always been considered an area of ​​exclusive influence by Russia and Sweden and Finland do not fall into this category, the neutrality of the two countries has always been considered a fact almost due, first to the Soviet Union and now to Putin’s Russia; the alteration of this state of affairs has caused irritation and nervousness in the Kremlin, where more or less explicit nuclear threats have not existed; the presence of tactical atomic bombs, that is, with reduced range, on the Russian borders, is in any case known and the international community is aware of it, however Russia has not missed an opportunity to reaffirm its nuclear potential; moreover, joining the Atlantic Alliance will require Moscow to deploy large quantities of troops on those borders, raising the level of tension, as well as increasing the naval units present in the Finnish Gulf. It should be noted that the two Nordic states already participate in the meetings of the Atlantic Alliance and their soldiers carry out exercises with the troops of the Alliance, in short, there is already a quantitative collaboration, which must only be officially sanctioned. The conditions for joining the Atlantic Alliance are already largely satisfied by the political systems of the two states and it is only a decision concerning their sovereignty, even if it must be said that Brussels could delay at this moment in order not to exacerbate a situation that is already very much tense with Moscow; however, the two Nordic countries have been subjected to Russian threats for about a year and from the end of 2021 the pressures from Moscow are repeated, punctual for each week; it is believed that this has provoked a growing favorable opinion in the societies of the two countries, which, it seems, is now in favor of abandoning the policy of non-alignment in a majority manner. With Sweden and Finland, the members of the Atlantic Allenaza would rise to 32 and Russia would see its border more than doubled with the presence of NATO: a result achieved by the ability and foresight of Putin, a great statesman and connoisseur of international mechanisms.

Despite the great price, unfortunately paid in human lives, which represents the most tragic aspect of the conflict, the Russian advance is proceeding slowly and, in some cases, is even forced to suffer defeats that force departments of the Kremlin to retreat to the ground. This provokes a tactic that involves Ukrainian civilians as functional objectives to weaken the resistance of Kiev, which, on the military level only, that is, without the theoretical involvement of civilians, would be able to contain the Russian effort, although in evident numerical and means inferiority to disposition. This modality has been successfully tested in Syria, where civilian targets, such as hospitals and schools, were deliberately hit to pull back the forces opposed to Assad, whatever their nature, be it democratic forces or the Islamic State; however the scheme, although it has similarities, in Ukraine presents profound differences: Ukraine is a sovereign state with its own army, cohesive with its population and not divided as in Syria and enjoys the unconditional political support of the West, which despite continuing not to intervene, it continuously supplies the armed forces of Kiev with weapons and logistical support. The conjectures about Putin’s convictions of a short war are probably true, and the evidence is that the heavy weapons deployed are outdated, the logistical support insufficient, precisely because it was not designed, and the troops, often made up of conscripts, are insufficient. trained and even less psychologically prepared to face a war of such intensity. Some analysts also believe that the employment of Syrian “volunteers” will not be decisive and there are considerable doubts about the contribution of the Chechens. In this context, the choice of indiscriminate bombing appears for Putin to be the only way to avoid being defeated by the conflict and with the internal image irremediably ruined. For this reason, President Zelensky’s request for the no-fly zone appears more than legitimate, but Western countries do not yet consider the time to intervene. There is a real danger of the use of chemical weapons by the Kremlin, on the winning experience carried out in Syria, which would constitute the renewal of a very dangerous precedent, which constituted Obama’s greatest political failure and which, according to many observers, it was the beginning of the current American political weakness in the world theater. The option of the use of chemical weapons could also constitute the consideration by Moscow of a possible use of the use of nuclear weapons, which has already been threatened since the beginning of the conflict. The danger of an escalation is concrete: Russia is in evident difficulty in its “military operation”, is on the verge of financial failure and is politically isolated on the diplomatic scene, especially after the increasingly cautious Chinese attitude on the conflict, caused by the threats of losing access to its most profitable trading markets: the US and Europe. These considerations, if combined with the news, that Russia in the current logistical difficulties, seems to face a further shortage of availability of supplies, both due to increasingly evident practical difficulties, and due to a not infinite arsenal and also an internal situation at the top of the Kremlin, where the major collaborators closest to the president, have been the object of removal from their offices, precisely because of the mismanagement of the war, the possibilities for diplomatic action seem to increase. For Russia, it is estimated that the next ten days will be crucial: if Moscow manages to win the conflict it will have achieved its goal, vice versa for Putin there may be no way out and therefore the Russian president may prefer an honorable exit through an agreement. diplomatic. This eventual agreement, however, passes from a truce that stops the use of weapons and allows safe humanitarian corridors; this eventuality, desirable, is, however, contrary to the current combat mode of the Russian military, which uses civilians as a target to achieve success. At the moment the situation seems to have no way out, but international pressure and some Ukrainian concessions could take away any justification from Russia and allow Moscow an honorable way out, honorable at the moment, because Putin’s reputation is hopelessly ruined. , also from the investigation that the International Court of Justice intends to initiate and which appears with an already written conclusion.

The aggression of Putin’s new “Soviet Union” against Ukraine, which has violated every rule of international law, has caused a sense of confusion for Beijing, whose main concern remains its own economic growth, which, however, does not it can be released from a state of global stability. The first result of the Kremlin was that of compacting the western front and even more the European Union, which is finding, despite many difficulties, an almost unknown unity of purpose and certainly not predictable in such a relatively short time. This figure is the opposite of what has always been pursued by the Russians, by the Chinese themselves and also by the USA, at least those led by Trump. For all these subjects it was a priority to work to obtain an ever deeper division between the European states in order to deal with individual nations rather than with the whole bloc of the Union. For this purpose, these international actors, who feared a new subject of large proportions on the global scene with their own political and even military and not only economic capabilities, have repeatedly implemented operations, including illegal ones such as illicit computer activities, financing for parties and movements. local sovereigns and an intense diplomatic policy aimed at exploiting the divisions of the states of the Union. The criminal invasion of Ukraine apparently overcame any attempt at division that was painstakingly pursued, ending up damaging the Chinese, as well as the Russians, who, from now on, will have to adapt to the new situation. Beijing, while affirming its loyalty to Moscow and denouncing, albeit alternately, the guilt of the Atlantic Alliance, said it was very concerned about the war situation and announced its willingness to provide a contribution to resolving the crisis. The greatest concern expressed appears to be that of the economic sanctions against Russia, which constitutes an aggravating circumstance to the pandemic situation, for the global economic recovery. It should also be remembered that China was, before the start of the conflict, Kiev’s main trading partner, and would not like to lose this primacy, especially if Ukraine, once the conflict was over, gravitated to the orbit of Brussels. Chinese diplomats strive with a kind of equidistance, which asserts that the integrity of each country should be protected, as well as the security concerns of each nation: this attitude provides the perception of a policy taken aback and still undecided about which attitude definitely take. The proximity to Russia should not be taken for granted, because the distance is too great and the respective interests do not coincide, but it is only functional against the United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Beijing cannot, precisely in order not to compromise its economic growth plans, initiate new conflicts with Washington, which could affect trade relations with the USA, just as it cannot go against Europe, which represents the richest market to get to. its own products. Probably from a political point of view, Putin’s action does not displease the Chinese, because, despite the denials, they can read similarities with Taiwan, but at the moment even this question seems to take second place compared to the failure to restart the global economy. A further concern for China is the ability expressed by Europe to develop strategies to make up for Russian energy supplies in the not too distant future and the newfound harmony with the USA, which may constitute a starting point for closer trade alliances, which they would determine a lesser capacity for Chinese commercial movement towards what are the richest markets on the planet. It is not known whether in the meeting between Putin and Xi Jingping on the occasion of the inauguration of the recent Winter Olympics, the Russian leader had informed the Chinese one, but it is certain that the Chinese resentment is high due to the developments that the war has caused, even if cannot be expressed. China’s studies and plans have been thwarted by a crazy decision that is determining a difficult commercial future for China and, however, for this reason it can be thought that Beijing will not neglect every effort to stop a conflict, which sees it as the greatest victim. collateral.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine changes Moscow’s international relations with European countries; in particular with Rome with which Russia, despite its respective alignment on opposite fronts, has always been characterized by a good understanding. Only two years have passed since the beginning of the pandemic and the Russian army convoy with medical supplies, destined for one of the most affected northern Italian centers, allowed Putin to reap an excellent result in terms of image. But this was only one of the latest examples of a relationship based on Italian pragmatism, based on its own cultural and commercial nature, which has always exercised a strong capacity for attraction towards Russians. Historically this relationship, pursued even though Rome has always been a great ally of Washington, has also been maintained in the Cold War, with industrial collaborations and thanks to the presence of the strongest Western Communist Party. More recently, these ties have also been maintained by progressive governments, capable of obtaining important energy supplies and opening increasingly intense commercial channels in the genre of luxury, tourism and food. More recently, ties with Putin have developed with the sovereign parties, also due to the Russian president’s strategy of wanting to divide the European Union, however this has not prevented a particularly important link with the government in office, where, moreover, the party of the Northern League, which has always had close ties with Putin’s party, about large supplies of Russian gas. The Italian economy depends on Russian gas for about 45% of the total, which for now are insured, despite Rome’s decision to support the European Union and the West in sanctions against the Kremlin. Despite the conversion plans towards cleaner energy and the contracts for new supplies of liquid gas from the United States, the concern in the social and productive fabric is very high. In addition to economic sanctions against Russia, Italy has engaged in a very vast program of military supplies to the Ukrainian military, which includes anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, machine guns of various ranges and ammunition, which could greatly complicate the advance of military forces of Moscow. The combination of dependence on Russian gas with military supplies and sanctions could cause a higher cost for Italians, compared to other member countries of the European Union. In reality, the Italian position was not immediately so clear-cut, precisely because of the fears of the various economic sectors involved in the export to Russia; the particular sensitivity of the government in office, led by the former president of the European Central Bank, towards the economy has led to fears that Rome could have had a less harsh attitude towards Russia, in reality the profoundly pro-European and Atlantic spirit of the government structure, made it possible to overcome these obstacles represented by the prospect of certain losses for the national economy. As far as gas supplies are concerned, however, it is a calculated risk: Italy needs Russian gas, but Russia needs even more to sell it, especially after it has been subjected to the harsh regime of sanctions, on the other hand. Putin’s behavior has had the positive effect, but not for Russia, of compacting a European Union, which is now more united than ever and which could prove even more inclined to allow budget elasticity for those who engage in sanctions and policy against Russia and in the reception of Ukrainian refugees. The cornerstones of the Union’s foreign political action remain Paris and Berlin, but Rome comes immediately after and due to previous relations with Moscow, it could be decisive in a possible negotiation phase to resolve the conflict, as, moreover, it publicly acknowledged the Russian ambassador to Italy. The firmness of Rome in condemning, rightly, Russia has therefore never been in question, and indeed it is strengthened precisely by the volume of business destined to fall for the Italian coffers, however for the Italian country a leading role could be ready. plan if the Union wants to commit itself, despite being a biased protagonist for the support provided to Kiev, when it will finally have to pass the word from arms to the negotiating table.

Probably the Russian commitment in Syria was not only dictated by geopolitical needs, such as maintaining the only Moscow base in the Mediterranean, by keeping Assad in power, but it was also a preventive exercise to prepare for military action in Ukraine. Certainly, Putin’s intentions and expectations were to quickly conclude the reconnection of all Ukraine under former Soviet influence: a repetition of the subordinate relationship that Belarus provides to the Kremlin; and in fact the plan is still the same: to establish a pro-Russian government in Kiev, which can guarantee that Ukraine maintains absolute distance from the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. However, despite the overwhelming superiority of the military apparatus, Russia is struggling, on the international level it appears isolated and with devastating internal economic prospects, the European and Western countries have regrouped, overcoming their mutual differences and arriving to massively welcome refugees, thus defusing the Kremlin’s intentions to favor internal disputes over immigration, even if they have had too long a reaction time in the face of events and even China appears more cautious in supporting Putin, so as not to hurt the commercial susceptibility of the market more rich in the world. For their part, the Ukrainians, despite all the contingent difficulties, are putting up a resistance that Russia had not foreseen, indeed the Kremlin expected a welcome from liberators for its troops. The set of these answers from the counterparties, added to the obvious erroneous assessments, if they can lead to positive assessments in the immediate future, cannot however prevent us from analyzing what Putin’s possible next moves will be. If we start from an analysis of the Kremlin tenant, it is difficult to predict a way out that is configured as a political conflict, that is, an agreement that allows Russia to cede the territories of the Donbass and also of the coastal strip may not be enough. in Odessa. Putin has been clear he does not intend to stop, because he considers Ukraine part of Russia and this admission constitutes his program which he has finally explained clearly. The granting of the opening of humanitarian corridors to make civilians flee opens extremely disturbing scenarios, which preclude, in fact, what happened in Syria and especially in the battles for the conquest of Aleppo. Precisely on that occasion, after the abandonment of the city of most of its inhabitants, the Russians, once they entered, gave a display of particular violence and now, strengthened by that experience acquired in the field, the fate of Kiev appears to be the same. On the other hand, reaching at least as far as the conquest of the Ukrainian capital has, for Putin, the meaning of the victory of the conflict, while for the rest of Ukraine, the part towards the west on the border with Poland, a military operation comparable to the current one is more difficult, but for the Kremlin, it will probably be enough to stop in Kiev. In the West, a possible conquest of Kiev by the Russians, moreover obtained with particularly brutal ways, could provoke a reaction that is difficult to predict. The approach to the borders of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, of the Russian enemy, who moreover directly threatens the Baltic countries and opposes the entry into the Atlantic Alliance of Sweden and Finland, as well as the European Union of Moldova and Georgia, would further raise the level of the clash, which until now has been limited to sanctions, albeit large, and military supplies for Ukraine. The approach of the front towards the Polish and Romanian border would significantly bring the beginning of the third world war closer. It is now useless to complain about the passive attitude of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, which have lost eight years in useless discussions, when they could have managed the Ukrainian question differently with preventive solutions capable of countering Russian plans: now is the time to put in place solutions are put in place that are capable of opposing Moscow, also from a military and not just a political point of view. Of course, immediately admitting Sweden and Finland of the Atlantic Alliance and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the European Union would constitute a political response equivalent to a clear warning in Moscow, but without a military organization and a willingness to directly engage in cases such as the current one. maneuvering is limited. Unfortunately it is bad to say it but the military option is increasingly becoming a necessity and a more probable eventuality.

That the invasion of Ukraine took place after the end of the Chinese Olympic Games was no coincidence: Putin risked a failure of the action due to adverse weather conditions for heavy vehicles, in order to keep the promise made to the Chinese leader and in homage to the alliance that is developing between the two countries based on commercial exchanges, first of all on the sale of Russian gas to the Chinese, but above all on the political understanding that is developing regarding the project of a new world order, based on values alternative to those of Western democracies and based on the repression of civil rights. The Chinese’s failure to condemn Russian aggression, which is also taken for granted and widely expected, represents a sort of warning for Taiwan, which has always been in the sights of the Beijing government, which supports the project of a single homeland. The moment could be propitious for an invasion of the island, with the Western states unprepared for Putin’s action to which they have not substantially resisted: these conditions could also be repeated for Taiwan, which nothing could, like nothing Kiev can, to an invasion. by a power so manifestly superior. There are, however, some practical contraindications for China, which highlight the differences with the situation that is developing in Europe. The first of all is that the main objective of Beijing continues to be economic growth and the economic repercussions of an invasion would greatly reduce the Chinese gross domestic product, on whose growth the efforts of the Communist government are concentrated, also due to the contraction of the world growth due to the pandemic. As for the Ukrainian war, Beijing has replaced Russia as Kiev’s first trading partner for the interest in the Silk Road and certainly does not like the current developments even if, perhaps it is estimated that with a pro-Russian government, it could have even greater freedom of movement. About Taiwan, some press media functional to government propaganda have defined the island as the Chinese Donbass, beginning to prepare a sort of preventive justification for a possible military invasion. It is no longer even worth believing that China will not dare to attack Taiwan in order not to undertake an action that is difficult to manage and with consequences that are not easy to predict, precisely because the same thing was believed about Putin, and it has been sensationally denied. It is also true, however, that unlike Ukraine, there are already American soldiers in Taiwan, which makes the scenario more complicated in the event of an attack and also the constant presence of the American navy, both in Taiwan itself and in Korea. of the South and Japan presupposes a direct military commitment, which, combined with presumable sanctions, could complicate a military action much more than for Putin. That of a direct American commitment in the Pacific area is explained by the international doctrine inaugurated by Obama of judging Southeast Asia as more important for the United States, precisely in terms of the ways of communication of goods and because of what it is. Syria has been neglected, there has been a disengagement from the Middle East and Afghanistan and substantially also from Europe, however substantial doubts are legitimate on the real will and ability to conduct a conflict on the part of the current American president, who does not seem intent on taking military action. Be that as it may, the American reaction on Ukraine will be deeply studied by Beijing to undertake strategies, which will not only concern the potential invasion of Taiwan, but also the relations with the USA itself, especially regarding the dossiers that have produced the deepest contrasts between the two countries. An apparent complacency of the Americans, also from the point of view of sanctions against Russia, could authorize Beijing to behave increasingly unscrupulous in trade battles and in relations with other states, both European and African, where China aims to fill the void left from the United States. For Washington a concrete warning to evaluate very well its moves and their consequences on a global level and not just limited to Russia.