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The issue of the cartoons on Muhammad risks triggering a sort of war of religion and civilization, which hides, however, a geopolitical confrontation that goes beyond the bipolar relationship between France and Turkey, but which involves geopolitical reasons, the confrontation between countries in the same area Sunni and, not least internal problems of the Turkish country. Despite these analyzes, which are necessary, it is however necessary to point out that no Muslim country has expressed solidarity with the French professor who was beheaded by a Chechen extremist. This consideration cannot fail to lead to reflections on the desire to direct towards a possible cultural clash which aims to solicit the support of the popular classes of Islamic countries in order to gain support; a strategy that applies above all to Turkey in difficulty due to its internal economic situation, but also useful for other countries such as Pakistan or Iraq where the governments in office are experiencing various difficulties. The strategy is also useful in trying to destabilize the French country by fueling the extreme right-wing opposition, but this could also have serious repercussions for the Islamic faithful on French soil. Paris must be very careful not to fall into this trap which would provide further arguments to the Islamic front. An unprecedented alliance is underway against France between Sunni Turkey and Shiite Iran, which seem to want to take advantage of the opportunity to put Saudi Arabia in difficulty. Between Tehran and Riyadh, the reasons for the tensions are known and refer to the search for supremacy between Shiites and Sunnis, while the confrontation between Turkey and Arabia focuses on the confrontation within the Sunni side. Here too, religion is a very present element, but only because it is a means of political domination, which the Ottoman politics of Ankara wants to exploit to undermine the influence that the Arabs have as guardians of Mecca. If Turkey is the main interpreter of the boycott of French products, Turkish products are boycotted precisely from Riyadh, albeit in an unofficial manner, for the alliance between Ankara and Qatar. The boycott of Turkish products carried out by Arabia has spread to other countries close to Riyadh, causing further difficulties for the economy of Ankara, which is already in decline. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia does not practice a boycott of French products precisely because of the desire not to appear aligned with Turkey and thus emphasizing its distance. Erdogan arrogates to himself the right to defend European Muslims, expanding the will to protect the Turks in Germany, but if in this second case it is a sort of direct protection to his compatriots, with the intention of becoming the champion of European Muslims, the the project is more ambitious and could also be understood as an opportunity to influence the Union, an instrument to be combined with the management of refugees traveling the Balkan route. But once again this provoked resentment towards Ankara which materialized with messages of closeness to Macron from Germany and Italy. Specifically, the confrontation between Ankara and Paris is taking place to contain the advance in their respective areas of influence: Turkey, in fact, has worked to strengthen political, economic and military cooperation with Algeria, Mali, Niger and Tunisia, countries that France has always considered it as its exclusive area of ​​action in foreign policy. Paris reacted to Turkish interference by siding with Cyprus and Greece, the object of Turkish maneuvers in the eastern Mediterranean, sending military ships to the area and increasing the supply of weapons to Athens. The respective deployment in Libya alongside the factions confronting each other in the civil war of the North African country contributes to the confrontation between the two sides. The protagonism of Erdogan remains, however, a danger, which deserves greater attention and commitment on the side of France by the European Union, both with diplomatic solutions and with military support, also to protect Greece and Cyprus, members of Brussels. . The sanctions path could be the first to be implemented to contain Turkish action, despite the possible blackmail of migrants to Brussels. Even from the US elections, answers will have to arrive about the Turkish attitude within the Atlantic Alliance and the real intentions of the administration that will take office in the White House, if with Trump there should be no changes, with Biden it is possible to focus more on allies Europeans and a lower tolerance towards external forces, such as the purchase of arms from Russia, which have characterized the Turkish attitude since Erdogan was president. In any case, the confrontation between Ankara and Paris has a lot of negative potential that all actors should contain to prevent the situation from escalating.

The need for China to increase its self-sufficiency will be the central theme of the fifth plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The 376 members, 346 men and 30 women, who make up the Central Committee will have to trace the path for the Chinese economy of the future, conditioned by both the pandemic and relations with the United States, and seek solutions to achieve what is indicated by President Xi Jinping . Chinese politicians have now come to the conclusion that whoever wins the American electoral competition, the US trade ostracism against China will continue; this factor combined with the pandemic could reinforce the global trend towards deglobalization, which represents the real danger to Chinese economic growth. For now, China has responded well, in terms of growth in gross domestic product, but an aversion to Chinese commercial practices, to repressive politics in its territory and also to the invasion in foreign countries, both European and African, is growing in the world. to condition the economic and even political policies of the countries where Beijing operates, through the use of large amounts of liquidity, which is often transformed into credits as an instrument of blackmail. If the economy is the main interest in the short term, China, in the medium term, wants to be a global leader also on the international level: for this reason the Central Committee must develop a five-year plan, up to 2025, for economic development , and a longer term, up to 2035, which allows to preserve the country’s economy, taking into account the geopolitical tension and in the face of an expected drop in exports, precisely in order to increase the country’s international prestige. The first need is to reduce low-value exports and focus on greater growth in domestic demand, the real weak point of the Chinese economy until now. This is the solution of the “double circulation”, a model that provides for a lower reliance on external demand, offset by a greater capacity for supplying raw materials, technological innovations and higher value production. A greater weight of the domestic cycle would make it possible to prevent and reduce the strategic risks associated with the international economic situation. On the other hand, China has enormous room for improvement on this front, both due to the large size of its domestic market and the current low level of incidence of domestic demand. From this point of view, the current contingency dictated by the pandemic represents an excellent test for these programs: the Chinese gross domestic product has grown despite the presence of covid-19, unlike most of the world’s economies, thanks to the push of internal demand, also favored by specific fiscal policies. The intent of internal growth certainly does not foresee the abandonment of exports, however the trend is already underway, given that the foreign trade share of the gross domestic product has gone from 50% in 2008 to the current share of 30%. This contraction was also affected by the decrease in low-cost labor in China, which also began to use workers from other countries for Chinese branded products. But, despite a greater specialization among Chinese workers and also a production of greater added value, the situation of rural areas, characterized by a still worrying retreat and with an increase in poverty, and therefore in inequality, due to the pandemic, compared to the cities , represents a brake on the Communist Party’s goals. The share of domestic trade that contributes to gross domestic product is still too low, being 38.8% compared to 68% in the US. A simple increase in wages would cause inflation and limit the thrust of exports; rather, the fiscal lever is identified to reduce inequalities and allow an adequate redistribution of wealth capable of allowing the rise in domestic demand, also through easier access to education, health and adequate housing policies. These policies may meet the resistance of the conservative classes of Chinese society, however the need for a more homogeneous growth of the Chinese people is the essential condition for breaking down those differences that do not allow the adequate increase in domestic demand and, consequently, the growth of the country. . However, it will be interesting to see if with a more widespread economic growth for the Chinese people, those needs linked to a greater diffusion of social rights, which have so far provoked the demonstrations against power, will not grow.

The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament since 1988, with the aim of recognizing people and organizations that have distinguished themselves in the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms and already awarded, among others to Nelson Mandela, was awarded for 2020 to the opposition present in Belarus, following the initiatives taken against the dictator Lukashenko. It is not the first time that the action against the dictator of Minsk has been awarded the Sakharov Prize, in fact already in 2004 the recognition was awarded to the Belarusian Association of Journalists and in 2006 to the politician Aleksander Milinkevich. Specifically, the 2020 edition of the award was assigned to the Coordination Council of the Belarusian opposition, the group that was to be the guarantor for the successful transition of powers. Since its inception, the Coordination Council has been prosecuted by the Minsk government on charges of inciting social unrest and jeopardizing national security: reasons that have made it unconstitutional. The alternative candidate to Lukashenko, Svyatlana Tichanovskaja, is considered the moral guide of the Council, for her political action against the dictatorship, a factor that has led to her being forced into exile in Lithuania; defeated in the sham elections on 9 August, with an official percentage of votes in favor of Lukashenko of around 90%, the candidate was personally threatened, as well as her family and the other leader of the movement Maria Kolesnikova was jailed since last September 8. The elections were blatantly rigged, with a result that is at odds with all polls outside the regime and with a percentage that was a manifestation of the regime’s arrogance, but also stupidity. The demonstrations that followed the proclamation of Lukashenko’s victory were impressive, so much so as to make it clear that the dictator of Minsk is no longer tolerated by the citizens and has carried out a real coup, even according to the laws in force; unfortunately the large number of demonstrators in the streets caused the repression, confirming once again that the Minsk regime is, as well as illegitimate, deeply authoritarian. The award of the Sakharov Prize, however, comes late compared to the reaction of the leaders of the European Union to the Belarusian repressions: in fact, it took Brussels a month and a half not to recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate winner of the electoral competition, and it was also necessary to wait two months to issue sanctions against forty regime officials. On the other hand, the attitude of the European Parliament which has shown support for the defeated candidate since the beginning of the repression is different. The suspicion is that individual European countries are slow to take a position of explicit condemnation so as not to aggravate the already difficult relations with Russia, Minsk’s main ally. Moscow’s position is to be totally on Lukashenko’s side, even if it constitutes an uncomfortable ally, precisely because of the modalities implemented in the repression. Russia needs not to be infected by the protests at a time when the approval of Putin is in constant decline, especially due to a worsened economic condition, which is added to the continuing discontent with the lack of respect for civil rights; but for Moscow it is also important to maintain control, albeit indirect, over a country considered as its own area of ​​exclusive influence: what the Kremlin fears most is that with a change of government, Belarus can enter the orbit of the European Union , as has already happened for other former Soviet states. For Europe, once again, it is necessary to choose whether to have a pragmatic attitude or to neglect the reasons of real politik in order to defend rights. The award of the Sakharov Prize, however, remains a rather clear-cut stance, which could be followed by a more severe attitude towards Belarus, if there were not the bulky Russian presence behind Minsk; certainly also the fact of being a party to a possible move to Brussels with a change of power structures in Minsk complicates the conduct that Europe must keep, because it can easily be accused of defending rights with ulterior motives, however the facts following the Belarusian elections are not contestable, so much so that Russia itself was embarrassed, at least in the phases immediately following the first repressions, to defend Lukashenko. However, the Sakharov Prize serves to keep the situation in Minsk at the center of attention.

The proposal of the European Commission, for the creation of a black-list of the Union in order to sanction natural or legal persons who have perpetrated the violation of human rights, marks a new chapter in the attitude of the European institutions in the face of non-compliance rights. From a regulatory point of view, the draft concerning the regulation to be adopted takes its cue from a law already approved by the USA in 2012, during the Obama presidency. The sanctioning measures may be adopted against individuals and companies regardless of their country of origin, therefore also belonging to nations that have normal diplomatic relations with the Union. Although it is already a subject of negotiation, the situation linked to the poisoning of the Russian opponent, Navalni, has put the subject at the center of the European debate. The measure that represents the greatest novelty within the regulation will be the prohibition at European level and, therefore, no longer at the state level, of the sanctioned person entering the EU territory. Naturally, the sanction options will also concern the possibility of intervening on the assets and assets, present in the EU, of subjects who have infringed respect for human rights. The regulation should be able to guarantee greater flexibility in prosecuting those responsible for violating human rights, a category of offenses that is not included at individual level in the lists present within the community bodies, which currently provide for black-lists for crimes of terrorism, use of chemical weapons and computer crimes. The ban on entry into the EU represents a new sanctioning instrument, which is added to the immobilization of assets, until now the only possibility to intervene against violations. The approval of the regulation against human rights violations must reach the unanimity of the Council of the Union and this will represent tangible proof of the will of all European countries to defend civil rights and therefore the founding principles of the Union itself. This will be an indisputable indication of the real will of the European states and, especially, of some specific nations, which within them are not fully guaranteeing political and civil rights. The vote of the individual states must be a matter to be carefully examined and the final result will tell which direction Europe wants to take. The approval does not seem obvious, both for political reasons, relating, in fact, to the attitude of some countries, and for reasons of expediency regarding the economic interests that may be affected and the related responses to European companies, subject to retaliation. The topic should, however, affect a broader spectrum, just beyond people and companies but include states guilty of human rights violations. If the adoption of the sanctioning regulation becomes a reality, only the first stage in the fight against the failure to respect human rights will have been covered, the battle of civilization to be fully effective should involve waging a fight against state regimes guilty of non-compliance with human rights. This side, at the moment, appears to be only an ambition that is difficult to pursue, precisely for diplomatic and economic reasons; however, the danger of not compromising on respect for rights puts Europe at the concrete risk of being able to suffer a similar fate; for the moment in the majority of European countries the rights are guaranteed, but the very presence of states within the Union where guarantees have decreased, is a warning, which must be kept in mind. Furthermore, the economic ties with states that are political regimes, certainly China, but also others, presuppose ever closer contacts, which envisage forms of presence on the European territory of representatives of these nations. If the solution cannot be autarchy, demanding greater respect for rights as a contractual basis could begin to be an effective means of obliging some regimes, at least to a different attitude on this issue. However, it is necessary to start from the home front: the permanence within the Union of countries that have governments that have the compression of rights in their political program must become a primary question and with a solution that can no longer be postponed because tolerance lasted for too much time.

With the exchange of prisoners between the Shiite rebels and the government of Yemen, involving about 1000 fighters on each side, the United Nations seeks to foster mutual trust between the two sides to promote negotiations aimed at ending a bloody war, which has been going on for six years. The exchange is proceeding, as confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, but the operations are not short, however they will allow the fighters to reunite with their families; this aspect is seen as essential to restore the necessary climate to proceed, then on the path of diplomacy instead of that of arms. Among the soldiers who will be affected by the liberation there are Saudi and also Sudanese soldiers, as the African country supports the coalition, headed by Saudi Arabia, which since 2015, has supported the government that the Huti rebels, of Shiite religion, they have ousted from leading the country. The current contingent situation, with the pandemic that has hit globally, has brought as a direct consequence to the Yemeni conflict the repercussions of the decrease in humanitarian aid in a scenario already compromised, in addition to the war, by a very serious health situation, which we must add the conditions of food famine that the population is suffering. These general conditions, together with the substantial stalemate in the fighting, which did not favor either of the two contenders, favored the exchange of prisoners already agreed in Stockholm. The specific numbers of this exchange concern the release of 681 Shiite rebel fighters, against 400 soldiers from the forces that support the government, plus nineteen foreign fighters, of which fifteen Saudis and four Sudanese. The activity of the Red Cross materially allowed the exchange thanks to medical visits, health supplies and clothing as well as sums of money necessary for the return to their respective homes. Meanwhile, the Huti released three US people who were hostage to Shiite militias. The Yemeni conflict does not enjoy the media exposure of the Syrian war or that conducted against the Islamic State, however, according to the United Nations, it is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. The country’s poverty, which was going through a complicated situation already in peacetime, has favored the rapid decline in the quality of life created by the conflict and aggravated by the consequent health and food situation, in this scenario the particular violence exerted by the coalition against the rebels, it has often hit civilians, causing deaths and injuries, including through the indiscriminate bombing of schools and hospitals. Particularly violent was the action of the Saudi armed forces, which showed their total lack of respect for the population; despite this fury, the coalition led by Saudi Arabia has failed to overcome the rebels. The action of the United Nations has concentrated on two paths: the first is the diplomatic one to stop hostilities, while at the same time a second practical solution was also practiced, through the creation of humanitarian corridors, which led, even if in partial way, relief from the suffering of the population. Also through the mediation between the two sides, the United Nations stopped military offensives, making it decisive for the protection of civilians. The United Nations Security Council with resolution 2216 of 2015 asked the Huti rebels to disarm and withdraw from the conquered regions, but without offering anything in exchange for the territory taken; for the vision of the rebels it is necessary to maintain control over large portions of territory, also to avoid the encirclement and prevent new military attacks. Even if the situation remains serious, episodes such as that of the exchange of prisoners represent important innovations for the opening of negotiations capable of leading to a peace, which would, however, remain precarious due to the presence of the radicalization of the conflict on ethnic, religious and geopolitical grounds , however, the state of prostration of the country from a negative element can become the determining cause of the need to stop weapons to allow the country, whatever its form of state and whatever will be its possible division, to try to recover through the peaceful way . However, greater involvement of the great powers alongside the United Nations would be necessary to favor this solution.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia appears to be in a disadvantageous position compared to Azerbaijan, which can enjoy the alliance of a Turkey determined to play its role as the new Ottoman protagonist. Nagorno Karabakh has a population of about 150,000 inhabitants, the majority of whom are of Armenian ethnicity and for this very reason is in search of self-determination. For Turkey, it is not a question of having gone to war only to support the Turkish-speaking country of Azerbaijan, but of reiterating, especially for internal public opinion, the will to play a role that goes beyond that of regional power, but also to test Russia’s reaction to an invasion of its living space or zone of influence that Moscow considers its exclusive competence. It should be remembered that Russia is linked to Armenia by a very close alliance, which could force it to intervene personally in the conflict. Erdogan’s strategy appears to be to provoke Moscow’s intentions in the area of ​​regional issues, above all due to the fact that Russia sells arms to Armenia, but, at the same time, also sells them to Azerbaijan, an element that it seems to be actually considering Russian behavior. The Kremlin, in fact, has chosen the diplomatic path very responsibly, obtaining a truce, which, however, does not seem to be fully respected. The allegations of violation are reciprocal, also because they occur in a situation strongly conditioned by mutual aversion that has materialized in thirty years of clashes. The entry into the field of Turkey seems to be an apparently incomprehensible provocation towards Moscow, because the theater of the fighting is adjacent to an area crossed by the Turkish gas pipeline built to transport Russian gas to the rich European market. Beyond the geopolitical reasons, is there any willingness of Ankara to affect economic relations with Moscow to condition the rich gas market? The demand is legitimate for an economy in recession, such as the Turkish one, which must revive the government’s approval in its internal political market, but also bear the costs of its expansionist foreign policy. In turn, Russia has no less serious internal problems, with the decline in support of Putin, who for the first time recorded worrying drops, as well as the difficult relations with an ever growing opposition. In foreign policy, the Belarusian question is of great concern to the Kremlin, already tried by the commitment in Syria that has not aroused enthusiasm among the population and the question of Russian territories in Ukraine, which threatens increasingly significant diplomatic repercussions. Considering these elements, Turkey’s choice to support, if not initiate, the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh can be identified as a strategic element within a dialectic that is not always unambiguous, but which seems to want to verify the real Russian intentions in the region. It should not be forgotten that relations between the two countries are going through more and more phases of sudden rapprochement and separation, according to mutual convenience, which often appear in contrast. It has been verified that Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, has bought, against the will of the Atlantic Alliance itself, Russian defense apparatuses in open conflict with the policies and directives of Brussels; but then it took sides against the Syrian regime supported by the Russians, because it is Shiite, but not only, by supporting the Islamic fundamentalists Sunni, also used against the Kurds, the main allies of the Americans against the Islamic State. The repeated violations of the interests of the Atlantic Alliance have, however, produced no reaction against Ankara, which felt entitled to proceed on the path of arrogance and violation of international law, practically without sanctions by the international community. Currently, the battlefield of Nagorno Karabakh highlights once again how it is necessary to stop Turkey, starting with very heavy economic sanctions to limit its range of action, also because the consequences, albeit serious of the current conflict, can become even worse , if the war can become a regional clash at the gates of Europe, but also on the Iranian border, with a direct commitment that Russia will not be able to postpone for much longer if the situation is not stabilized, including through the abandonment of the presence of Ankara .

Unconditional admission of countries not accustomed to the rule of law risks blocking economic aid against the pandemic in Europe. If the problem is not to choose between economics and health, with all that entails, similarly, one should not choose between economics and law. On the contrary, the strategy implemented by the states of the Visegrad Pact seems to contradict this second assumption. The will to block economic aid for the countries most affected by the virus, if not in exchange for a relaxation of monitoring measures on the application and validity of the rule of law. This crisis in the headquarters of the European institutions could have negative effects, directly on the states affected by the pandemic, but which could not fail to have repercussions from an even greater contraction of the economy; it should be remembered that the revenues from the contributions of the Union are an important chapter of the budget items of the states that belonged to the Warsaw Pact. It is clear that the strategy of the eastern countries is characterized by an element of political myopia and a vision on the medium and long term. Despite this evidence, the rigid positions of the executives of Poland and Hungary, in particular, do not seem to present negotiation possibilities. At the institutional level, the clash is between the European Parliament and the Council of the Union and the negotiations are already slowing down the distribution of funds with the most optimistic forecasts that say that before the end of October the agreement will not be reached, with the direct consequence of the possibility of postponing the entry into force of the new budgets beyond 1 January next year. Politically, Germany’s position appears very delicate, because it must mediate between the needs of the eurozone economy and those of the application of the rule of law throughout the territory of the Union and a failure in the face of a mechanism defended by Berlin would mean a weakening of the German leadership. The European Commission also enters the institutional dialogue as mediator between Parliament and the Council, but the main parliamentary groups, popular, socialist, liberal and green, share the commitment not to approve the financial plan until there is an agreement on the monitoring of the application of the rule of law. The game of European funds concerns the recovery fund, which has an endowment of 750,000 million euros. It is understandable that the threat of non-ratification in some parliaments of these provisions on economic aid, without a review of the monitoring of the rule of law, represents a blackmail that jeopardizes the very survival of Europe; were it not for the financial repercussions on those countries reluctant to approve it, this strategy might seem to have been built as a special plan to cause major problems for the European institutional framework. It must be remembered that Parliament is requesting that the possibility of cutting funds be extended beyond the mismanagement of resources, in order to finally cover the violation of fundamental rights of the Union. Parliament sees in the current German attitude, qualified as hesitant, the main obstacle to achieving this objective, because Germany’s activity as current president does not seem entirely determined to reach the necessary consensus in the Council. However, despite the highly problematic aspects of the situation, the positive thing is that a climate is being created that goes beyond good intentions to assume a practical and political character in the European institutions, to affirm the fundamental importance of the founding principles of Europe. This represents a starting point for those who want to enforce the law and do not want to surrender to compromise solutions in the name of the economy. For now, however, the German position is notable for a lack of determination that questions its real intentions in the face of economic interests, with the feeling of preferring the latter. The need for a strong and determined stance on the part of the largest European shareholder is, on the other hand, an imperative need within the current debate, which cannot fail to have an even more severe result than the simple reduction of contributions, to reach up to to the expulsion of those who use Europe only to obtain financing without respecting the obligations towards other countries and the right within them, because this is incompatible with the permanence in the European institutions.

the European Union is finally moving to sanction those states that deviate from the fundamental principles, which they themselves subscribed at the time of accession, of the common European home. This is a belated measure, carried out after years of provocations towards Brussels and all those countries that have made respect for the fundamental principles of the Union their distinctive feature within the supranational organization; however, it is also a beginning with a meaning that goes beyond the single sentence and serves as a warning and warning for other nations, which only intend to enjoy the advantages, especially economic ones, of belonging to the European Union. The Brussels strategy was that of the judicial route, despite the presence of the famous article 7 of the Union Treaty, which allows the suspension of the right to vote in the European institutions of the country that violates the fundamental values ​​of the EU included in article 2 of the Treaty. Against the application of this sanction, however, Hungary and Poland can count on the alliance of different states, which share with the two countries the economic interests deriving from belonging to the Union. For Brussels, therefore, the judicial route was an obligatory solution but which proved to be effective. Specifically, the action of the European Court of Justice was implemented against the Hungarian legislative measure which provided for the closure of a university with an ad hoc law. This was considered incompatible with Community law; the law of the government of Budapest was built specifically to ban the activity and expel the Central European University, present in Hungary since 1991, from the state territory. This university was established by the billionaire George Soros, of Hungarian origin and opposed by the parties and sovereign movements. The Court’s verdict accepted the European Commission’s appeal against the Hungarian law for violations of European rules on the freedom of institutions, failure to comply with the articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which enshrine the freedom to establish educational centers and the relative freedom of teaching and finally also the violation of the rules of the World Trade Organization on the free provision of services. The Court’s decision will allow the European Commission to formally request the Hungarian country to repeal or amend the disputed law, while eliminating the articles that led to the closure of the university; in the event that the government of Budapest does not follow the provisions of the Court, the Commission may present a new complaint with the aim of proposing heavy financial sanctions against Hungary. This case has an important significance for the European Commission because, specifically, it marks a method, which seems to be effective, against those countries that have undertaken the non-respect of rights as a method of government; moreover, the provisions of the Court had already stopped the judicial reform envisaged in Poland, which endangered the independence of the judiciary. If the judicial path has practical effects, it remains, however, bound to a legal procedure, which may have uncertain effects, i.e. for the moment it represents the best tool available, but it cannot completely replace an adequate political process, capable of regulating in a definitive and automatic way the non-respect of fundamental rights by authoritarian governments. Unfortunately, the Union is still conditioned by the need for the unanimity of the states: a system that conditions and blocks the decisions of the European parliament and slows down the action of the Commission, often called upon to make decisions that the contingency of times would require very fast. This approach should be overcome, also with a view to greater European integration, certainly paying for the loss of a share of the sovereignty of individual states; but, in the end, the crucial point is precisely that of the sovereignty of individual nations, an issue which, if not overcome, could block any progress towards greater integration. It appears the task of the European Parliament to proceed towards a reform that can release decisions and also sanctions in a majority manner in order to overcome the current logic that provides for the unanimity requirement, trusting that the majority of states will always be faithful to the constitutive principles of ‘European Union.

Turkey, in support of Azerbaijan, tries to characterize the ongoing conflict also as a war of religion; in fact, the presence of Islamic mercenaries from the north of the northern country could be interpreted in this sense. This religious element could have a double value: on the one hand of a practical and military nature to employ mercenaries already trained in guerrilla warfare and determined against the Christian enemy, on the other hand they would give meaning to the Turkish presence of a sort of Islamic representation in the conflict, functional to Ankara’s intentions to be accredited as a representative and defender of the Islamic religion. The Syrian contingent would be made up of about 4000 men, who are already fighting alongside the Azerbaijani troops. This presence could also be read in opposition to the Egyptian desire to side with Armenia and open a competition with a religious significance as a geopolitical factor; however, Turkish support also includes the use of personnel from the Ankara army and the use of drones and military aircraft. Erdogan’s intention is to win Azerbaijan victory and consequently occupy the region and encourage the return of the approximately one million Azerbaijanis who have been forced to leave the Armenian majority territory. With this victory, the Turkish president tries to obtain an argument that can be spent in his favor, both nationally and internationally, to revive his project of making Turkey a regional player. The enlargement into territories that Russia considers to be its influence indicates that Russia has become the target to hit by taking advantage of Moscow’s internal difficulties and its difficult commitments in international scenarios. The fact that Erdogan wants to exploit the conflict, always latent and never defined, of Nagorno Karabakh, means that Turkey wants to extend its influence in an Islamic area, albeit with a Shiite majority, where a language very similar to Turkish is spoken; therefore a cultural, as well as a religious character. The Turkish vision foresees a stability of the area achieved to the detriment of Armenia, an ally of Moscow. Erdogan’s risk appears to be anything but calculated, indeed it seems an almost desperate gamble, which reveals how his management of power is not as solid as he wants to believe. The direct entry of Russia on the scene is an event that is very likely to occur and which would cause a conflict between Moscow and Ankara; Erdogan’s chances of success can only occur if this eventuality does not occur and for that to happen Azerbaijan must bring Nagorno Karabakh back under its control as soon as possible, ending hostilities. A possible Russian intervention at the end of the conflict would not have the justification to defend the Armenians and would be more complicated from an operational point of view. The next few hours will be decisive for the development of the fighting; meanwhile, this situation demonstrates once again how Erdogan is an unreliable and unscrupulous politician, ready to insert religion to further his purposes, without taking into account the possible implications. A good thing that a country like this has not entered Europe.

The debate for the presidential elections of the United States highlighted the transformation of American politics, now very far from the characteristics that saw its two major parties on similar positions and with few differences. The personalization of politics, to the detriment of programs, has established itself in parallel with the progressive radicalization of the most extreme positions, based more and more on preconceptions and politically incorrect ideas. The increasingly exasperated populism has caused a retreat in the ways of confrontation, also caused by an emptying of politics and, above all, of the value of politicians, increasingly aligned towards low values. This process has affected both sides, albeit more clearly the Republican Party, which has been emptied of its conservative aspect from the inside to embrace the themes of movements like the Tea Party, of which Trump is the tragic product. In the Democrats this involution was more nuanced, but the impression of being a party linked to finance and major economic interests led to the desertion of its constituents from the polls, resulting in the defeat of an unpresentable candidate like Clinton. The moderation of the Democrats has created a rift with the left of the party, which appears to be held together only by legitimate opposition to the figure of the president in office. With these premises, the debate between the two candidates respected the forecasts of a confrontation where the analyzes on the respective programs were lacking in favor of a series of mutual insults and rudeness, which gave nothing to the general debate and no indication for those who still have to to decide. Trump blamed the opponent’s tolerance the most and had moments of great difficulty, while Biden showed, going against the odds, a remarkable self-control, which allowed him a test, in the end, better than that of his opponent. However, it must be reiterated that the two have embarked on a personal duel, without explaining how they intend to govern and with what programs, an unworthy spectacle for the position they will hold, completely useless for voters and international public opinion. Certainly Trump’s refusal to condemn white supremacists, if it is a call to vote from a certain part of deep America, on the other hand may constitute a call to seats for the often absent African Americans in favor of Joe Biden; but the most disturbing thing remains the possible rejection of a defeat by the president in office: a scenario never seen in American politics, which evokes a situation of extreme danger precisely because of the presence of such an exasperated radicalization. Progressive networks and newspapers gave Biden the victory for his self-control as an expert politician in the face of Trump’s gratuitous provocations, mirroring the conservative media gave Trump the victory, but, in reality, both sides are aware that the debate has not moved a single vote, even if some analyzes say that the majority of viewers were Democrats and even the undecided were superior to the Republicans in front of the televisions and among the undecided viewers there would have been greater favor towards Biden. However, these are unsafe data, as opposed to the collection of funding for the respective electoral campaigns, where Biden has a clear advantage, which, moreover, does not guarantee him victory, as well as the polls that give him ahead: the memory of the defeat of the super-favorite Clinton is an ever-present warning.