Categoria: English version

The protests that took place in Cuba last July 11 provoked a strong repression which resulted in a series of summary trials, without legal guarantees; the accused are all demonstrators who have been charged with the crimes of public disorder and incitement to crime, despite the fact that the vast majority of the suspects were not guilty of violent acts. The sentences imposed range from ten to twelve months in prison and are the result of trials where it was impossible to ensure the choice of defenders with the consequence of the impossibility of preparing an adequate defense strategy. The fact that the number of detainees has not been officially communicated by the authorities gives an idea of ​​how the Cuban regime intends to operate in an authoritarian manner with the sole purpose of stifling the protest; unofficial sources speak of more than half a thousand arrests, which were followed by some releases, house arrest pending trial and an unspecified number of people who remain in the places of detention for which the trial is expected more quickly. The guarantees of the authorities on compliance with procedural guarantees do not reassure the arrested and their families or even international public opinion, which fears, through these proceedings, a resumption of the repressive activity of the regime. From a practical point of view, the few conceivable days that will elapse between arrest and sentence do not allow for an adequate defense and this circumstance seems to be a functional means of exercising repression with semblance of law. The Cuban judicial authorities have announced possible penalties of up to twenty years of imprisonment for those involved in looting and violent acts, but it seems easy to include in this case also non-violent demonstrators, who are in any case against government policy. The regime itself is, however, at a crucial point: the threat of trials serves to calm the protests, but if the threats are implemented, an increase in protest in the streets appears inevitable, which the government could not cope with except with repressive methods, unleashing international outrage and the possible increase in sanctions; conversely, a more conciliatory attitude could allow the regime an honorable way out. One of the major causes of arrest was that involving those caught filming the repressions: this element focuses on the Cuban government’s habit of censorship, despite the change in power that took place after the Castro dynasty. All these elements have contributed to greater US attention, with the Biden administration stepping up pressure on Cuba with direct sanctions against the defense minister and the special unit that has distinguished itself in the repression of recent demonstrations; Biden’s attitude, however, is not a continuation of Obama’s attitude, based on the thaw between the two sides, but rather has points of contact with what Trump did, who had re-established the restrictions on travel and trade and maintained by the current tenant of the White House. It remains true that Biden must find a mediation between his own party, where members of the Cuban-American movements are asking for even heavier sanctions, and the left of the party, which would like more attenuated sanctions to reduce the difficulties of the population. The US president, with his staff, in this regard, would be working on solutions capable of alleviating the fallout of the sanctions on Cubans, such as ensuring that remittances from emigrants can reach their destination, making it impossible for the regime to confiscate. A further measure is to try to encourage free access to communications through a use of the internet without censorship. The reactions of the Cuban government have touched the obvious with the accusations that the United States of having organized the protests, despite a certainly very critical economic and social situation, which forces Cubans to very difficult living conditions, despite the many expectations generated by that. which must have been the end of the Castro dynasty.

The Brexit rules, which concern the transit of goods from the Northern Irish border, are unwelcome in London due to the practical problems they are generating and this has led the British government to ask Brussels to change this regulation. In his speech to the House of Lords, the Brexit minister expressly affirmed the need for essential changes to the protocol for Northern Ireland already agreed with the European Union. The institutional situation that could be created and which has been perceived as a possible threat in Brussels, could be the use of the application of Article 16, which can allow both parties to withdraw from the signed rules and which regulate the entire exit. of Great Britain from the Union. An eventuality that could have dire consequences for relations between London and Brussels and which includes various possible solutions: from a total break up to a very unlikely resumption of negotiations. Between the two sides, although both have a lot to lose with a possible suspension of the laboriously reached agreements, Great Britain appears to have greater disadvantages in perspective, with the absence of common rules for mutual commercial relations. If the intention of the British minister was to threaten a withdrawal from the agreements, the impression is that it was an almost desperate move, which signals the inability of London to manage a freely signed situation; after all, the European reaction was the one widely expected: a refusal to renegotiate the protocol, deeming this solution unacceptable, even though it was willing to seek solutions to solve the problems. The European position seems to be a manifestation of good will, but not entirely real, in the sense that exhibiting a show of strength could be favorable to the British, conversely a more firm attitude, in compliance with what was signed, but still collaborative exposes London to research of non-traumatic solutions. The reason for the dispute remains the European controls imposed on goods entering the Northern Irish border, considered excessive by London; however this choice was forced in order not to introduce customs controls with what is a state that no longer belongs to the Union. London has probably underestimated the practical difficulties of these controls or caused these difficulties precisely to renegotiate the use of the only physical contact on land with the Union; even the British explanations, in search of a new equilibrium, also in aid of Brussels to protect its single market, appear specious and suspicious. The most likely reading is that the British government suffers from a situation created by itself, which is a mixture of incompetence and impudence, where the aim is to circumvent the rules signed to access the European market by a shortcut, which is widely foreseen by the ‘ European Union. A further assessment to be made is that the protocol concerning Northern Ireland is the most sensitive issue for the most extreme nationalists, who represent a significant share of Boris Johnson’s electorate and, despite a large majority approval by the English parliament, remain a highly contested issue, becoming a factor of balance of the conservative party’s assets. The difficulties of the British government must take into account all the components to be able to maintain power and the Brexit issue was decisive in reaching power through the last elections: a lack of support from the most extreme parts of the nationalists can nullify the project of governability of the London premier. In the current state of affairs, the judgment on the British government touches on unreliability because it claims to renegotiate the rules that have just been signed, which have certainly not been imposed by Europe: yet another confirmation, that, in spite of everything, the English exit from Europe , in the long run, it can only be advantageous for Brussels, because, on the political level, the lost member is a member who does not guarantee any space for shared planning and represents a lesson that cannot be applied to other members of convenience, as was the United Kingdom itself, to bring the European Union back into its founding aims, leaving aside a forced inclusiveness that is not justified by general convenience.

The inclusive vision of Germany, probably partly explainable by the economic advantages to be gained for itself, of the Balkan countries within the European Union sees an acceleration on the part of Chancellor Merkel, who recently reaffirmed her position, while acknowledging that the integration process still requires the achievement of various conditions and requirements. According to Merkel, the six Balkan countries, which have not yet been integrated into the European Union, must be able to join Brussels because this is of fundamental strategic importance for Europe and the Union must be a protagonist and lead this process. This vision is conditioned by the fear, in Europe and the United States, that the vitality of political and financial action, especially in China, but also in Russia, could lead to cumbersome presences on the European borders, both from a geopolitical and a military point of view. This is a shared perplexity, which, however, cannot justify rash adhesions because they are not convinced of European values ​​and which, consequently, could become a factor of further alteration of the already fragile internal balances of the Union. The question is fundamental for the very survival of the European Union: accessions instrumental to the economic benefits of most of the countries of the former Soviet bloc should constitute a warning to practice an acceptance of new members based on more selective and secure criteria for the common European home. Too many times now cases such as the refusal to share migrants or the promulgation of illiberal laws and in blatant contrast with the inspiring principles of a united Europe, have sparked bitter confrontations among the members of the Union, which have slowed down their political life. It is also necessary to remember the case of Brexit, as an ever-present warning of a country never completely convinced of the European project, but able to ensure, however, substantial advantages for its economy. If the English doubts were based on utilitarian themes, for the Balkan countries the real question is whether these peoples and, consequently, the governments they express, have the necessary democratic maturity to be able to join Europe. Unfortunately, this question still has a negative answer if one thinks of the work and the laws, which trample on civil rights within the Union, of countries such as Poland and Hungary, which have proved to be clearly immature from the point of view of democratic thinking, probably because within them they have not carried out a process capable of elaborating democratic values ​​in a complete way. The presence, still too intrusive, within the societies of these countries of the anti-libertarian communist custom is still conditioning the ability to accept the social evolution of those countries, favoring a typical ideology in the ways of the far right, not far away, therefore, from the totalitarian conception in force in the Soviet bloc. If the parts of the Balkan countries really in favor of joining the Union, not only for the economic benefits, will be able to emerge and show a real change in the society of those countries, nothing will prevent them from entering Europe, but for the moment doubts many still appear. To further sacrifice European values, only to prevent the Chinese and Russian advance, appears to be a worse solution to the problem, when, on the other hand, it would be advisable to ask whether to continue to allow countries that are not deserving of this privilege to be part of Europe at all. Instead of a too inclusive policy, it would be preferable to implement more stringent inclusion criteria, necessary for greater protection of European cohesion. It can be objected that such a policy could alienate the pretenders to join the Union too far, up to totally contrary choices, however the Turkish example says that having prevented Ankara from entering Brussels has preserved Europe from having a a real dictatorship, which would only bring havoc within the European institutions, with completely destabilizing consequences for the life of the Union. It is therefore necessary to develop alternative tactics to an internal or external process, which know how to surpass the current times and methods of insertion, although certainly not short. One idea could be a collaboration based on a sort of federation to the Union of non-member states, with the possibility for European officials to examine the capacity of democracy and respect for rights from within the institutions of these countries, in order to obtain a more direct judgment of the real intentions of the candidate states. What is needed, in conclusion, is the verification of the real conviction of accession to Europe, to avoid entries due to the exclusive transposition of economic benefits, but also to prevent historical members of the Union from benefiting from them.

Military exercises between Ukraine, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance risk jeopardizing the period of calm, albeit unstable, between Moscow and Washington. The détente that followed the Putin-Biden summit, which was held last month, is beginning to be just a memory. The Kremlin, in fact, perceives joint military maneuvers as an affront and a threat precisely because they are carried out in an area that Russia considers to be its exclusive influence. Of course this also implies reasons of international politics, which concern the expansionist attitude of the United States in Ukraine: the fundamental reason is that Moscow refuses to have troops of the Atlantic Alliance on its borders, which is also the reason why it has always rejected the possibility of the entry of Kiev both in the European Union and in the Atlantic Alliance itself. If in the opposition to an agreement with Brussels there are also economic reasons, the aversion to joining the Atlantic Alliance is justified by the fear of no longer having a physical space between the western garrisons and those of Moscow, with obvious potential close threats, especially of the missile type, which would expose the Russian country to a constant threat from the United States; this vision is of the medium term, while in the short term the functional need for Russian interests is that there are no allies of the Ukrainian country in the disputed territories with Moscow, where the fighting continues, capable of reversing the fate of the conflict. The numbers used say that Moscow is not wrong to fear these military maneuvers and also to interpret them as a threat towards Russia: in fact in 2019, the last exercises carried out before the pandemic, the participating countries were 19 against the current 32 and the ships soldiers employed went from 32 to 40. Undoubtedly this increase is due to Biden’s ability to aggregate allied countries and to have been able to focus Ukraine as a point of general interest for the Atlantic Alliance; in this Moscow was right to prefer Trump as a tenant of the White House and to commit himself to getting him re-elected. Beyond the political implications, the real objective of these exercises is to provide adequate training to the Ukrainian military regarding the methods and methods of combat of the Atlantic Alliance and this seems preparatory to an entry into the Western alliance more or less. official, but in any case with the intention of integrating the Ukrainian armed forces with those of the Atlantic Alliance, even if, in fact, these exercises have been held since 1997, but have acquired greater importance after the annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea to the Russia, in a manner condemned by a large part of the international community. The fact that the United States is the major financier of military maneuvers must be associated with the willingness that Ukraine provides to use its territory as a logistical base and the possibility of access to foreign forces within it. The Russian grievances were of a military and geopolitical nature and close to clash when an English ship was accused of having violated the border of the territorial waters of Crimea and therefore of Russia, with the forces of Moscow opening fire on the ship of the Atlantic Alliance, first episode of its kind since the end of the Cold War. It is understood how this state of affairs can favor accidents that can degenerate into much heavier situations; paradoxically, the possible scenarios, in this historical phase, seem to be much more dangerous than when the cold war was underway which was based on the balance of terror and where each of the two contenders had well-defined fields, which could never have been surpassed. On the contrary, the strong precariousness of the current equilibrium seems to favor a series of conflicts with low potential intensity, but which can trigger much worse situations. One of the dangers is that Russia appears isolated, especially from Beijing, which could provide aid only if functional to its interests and in any case not in an equal way, but in such a way as to put Moscow in a subordinate role, this aspect of Russian isolation risks increasing in Moscow military actions that are not classic, but which have now entered modern practice: the activism of Russian hackers constitutes, in fact, a further unconventional battleground, which, however, risks involving classic weapons: an additional danger from a cornered nation that can no longer exercise its role as the first power which it has not renounced.

Western countries fear the growth of radical Islamic movements in Africa, where episodes of violence have grown with a very significant increase, which counted about 5,000 attacks with over 13,000 victims, last year alone. The displacement of extremist formations, such as the Islamic State, from Asian countries, such as Syria and Iraq, where the phenomenon is practically under control, to African countries, following a path from east to west, places large parts of the African continent under close observation. also due to its relative proximity to Europe and the obvious contacts with issues such as emigration and energy supply, which are increasingly at the center of European problems. It should not be forgotten how, on the issue of emigration, the continuous disagreements between the members of the European Union can be exploited as a destabilizing factor by Islamic fundamentalists, increasingly allies of the gangs of human traffickers, both as a capacity to manage flows, and the introduction in Europe of potential agents capable of carrying out attacks. If the first countries threatened by these new developments, in the immediate future, are Italy and Spain, it is obvious that an inability of global management on the part of Europe affects the old continent, still very divided on the possible solutions to the issue. . The new American administration is very sensitive to this issue, because it bases its Atlantic leadership on collaboration with Europe and considers the security of the old continent to be a central topic of its geopolitical strategy. Probably Washington, internally, does not want to repeat the errors of assessment made by Obama, with the Syrian war and intends to prevent a military development of Islamist formations in Africa, where, moreover, they are already present and active, to prevent the opening of a a new front of commitment and, above all, of jeopardizing European security, which would imply an even greater effort for the USA. Currently the crucial geographical point is the Shael, where the presence of fundamentalists is favored by a scarce presence of the government forces of the various countries that govern the area, in addition to the physical conformation of the territory, which allows extreme freedom of movement for the Islamist militias. The spread of the pandemic has also favored the activity of fundamentalists, slowing down diplomatic meetings for the solution of the problem, however the assurance of collaboration in the fight against Islamic terrorism of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania and Yemen, represents a further guarantee that the problem is perceived at the supra-continental level as urgent and very dangerous. The law enforcement activity cannot fail to provide for a commitment on the field, but on this front the European countries are reluctant to engage their own personnel directly on African soil, rather a choice of intelligence operations is preferred, able to anticipate the moves terrorists and, above all, blocking the funding of fundamentalist groups. However, this approach appears to be only part of the possible solution to the problem: in fact, without a direct military conflict, it appears difficult to overcome the problem entirely, also because the physical presence of the terrorist formations, on the one hand, succeeds in proselytizing the populations of the area and with those who fail to integrate a regime of terror, which, in any case, represents a strong point in the garrison of the territory. The challenge for Westerners is to know how to involve the armies of the countries of the Shael belt, at least with funding, military supplies and the training of regular troops; certainly the funding will have to concern not only the military aspect but also, and in a substantial way, everything that may concern the development of the countries involved, in terms of infrastructures, medical facilities and development of the productive sectors. The African question, long postponed by Western countries, thus reappears in the form of urgency which has as its purpose the very security of Europe and the West, but is, at the same time, an opportunity for global development that cannot be wasted, also to wrest Africa from a Chinese influence, now badly tolerated by the Africans themselves.

Kim Jong-un’s public acknowledgment of the gravity of North Korea’s food situation is an alarm not to be underestimated. The head of state of Pyongyang spoke of a very difficult situation for finding food, aggravated by the failure to comply with the production plan in agriculture, also due to damage caused by environmental and climatic issues. Agricultural production is considered essential not only to cope with the already difficult situation in the country but also to try to overcome the emergency linked to the pandemic; in fact, even if, officially, the North Korean country was not affected by the covid, the situation of serious malnutrition and with a health sector not up to the task, it is thought that the victims of the pandemic and also the poor production sector of the country have aggravated a state of affairs already in severe crisis. According to estimates, North Korea has about ten million, out of about twenty-five, of its population suffering from malnutrition and this affects the life of the country and the already compromised production capacity. Pyongyang suffers from a state of backwardness in its production structures, which prevents it from recovering from the crisis, to which must be added the nuclear sanctions, which have severely tested the survival capacity of entire social classes. According to the United Nations, the closure of the borders would have increased the prices of basic products exponentially and the non self-sufficiency of food in the country would have produced a state of severe famine. The food shortage was further increased by contingent climatic factors such as typhoons and heavy rains in the past months of August and September. The general picture is however incomplete due to the scarce access to the news that the regime determines and the few data available come from some humanitarian organizations that have access to it in any case in a partial way. The fact that Kim Jong-un publicly denounced the situation can have several meanings, one of which is incontrovertible: the situation in the country is certainly very serious. The Korean leader may have admitted the gravity of the crisis to hope for an easing of sanctions or to prepare the ground for a request for aid addressed first of all to China, the country’s only ally, but also to the United States. Biden has not yet addressed the problem of relations with North Korea and a form of aid to contain the food crisis could constitute a starting point for the resumption of bilateral relations, however Kim Jong-un has become accustomed to contradictory attitudes and the public recognition of the state of food crisis could also be used to blame that part of the international community responsible for the sanctions. In this perspective, the resumption of nuclear threats and the test launches of intercontinental missiles could take, in the mind of the dictator, new forms of blackmail to obtain advantages. From the point of view of internal politics, despite the serious crisis, a popular uprising capable of overthrowing the regime does not seem possible: the control is too intense and the population is too weak and exhausted to face a revolt, also because any external support is entirely impossible. Help could come in the form of supplies from South Korea, which could fear a huge influx towards its borders, a possibility also feared by China, which does not like the creation of refugee camps on its territory. For the moment, for Beijing, the interest that the Kim Jong-un regime remains in power is prevalent to avoid a union of the two Koreas that could only materialize under Seoul and that would bring the united country into the American orbit. The most logical solution should therefore be the arrival of aid from Beijing, in a quantity sufficient to avert the crisis but not to revive the country altogether, to maintain control of the possibility of replacing the regime with a government increasingly favorable to China. , but more controllable. In the confrontation between Beijing and Washington, every possible point in favor must be maintained and North Korea could become strategic for China if Beijing were able to fully control its moves.

The showdown of the Chinese Air Force over the skies of Taiwan represents the most coherent response to Beijing’s intentions about what was agreed by the Western powers at the G7. The warning of Western leaders to the Chinese country that highlighted the importance of peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait, including through a peaceful resolution of the dispute, was perceived, as it was easy to imagine, as an interference in Beijing’s internal affairs. which has always considered Formosa as an integral part of its territory: an issue where other states, especially the USA, must not enter. Tension over Taiwan, whose government is not formally recognized by Washington, had already increased significantly with visits from US government officials and military aid from the United States, which is, in fact, Taipei’s main ally. China has never welcomed these developments and the adverse attitude that has developed from Western countries has determined the willingness to perform a show of strength. Beijing employed twenty-eight aircraft that reportedly entered the Taiwan Air Identification Zone. The feared resentment against the West thus immediately expressed what for Westerners and the US in particular, can only be understood as a provocation. In essence, an escalation of a military nature between the two parties would have started, without going through a political confrontation or economic conflict. It goes without saying that the dangerous potential that can arise from Chinese action promises to be dramatic. A possible scenario is that China implements repeatedly repeated threats to consider the military option to resolve the Taiwan issue, if this hypothesis were to become concrete for the US it would be impossible not to take sides in the defense of Taipei, with a possible involvement of other Western forces or the Atlantic Alliance itself. On the other hand, China cannot depart from the purpose it has publicly announced to the world, which is to prevent any attempt to break its sovereignty and security. In addition to Taiwan, this also involves Hong Kong and the Uighur issue. It is a question of defending, in addition to one’s own strategic interests, one’s image as an aspiring world power of the first level, which is part of Chinese ambitions and projects. Beijing’s mistake was that of wanting to relate to Western democracies without considering their point of view in the least and trying to impose their own with the use of soft power and economic strength, without succeeding in the intent. To dialogue with Western democracies, which are also the richest market in the world and therefore essential to China itself, the display of strength within the Chinese country and the neo-colonial attitude in developing countries cannot be accepted and European partners of the USA were waiting for nothing more than a president capable of reducing this opposition; opposition that is not only political but also economic: Chinese excessive power is badly tolerated by Westerners, who also use the violation of political and civil rights to sanction Beijing and try to reduce its economic weight. In the end, the issue, even geopolitical, risks being reduced to this element, which is however capable of dragging the relationship between the two parties to very serious effects. China’s warning is clear and it will be impossible not to take it into account.

The common fears of the members of the Atlantic Alliance towards China have produced a completely predictable response from Beijing. The Chinese tactic is to turn everything against the People’s Republic into defamation, only that the international stage is not the domestic one, where information is controlled and criticism repressed. Beijing denies implementing systemic challenges against international security, which is, by now, the official and common opinion of the West, or at least of Western governments, ignoring the influence it wants to exert on developing countries, through a credit policy that easily turn into very onerous debts, aggressive financial policies, non-compliance with civil rights and economic growth obtained with the absence of guarantees for workers, a very low cost of labor often obtained with methods that touch slavery. Denying this is obvious because we cannot present the world with these characteristics, but the very globalized world that the Chinese like is the main tool to unmask them. In the note from the Beijing diplomatic mission accredited to the European Union, the West is reproached for still being stuck in a cold war mentality, but this situation is the one created by China itself. Which pursues policies, especially internal, but also external, in complete contrast with Western values, and it is clear that if each party is legitimate to support its own reasons, it is legitimate for the West to see present-day China for itself, as a threat. Beijing has become one of the worst victims of Trump’s defeat: with the previous US president, the confrontation dialectic was at the highest level, but without too many consequences, moreover, Trump’s aversion for Europe had brought dialogue with the western allies; Biden’s attitude is quite different, as he turns out to be a much more formidable enemy for China, precisely because, in addition to maintaining his distrust of Chinese power, he was able to recompose the West towards traditional ties with the USA: a factor that gives it only weakens Beijing and isolates it from the richest markets in the world, an issue to which China is very sensitive because it is functional to those objectives of economic growth, which have long been at the center of Chinese objectives, also as an element of geopolitics. Beyond the battleground of the economy, which is by no means secondary, the unity of vision matured in the Western camp against Chinese authoritarianism, allows Western states to move away from China, towards which it was dangerously approached due to the worsening of relations caused by Trump. From the point of view of the consequences, the danger of a China isolated from the West is that of a further recourse to the expansion of armaments, a direction, moreover, already undertaken for some time, which however, with these latest developments, could induce Beijing to accelerate towards demonstrations of force as he has repeatedly threatened. Think of the garrison of the naval routes of those it considers waters of its relevance, of the issues of the disputed islands and of the most potentially dangerous event constituted by Taiwan, which Beijing has never formally renounced, considering it an integral part of the Chinese territory. Even further, it should be remembered that China has always claimed to want to defend its interests, if this concept is extended to the defense of the possibility of making investments considered strategic for its objectives, it will be interesting to see Beijing’s reaction in the face of a possible conflict. to Chinese activism in Western countries. The most likely reaction passes from a trade war, which is not convenient for anyone, because it can block or strongly compress the world economy, however the one that has the most to lose is precisely China, if the major world markets were foreclosed, in that case it seems easy to foresee the performance of a show of strength, with potentially irreparable consequences. Before reaching that point, however, there must be the work of diplomacy, with the threat of a possible return of Trump on the US scene, who will be the real balance for a whole series of situations capable of overturning the current structure and for which, probably, China, but also Russia will work in favor; therefore the success of the West, also as practical and abstract values, passes through the success of the current American president, who must make his project to strengthen relations with the West effective: a task capable of bringing history back on track from which she had come out.

The impression that Egyptian mediation has had a positive effect on the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians of Hamas appears to have had a positive effect for the Cairo regime. In reality, the Egyptian contribution, which was nevertheless present, only partially contributed to stopping the Israeli bombing, which had lasted for 11 days, and the launches of rockets from the Gaza Strip; nevertheless President Al Sisi received the public appreciation of the American president, met the French president and the Egyptian foreign minister was able to receive the compliments of Germany and the European Union. The Egyptian regime must be given a certain ability, more than anything else, to know how to use a contingent situation to its advantage, which can allow it to claim its diplomatic relevance in the region, trying to fix a calendar for the question of peace. This is a unique opportunity to get out of a state of isolation caused by the application of increasingly repressive practices within one’s own territory. The Egyptian goal is to coordinate, through its diplomacy, the management of the current peace, through increasingly frequent meetings with Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority to maintain the ceasefire thanks to a lasting truce and promote Palestinian reconciliation. , as a first point to proceed to a possible dialogue with Tel Aviv. Egypt has financially committed itself to the reconstruction in the Gaza Strip with an investment of 500 million dollars, thus becoming the main interlocutor for Hamas, also thanks to the maintenance of the only access not controlled by Israel, through which to deliver aid humanitarians, including from third countries. It is clear that this whole strategy is functional to a sort of cleansing of the image of the regime, which, however, is proving to exceed in its paternalistic rhetoric, almost replicating the attitude taken in practice, which is moreover typical of authoritarian regimes. The history of the relationship between Al Sisi and Hamas has recorded moments of crisis precisely with the Egyptian dictator’s seizure of power due to the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, particularly close to Hamas, however Cairo needs Gaza and Gaza needs de Cairo, and the link between the two sides appears to be obligatory, even if several people who collaborated with Hamas itself continue to be imprisoned in Egyptian prisons. On this contradiction, the Palestinian Islamic movement for the moment must postpone for reasons of obvious necessity, but it is legitimate to think that in the long term this cause can only be a reason for conflict. Egypt, however, is the strong partner of the alliance and can conduct relations by reason of its support for Hamas, with the primary objective of making this link and its effects functional, as a guarantee for the sustainability of the dictatorship, especially on the internal front, but not disdaining the positive implications that can also be gained from the outside. Logic is part of a classic scheme that is always valid for dictatorships: gaining international consent, even partial, through a diplomatic action worthy of a democracy: a factor that allows you to hide internal misdeeds and assume almost essential positions, especially if in certain contexts there is no they are alternative international actors who can and want to guarantee their commitment, as the recent clash between Israel and Palestine has shown. On the other hand, the humanitarian aspect is a factor that arouses a lot of sensitivity in democracies, especially in Western ones: if the amount of aid is undeniable, the methods, strongly exhibited, through banners advertising the president’s gift to Palestinians Egyptian, did not arouse particular enthusiasm in the population, who still remember the work of destruction, carried out by the Egyptians, of the Palestinian tunnels in 2013. Each part, therefore, makes a virtue of necessity, but the meaning of this collaboration is that the Palestinians cannot reject it because they are in dire need, while for Egypt it can mean one of the last possibilities to try to improve its image towards the outside, not realizing that it is playing a role that should have been a task of the United Nations and Western democracies, who, ultimately, are using Cairo by paying it back with a little appreciation, which is, in reality, a real and proper fiction. ia.

The crisis following the hijacking of the plane bound for Lithuania by the Belarusian regime led to a reaction, which made it possible to verify an unprecedented identity of views among European countries. The harshness of the response from Brussels, in fact, was shared both by those countries, such as the Baltic ones, which have always feared the actions of Moscow, and by nations more inclined to resume dialogue with Russia. This premise, despite the sanctions being directed against Minsk, is a duty to analyze the possible consequences of this diplomatic step, including for the Kremlin. One of the European fears, aggravated precisely by the issue of the Irish plane forced to land in Minsk, is the possibility that Russia will create a sort of federation with Belarus, which, in reality, could mean the annexation of Minsk to Moscow. After all, Russia is also planning similar solutions for areas belonging to Ukraine: the aim is to contain a possible advance of Western influence on the borders of the former Soviet country, which could be implemented with the economic action of the European Union and of the military one of the Atlantic Alliance, which already deployed its forces in various countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. The most immediate consequences would be a further closure of Russia to Europe and an even greater worsening of relations with the West. This is a possibility that several European countries are against and which is seen as too negative a development, such as to constitute a difficult front to face, in these terms, even for Washington, which is already focused on other issues. Moscow’s intentions would be to proceed along this line, if elements such as to distract it from its intentions were not to intervene and even Belarus, by now isolated and with only Russia as an ally, would see no alternative solutions to the substantial renunciation of its sovereignty. For Moscow, with no other way out, pursuing this goal is functional to maintaining its geopolitical influence and, on the domestic front, a distraction for public opinion in a phase of rather serious economic stagnation, where per capita income is at a standstill. about 9,000 euros per year due to the absence of an industrial policy capable of diversifying national production to make it more independent from the energy sector and the inability to modernize an industrial fabric characterized by excessively obsolete plants. Europe, however, has no interest in Russia remaining in such a position: a more modern country, both from the point of view of rights and the ability to spend more, could represent a potentially huge and very close market from the point of view. geographical. The first step is to create a tendency of greater detente through greater cooperation by diversifying the possible aid to Moscow and Minsk, with the first aim of maintaining the sovereignty of Belarus on its territory. The perplexities concern the relationship with the two heads of state, who are severely contested at home; if this prerogative could favor European plans, in reality the repressive apparatus ensures a practically certain stay in power and this could backfire against European projects, which would end up financing authoritarian regimes that are not at all willing to move towards forms of greater democracy. However, it must be said that the capacity of European countries to respond to the Belarusian provocation, univocal and unusually fast, has produced a certain impression both in Minsk, but above all in Moscow, where the ability to produce sufficiently harsh responses has been recorded. Brussels. Russia is already subject to a regime of sanctions which has produced negative results for the Kremlin precisely in the economic field and which have contributed to the discontent of the population. The pact with the social body based on the assumption of more prosperity in the field of more authoritarianism has caused an erosion in the approval of Putin, who has found himself grappling with an increasingly open dispute. This fact created great concern in the Kremlin, so much so that it feared that the Belarusian protests could also influence the climate in Russia, through an exponential growth of dissent. For now, to counter the phenomenon, solutions have been thought of that are contrary to European approval, but if Putin wants to get out of the crisis he will have to create the conditions for collaboration with Europe, which must begin with the relaxation of sanctions and the ability to create the conditions for attracting foreign investments and, to do so, the change in the domestic political situation is the first necessary step, even if, perhaps, not yet sufficient.