Categoria: English version

In foreign policy, one of the most significant repercussions of Trump’s electoral defeat will be the possible rebirth of the Atlantic Alliance, as a rediscovered tool of Western politics. President-elect Biden’s attitude is certainly the opposite in nature to that of his predecessor, but some of the criticisms that Trump has made of his European partners, especially about the nature of financial investments in armaments, will remain current. If the request for the measure of two per cent of gross domestic product seems to be confirmed by the new tenant of the White House, at least in intentions, it will be interesting to see how the destination of the expenditure will also be evaluated: Trump had the aim of strengthening the American industry, that equipment and the European decision to finance its own armaments industry, albeit still within the perimeter of the Atlantic Alliance, had to be strongly opposed by the United States in its role as the largest shareholder of the organization. On the other hand, Trump’s willingness to detach from the Atlantic Alliance, which probably would never have been granted by the American Congress, had favored the birth of a discussion within the states of the European Union, for the creation of a common armed force: an essential tool for practicing one’s own foreign policy and preparatory to a more stringent political union. The intention was certainly not to leave the Atlantic Alliance, but a subject of such weight would have or will have the possibility of exercising a different political weight in the relationship with Washington. This determination must not fail even with Biden’s presence in the role of president of the USA, but, on the contrary, his best disposition and greater political tact must be exploited to begin rethinking the Atlantic Alliance in the context of profoundly changed geopolitical structures, which Trump did not substantially take into account. Reconciling the European Union with the United States can pass from a different role of the Atlantic Alliance, no longer more functional to US interests, but as a guarantor of Western values ​​in the theaters already present and which will emerge from global confrontations. For the moment, however, it is necessary to prepare for the possible damage that Trump will want to leave to put the organization in difficulty, starting with the desire to withdraw American soldiers from essential scenarios for world security, such as Afghanistan; these days remaining to the outgoing president could be used to put the Atlantic Alliance at a serious disadvantage and with the future need to start again from a more difficult point for reconstruction. Moving on to the most relevant specific cases, it will be interesting to see how the relationship with China will be set up, which is increasingly emerging as the main adversary, also due not only to the huge investments in armaments but as a global competitor in industry and technology. If with regard to the United States the policy of hard confrontation with Beijing should not undergo substantial changes, for a revised and corrected Atlantic Alliance, space could be created to dampen the clashes on the diplomatic level, thanks to a possible greater weight of Europe. This does not mean abdicating Western needs but only creating the possibility of a different approach. Another case that must be dealt with urgently is the role of Turkey within the alliance: Ankara opted for a policy that did not comply with the transatlantic agreements, entering into agreements to supply arms from Russia; a factor that cannot be separated from Turkey’s foreign policy conducted in open conflict with American and European interests. The attitude that will be held with Ankara will mark a line of conduct that must then be maintained in a coherent manner within the relations between the members. Finally, the deadline, February 5, of the 2010 treaty to limit nuclear warheads, signed with Russia, represents an urgent need that cannot be postponed, also due to the Russian president’s willingness to renew, which could pave the way for a new type of relations with Moscow. The need for a greater use of diplomacy seems to be shared by both the new president and the European members, this approach will be essential to approach crisis situations in a more reasoned way, without however renouncing the need for supervision and actions where it will be necessary for maintenance. of peace and the protection of Western interests.

Could the strategy of Saudi diplomacy mark a point in favor or a potential defeat at the summit, not officially recognized, with the Israeli president and the US Secretary of State, now at the end of his mandate? It is well known that the contacts, which have now become an unofficial alliance, between Israel and Saudi Arabia are known, above all in an anti-Iranian function, however the trip of an Israeli head of state welcomed to the Saudi capital represents a novelty; even if the signal of denying the veracity of the event represents the presence of a fear still existing among Arab politicians to make official what could be understood as a further step in relations between the two states. While Arabia has maintained a fairly explicit confidentiality, in Israel the episode has not been welcomed within the same government in office, for similar reasons. Netanyahu, officially did not communicate to the other members of his executive, a government certainly not solid due to its compromise composition, the trip to Arabia, which was immediately identified, thanks to the analysis of sites specialized in the analysis of air travel. If for Saudi Arabia the fears may coincide with the non-compliance with the agreements of the Arab League, which subordinate the recognition of Israel to the birth of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, for Tel Aviv we can glimpse a preventive maneuver by President Netanyahu to anticipate agreements that the new US administration may not endorse. It is no mystery that both Israel and Saudi Arabia would have preferred a reconfirmation of Trump, certainly aligned with the interests of the two states and a political vision where the US opposed Iranian action in the region. A convergence of interests that may not coincide with the intentions of the new American president, if the attitude towards Tehran were to change and the Iranian nuclear deal were to be reconfirmed, as signed by Obama. Even the presence of the current Secretary of State, not very understandable if framed in the expiration of his mandate, seems to want to give a preventive value of breaking with the future policy of the United States. If future diplomatic relations between the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia are more problematic, Trump reminds the two nations of his personal closeness, also in view of a possible return for the competition at the White House in four years. In any case, confirming this meeting, even with all the denials of the case, has the meaning of wanting to complicate the future political action of the new American administration, presenting as an acquired fact an increasingly close relationship between Tel Aviv and Riyadh on which the new president he will have to work, if he wants to give a different direction to regional structures, to be able to dampen the current potential dangers of a confrontation with Iran. Making the link between Israel and Saudi Arabia even more public is functional in Tel Aviv to have an almost certified relationship with the leading Sunni exponent, to present itself as an ally of this part of Islam, with the dual aim of having the highest number of interlocutors possible to protect his interests at home within the management of the Palestinian question and, at the same time, be a reliable partner for Sunni interests at the regional level against the maneuvers of the Shiites, therefore not only against Iran, but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria and too much power gained against the Sunnis in Iraq. In addition to the common interest against Tehran, Riyadh needs to increase its proximity to Israel to have support against the advance of Turkish expansionist policy in Islamic countries, in a confrontation that is all played out within the Sunni area. For Saudi Arabia there is also an increasingly pressing problem of gaining accreditation with world public opinion, after all the investments and efforts that have failed due to an internal situation that is still too serious for the continued use of violence, torture and repression, which do not allow for an adequate consideration of other countries, if the economic power given by oil is excluded. Riyadh cannot count on the exercise of its own soft power, such as China for example, and this relegates it to a position of inferiority and little consideration, especially in relation to Western countries. Losing an ally like Trump will aggravate this situation becoming more and more essential to establish relationships with as many subjects as possible, even if as uncomfortable as Israel.

Trump’s defeat must be analyzed on a broader panorama of the US borders, especially from a political point of view we must look at how the unfavorable electoral result for the populist champion can have repercussions at a general level and also in particular in the vast world current, which refers to the values ​​of populism, which, despite being more present in far-right parties and movements, is not the exclusive prerogative of this political party, having followers even in some far-left movements. The first question is whether this defeat can affect future electoral trends in a cascade. A hallmark of Trump in power was that of clearing through customs practically all the politically incorrect and stigmatized attitudes of traditional political forces; however, it must be specified that this trend was already underway and that Trump only had the merit of increasing to previously unknown levels, the ways in which to overcome political taboos, liberalizing ideas and behaviors, which until then were not externalized and practiced precisely for the limits imposed by the current political culture. The growth of a ruling class not sufficiently prepared and detached from the normal political dialectic, because it grew up in social sectors characterized by a limited vision and relative to particular interests, both of an economic and territorial nature, has certainly facilitated the affirmation of populism at the global and this characteristic, combined with a legitimate distrust in traditional political forces even on the part of the electorates who do not like the populist turn, prevents us from thinking that in the short term, there can be a significant contraction in the appreciation of populist values. On the other hand, the opposite aspect is constituted by the capacity of mobilization of the anti-populist forces due precisely to the profound aversion aroused by people like Trump; this aspect, however, signals an intrinsic weakness that the traditional parties will have to overcome already in the immediate future: the inability to arouse consensus on their programmatic aspects, capable for the moment, of gaining even lower consensus than the opposition to populism, capable of to aggregate and bring back to the polls voters of even opposite ideas, such as center right united with the left. On this aspect, the need is highlighted that the leadership of the new American president is not limited to the United States, but can represent an element, on a global level, capable of pulling those progressive forces and that are part of the classic conservatives, which, while maintaining respective differences, come to be able to form a common front against populist ideology. In fact, the reflection must focus on the ability to remain current the causes that favored the development of populism, whose perpetrators are well present in both progressives and conservatives; their work has provided both evident reasons and substantial perceptions for the understandable growth of movements that advocate ideas capable of taking root in social classes tried by the crisis and left outside the productive process and the redistribution of wealth. The deception perpetrated on these sectors of society, unfortunately increasingly vast, has been to foment a struggle between the poor (often with immigration, certainly not regulated, in the crosshairs) capable of diverting attention from the creation of norms capable of favoring large capital to the detriment of the populist voters; we moved on to fighting the large financial agglomerations to encourage the increase in the concentration of wealth. Another aspect is the contempt for the values ​​of civil rights, which leads to an increasingly marked anti-democratic orientation in populist governments: this factor must become a strength in the ability to aggregate anti-populist sentiments, but alone it is not sufficient for a effective and efficient contrast if it is not combined with an improvement in widespread living conditions, both practically and at the perceptual level of the social classes that have embraced populism. Precisely for this reason, Biden’s policy will have to be characterized by reforms capable of interrupting the liking for Trump, who nevertheless took 70 million votes, and, at the same time, influencing the political programs of other world leaders. The challenge of populism has only just begun.

US President-elect Biden will have to shelter his predecessor’s trade policy, which has also had an impact on American foreign policy. In the era of globalization, dividing trade from foreign policy is anachronistic, because the two factors increasingly go hand in hand. Especially in a world scenario where contrasts are increasingly resolved without resorting to wars, which are left as a last option or in secondary scenarios, commercial competition, as an instrument of economic and therefore political affirmation, becomes the strategic theater to determine supremacy and advantages. Trump never understood this focal point, which is characterizing foreign policy achievements globally; closed in his isolationist strategy, the expiring American president conducted a short-sighted policy made up of tariffs on imports, not selective from a political point of view: to benefit American products, he conducted an indiscriminate struggle against adversaries and allies, which produced damage politicians both in the adverse field, and above all in the friendly one. The success that Trump attributes to himself in the economic field is actually a lie, given that he took advantage of the measures bequeathed by Obama and that his advisors have managed to keep active. For Biden it will be different, especially in relation to the trade wars that Trump will leave to the new president and which, in some way, will have to be defused. It has been said since the beginning of the electoral campaign that neither of the two contenders could have changed the attitude towards China, this is true because there is a continuous need to condemn what is a dictatorship, as, moreover, Beijing has repeatedly proved and that a White House tenant from the Democratic Party will have to stress even more strongly; however, a different and more diplomatic approach can be hoped for in the next dialogue between the US and China, which is able to mitigate the level of the clash. But the real crux is the attitude that Biden will want to have with Europe and the need to recover a relationship that his predecessor has considerably deteriorated. Trump’s behavior, combined with the situation generated by the pandemic, underlined how for Brussels the need to be increasingly autonomous has become a real emergency. This factor will continue to be present also in relations with the new American administration, even if, as is to be hoped, relations will improve. On the other hand, Europe can only give priority to relations with the United States, over that with China, whose dictatorial ways internally and the failure to respect correct commercial practices with foreign countries, condition the evaluations of the states. of the Union. In addition to convergence on China, the US and Europe must start from the awareness that together they constitute the richest market in the world and this is a primary factor that can act as a driving force for both parties. It should also be considered that China, which is seeing this market foreclosed on, is trying to create alternatives, such as the recently signed one to which several countries, including the western area, such as Japan and Australia, as well as various Asian states, adhere. created a larger market than the single European area, but also the trade union between the USA, Canada and Mexico, adding up to 40% of global trade; this association has no political constraints and this represents a factor of weakness, but aims to obtain a reduction in customs duties of about 90% in twenty years, also integrating the services and goods of the members. This agreement, which highlights the Chinese leadership, was made possible precisely by the abandonment of the role of American influence on the Asian continent. Repeating this mistake with Europe, but also with Canada and Mexico, often equally mistreated by Trump, could be lethal for the US economy. From the global economic aspect to the political one, the step is short: if Washington were to further weaken its international political weight, its decline would be guaranteed and any willingness to regain positions would imply a very high financial and social cost. Better to develop an alternative and competitive strategy to China, through the involvement of direct allies, with tools that provide common benefits, even beyond the economic aspects, and the attraction in this orbit of Beijing’s enemies such as India; also trying to take away from China, from a commercial point of view, countries of western orbit, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which have come too dangerously close to Beijing.

Despite all the objections raised by Trump, the American elections would have been carried out without defects that could be invalidated. In fact, there are numerous American electoral authorities who are certifying the result and in a recent joint statement they stated that they have not found clear evidence of modified, lost ballot papers or counterfeit votes. The latest elections have come to be proclaimed as the safest of those so far held in US history. This judgment contradicts all the accusations coming from the loser, who continues to persist in a personal war, which only harms the country. In reality this tactic had been widely announced even before the vote, during the electoral campaign, with the desire not to recognize the defeat a priori anyway; Trump still remains the Republican candidate who got the most votes in an electoral competition, even if that wasn’t enough to win; this great result, however, reinforced the conviction of the now former president to continue the campaign of denigration of the opponent and the electoral system, which had allowed him, four years earlier, to reach the White House. The suspicion is that Trump, with this attitude, is preparing the most favorable conditions for his future as a former president, securing rich compensation for writing books and paid participation in conferences and conventions: a way to remain, somehow, however at the center of the functional scene for the preparation of the electoral competition of 2024, in which it seems to want to reappear. This is certainly possible by birth, Trump will be 78 in four years, while politically the question poses more complicated questions. The candidacy, undoubtedly cumbersome, would increase the pretenders to the primaries, in a party where the American tycoon was supported, more than appreciated, by a considerable part, both in the base, and, above all, by the leadership of the party that recalls the classic values ​​of the republicans, subverted by the populist wave that began with the contamination of the tea party. In this period following the election results, the majority of the Republican party establishment did not follow Trump in his tactic of delegitimizing the results of the vote, but showed an intolerant attitude towards this betrayal of practice, so much so that it was threatened, besides than by Trump himself, even by the former president’s children. This situation opens up new possible scenarios within US politics, ranging from Trump’s possible attempt to take over the republican organization to the founding of his own personal and family party. The great electoral result achieved can also be interpreted as a consensus expressed mainly towards one’s own person, rather than as an expression of the vote towards the republican party, this assumption certainly has a foundation of truth and is what the premises for the foundation are based on. of a Trump party, detached from the Republicans. For US politics it could come as a shock due to the possible disappearance of the Republican party, especially if it will not be able to express a suitable candidate to confront the former president. It must be said that the radicalization of political positions would leave little room for a republican party without Trump’s presence, if not towards the center of the US political scene, a center currently occupied by the figure of Biden, but not by the whole party. Democratic where there is a strong presence of the left, which has remained silent so far in order to achieve the sole objective of Trump’s defeat. Since Biden takes over the presidency it will be inevitable that the Democratic left, even for various reasons, will assert its legitimate claims, given that it has been an essential part in leading the Democratic candidate to victory, especially remembering that the lack of support of the left to Hillary Clinton determined the victory of the tycoon Trump. A possible party of the former president thus also affects the Democrats, since peaceful coexistence between the moderates and the left is not taken for granted. The American political scenario could thus transform from two-party to tripartite (similarly to what happened in England, albeit with different assumptions), where the moderates of the two current parties should find common ground to try to prevail. In any case, Trump, if so, will represent a further element of novelty.

Eventually Russia was forced into a first-person engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it was not the kind of engagement that the Armenians were hoping for. In Yerevan, in fact, from the start of the conflict, the hope was that Moscow would deploy its soldiers alongside the Armenians, to balance the support given by the Turks to the Azeris. This is not the case; too many conflicting interests for the Kremlin to prefer just one side. If up to now Russia has been the main ally of the Armenians, it is also the main arms supplier to Azerbaijan, while the confrontation with Turkey is already considered potentially dangerous, without the need for further deterioration. The only viable solution from Russia was, therefore, a diplomatic commitment aimed at stopping the fighting, to avoid its own direct involvement, among other things unwelcome to a considerable part of the population, which does not see in a positive way the direct risk of the Russian soldiers, however, still engaged in Syria. Putin had to make a virtue of necessity and reconcile the too many negative aspects of a military commitment, which could worsen his popularity with the population, and a financial outlay, which was judged as an investment without great returns even in terms of international prestige. Even the current economic phase, conditioned by the pandemic, has resulted in the risk of losing an arms industry customer, such as Azerbaijan, as too high a price to pay. Finally, for relations with Ankara, already very compromised, it was preferred not to create further deterioration. However, Moscow exercised a mediating role, which allowed the achievement of the ceasefire and the beginning of talks between two very distant parties. The Azerbaijani advance was thus stopped with the conquest of the second most important of Nagorno Karabakh, only eleven kilometers from the capital. Following this agreement, the Armenian military will have to withdraw to be replaced by 2,000 Russian troops employed as blue helmets, to guarantee the ceasefire and to guard the corridor that will be created to connect Nagorno Karabakh with the Armenian country. The concrete result of the agreements will be that both sides will maintain their current positions and Nagorno Karabakh will be divided into two areas which will constitute northern Armenia and southern Azerbaijan, plus a strip of territory conquered by Azerbaijani forces. The head of the Kremlin says that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will guarantee the return of displaced people to their homes, both Azeris who fled the area in 1994, after the war of that period, and Armenians who escaped the last fighting; the agreements also include the exchange of prisoners and the recovery of the bodies of the fallen of the respective opposing forces. If in Baku these agreements were experienced with the euphoria of a military victory, which allowed the reconquest of a territory that has always been considered illegally, in Yerevan the defeat was experienced as a military capitulation that has the meaning of humiliation national; this provoked demonstrations by the population, most of whom proclaimed themselves in favor of the resumption of fighting; for the Armenians it is a sort of mutilation of the national territory, experienced with even more resentment for the decisive role of the eternal Turkish enemies alongside the Azeris. The fact remains that the Armenian government had no alternatives and made the only possible choice to avoid major losses, on the other hand, Turkish support for Azerbaijan was decisive for the fate of the conflict and the Armenian force could not compete. with the armaments supplied by Ankara. What worries, mainly the Armenians, but also international public opinion, will be precisely the role that Turkey will want to play following this agreement: Erdogan’s threats to annihilate the Armenians during the early stages of the conflict are well present. in the memory of the Armenian people and of international public opinion. Russia is present in the territory with its contingent of blue helmets, but a further presence would be advisable, preferably from the European Union to eliminate any ambitions of the Turkish president, who struggling with the probable economic failure of the country, could, time, try to distract attention with symbolic operations against the Armenian people. An eventuality to be absolutely avoided, both for the specificity of the case and for the geopolitical drift that could follow, capable of involving religious confrontation and to avoid yet another potential conflict capable of reflecting itself well beyond regional balances.

The end of the American elections did not coincide with the proclamation of the winner and this risks plunging the country into an institutional crisis even worse than that of 1974, which culminated in the resignation of President Nixon. The first concrete risk is the institutional paralysis of the country until 14 December, the day on which the electoral college will meet to ratify the winner of the elections; up to now this meeting has been a formal practice, an institutional passage for the appointment of the president, but with the current situation characterized by Trump’s strategy of exercising legal recourse against the results of some states. This behavior is consistent with the story of the American president, who, during his professional life, filed about 1,600 lawsuits, appealing to justice once every eleven days; recourse to justice usually proceeds in parallel with a tactic of attrition and postponements, a real set of techniques to delay the definition of the cause, which have the purpose of postponing the occurrence of situations potentially unfavorable to his objectives. If this was the conduct that marked his professional activity, it seems reasonable to believe that this will also be applied to retain what is considered the most important position in the country. It seems obvious that Trump does not want to do his country a good service, but only to himself; this represents the pinnacle of a very bad presidency and the worst point, if possible, of a year already marked by the most serious racial unrest since 1968 and by the poor management of the pandemic, which resulted in as many as 233,000 deaths, a figure in stark contrast with the image of the USA, which Trump himself wants to present; after all, also the declaration in which he proclaimed himself the winner of the electoral contest and the definition given to the counting of postal votes, a possibility widely recognized by the law in force, as a fraud and the desire to request the Supreme Court, which he previously modeled in his measure, does nothing but confirm the paucity of the character and his inadequacy to fill the role of American president. However, although currently at a disadvantage, his defeat is still not certain and the outcome of the vote is still in the balance, despite defeats in important states where Trump had built his victory in the last elections. The game is all about the numbers of the big voters as Biden with his 69.5 million votes has become the most voted presidential candidate ever in the history of the United States, but this supremacy may not be enough and Trump could repeat the performance of the last election, when it became prevailed, despite Clinton’s two million more votes. The climate of radicalization of American politics, with the division that has changed from politics to social, is causing a dangerous drift in the US country, which presents itself at the end of the elections increasingly divided and with the concrete danger that the confrontation will shift to the streets and in the squares. The respective supporters have already started demonstrations of support for their candidate and some clashes have already occurred, quelled by the police. Trump’s conduct, which does not seem to resign himself to the possible defeat, risks involving in the confrontation the many autonomous groups with weapons, which support him and who feel cheated of the victory of their candidate. The scenario is that of a split country where a spiral of violence could be created; were it not for the complexity of American democratic structures, all the elements for a sort of civil war could be concretized. On the political level, the Republican Party has achieved a good success, which would not allow Biden to have a majority in the two branches of parliament and this political data, in contrast with the possible defeat of Trump, opens a gap between the structure of the Republicans and the their candidate, who in recent years has been suffered by a large part of the party, sometimes in complete disagreement with the policy and behavior of the President. For the Republicans, who in several cases have condemned the tactics used by Trump to contest the counting of the votes, it could finally be an opportunity to reorganize the party according to a more traditional policy and in keeping with the values ​​of the party, setting aside the extremisms of the Tea party , which took Trump to the White House. It would be a first step for the reconciliation of the country and to allow the United States a policy more in keeping with its role as the first world power.

The resumption of Islamic terror within the borders of Europe finds European countries surprised and unprepared, focused on the pandemic and its health and economic effects. The impression is that European states have underestimated the threat and indirect connections of the attacks with foreign policy and the leading role of some international players, such as Turkey. The initial belief, now accepted for some time, that the military defeat of the Islamic State has generated a generalized resentment capable of creating what have been defined as “lone wolves”, extremists who act alone on their own personal impulse against the West, seems to be less and less certain in favor of the possible presence of a superior plan, conceived and organized in that gray area of ​​contacts between states and terrorist movements. The current aim of the provocations carried out with the death sentences carried out in Christian places of worship or in Western squares and streets seems to be to provoke a reaction against European Muslims capable of provoking a general uprising, even at an international level, of Muslim states against Europe. The ambition to lead this war of religion, but also of civilization, was publicly recognized by Turkish President Erdogan, who defined the treatment of Muslims in Europe as comparable to that reserved by Hitler for Jews. The significance of this statement speaks for itself, but highlights the clear intention to make a grip on a population with little critical spirit and eager to recognize itself in a common religious element as an instrument of recovery, including social. This is not only true in Turkey, but for the Ankara government it can be a means of exercising geopolitical supremacy also functional to Turkish geopolitical objectives, above all to make legitimate, to the Muslim audience of the faithful in general, but also to the governments of Muslim countries, the will to exercise a leading role capable of uniting the multitude of Muslim faithful, now divided; however, it does not seem possible that in Ankara there is the direct instigator of a terrorist strategy, which would be equivalent to a declaration of war, what seems most likely is the desire to exploit events to turn them to one’s advantage. The surprise is the lack of coordination at the political level of Westerners, who even in the most progressive sectors continue to maintain a sort of national rivalry with completely useless skirmishes. For example, the reaction of the Washington Post to the killing by the French of the Chechen terrorist protagonist of the beheading of the Parisian history professor, accusing the French government of targeting Muslim groups, appears singular. This example shows how a certain progressive part is still stuck in positions of principle, which are badly reconciled with the practical needs of the defense of Western values. What should be done, first of all on a cultural level, should be to involve the part of moderate Islam that has already managed to integrate in the West; certainly this cannot be enough because it is a minority part, which however has some fear of exposing itself against what, like it or not, is the majority part of Islam. In this phase, in addition to not derogating from democratic principles, especially in a possible repressive phase, a decisive preventive action is needed, capable of nipping every terrorist act in the bud, combined with a tight control of all those possible terrorist sources, such as radical mosques and groups extremists, who find space in the most degraded places in our societies. The streamlining of judicial operations is another essential prerequisite, together with the enactment of laws that make a certain type of proselytism difficult. In this regard, the sermons of places of worship should always be in the national language. It is also necessary to reduce the opportunities for protest, both national and international: the issue of cartoons, although the freedom of the press must be ensured, is an example of how to give the assumptions, certainly wrong, to terrorist action; this means that every single member of society must be aware of having to commit himself personally to protect the interests of Western values, even renouncing part of his prerogatives. The important thing is that the battle against terrorism maintains in any case and in any case its peculiarities of respect for civil rights, as a distinctive feature; this is the starting point in order not to provoke a confrontation of civilizations otherwise destined to get worse and from which we Westerners are the ones who have the most to lose.

The need to limit the pandemic forces European governments to move towards the ever more intense closure of normal social activities, in this context the European Union also tries to enter by trying to coordinate national governments, a laudable attempt, which, once again, he denounces the need for greater political integration, but which, at the moment, is only an impromptu initiative. The decline in infections in the summer was not exploited for a health reorganization both at the state and supranational level: a serious mistake in a regime of free movement between European states. The exponential increase in infections is due to an excessive loosening of the rules of coexistence with the pandemic and the absence of a tracking system for the infected, without coordination between states. The blocking of sports, catering and other activities deemed expendable has generated protests but will also cause a series of refunds that could have been used for other purposes. The feeling is that the governments of the European states are improvising temporary solutions that are too functional for the very short term, without a longer term perspective; it is true that we are still facing a problem that is still too little known, but the repercussions threaten to be even more serious than the predictions made a few weeks ago. The first issue is that relating to the health of citizens: covid-19 impacts both on the direct consequences of infections and on the treatment of diseases that continue to be present, but to which due attention is not ensured; there is a sort of exclusivity of covid-19 treatment, which has compressed assistance for other health problems, a situation already experienced in the first phase of the pandemic, but which should not have repeated itself when the infections resume. One of the problems is certainly the concern for aspects of the economy, that is, in the immediate reconciliation of health needs with economic ones, but in the short term to ensure the economic stability of countries, through the production and maintenance of jobs. Currently the executives seem to be aimed at keeping the primary, secondary and some parts of the advanced tertiary sector active, which can allow the continuation of the activity through smart working, to the detriment of the catering, culture and sport sectors ( without, however, touching the professional leagues). This vision may be justified by the desire to avoid the movement of people to prevent the spread of the virus, but it proposes an unbalanced vision of the labor society, a sort of vision still anchored to the importance of the factory; however, it can be argued that the share of gross domestic product produced by the sectors that are allowed to work is greater, therefore more significant than the closed sectors; so, however, the problem is also reversed: if those who are prevented from working are ensured, albeit indirectly, greater health protection, those who go to the workplace (which does not apply to smart working) have more chances of contracting infection. Of course this reasoning is an extreme, because the closure is not total for all sectors and the preservation from the resulting virus is not absolute; however, beyond the difficulty of the problem, what passes is a contradictory management, but which signals the need to form preventive rules in the event of extreme phenomena such as this pandemic. This is true both at the state level and at the European level, a dimension that cannot be exempted for political reasons but above all for practical reasons, given the free movement of people and goods. At the moment we are proceeding with provisional adjustments, which may not be satisfactory for everyone, but which must be the basis on which to reason for subsequent institutionalized measures. Another element of discord is school attendance, which is then linked to the transport system and digital communication networks. As can be seen, ensuring the right to education affects other sectors, which need new regulations and new impetus, the benefits of which will remain available to society when the pandemic is over. Because what the pandemic highlighted, in addition to the health and economic emergencies, was the general unpreparation due to wrong and often unproductive investments, which have characterized the whole of Europe. These are elements to be taken into account immediately, but above all for the future, a future to be planned right now, in parallel with the management of the emergency.

The hostilities, but it would be more appropriate to call them war, in Nagorno Karabakh began a month ago and the sad accounting of the victims is far from precise, the real and precise number of deaths is not known by the two contenders, Putin’s estimate exists , who spoke of about 5,000 victims; the Armenians added about 1,000 killed among their fighters and 40 civilians, while Azerbaijan admits no deaths among its armed forces but 60 civilians killed by Armenian missiles. Politically, both Armenia and Azerbaijan remain on their respective positions, a factor that denounces how the conflict can become an exhausting war of position. Until now the confrontation in Nagorno Karabakh was defined as a low intensity conflict, characterized by a continuous hostility between the parties, without diplomatic developments but with sporadic clashes; in international public opinion it was not seen as a potentially more dangerous outbreak, that is, the transition to continuous and larger-scale clashes was not expected. This opinion was due to the international stagnation of the confrontation and the entry of any external actor capable of raising the level of the clash was not expected. The situation changed with the Turkish desire to re-establish the situation prior to the collapse of the Soviet empire in favor of the Azeris. The suspicion that in Erdogan’s plan there is a sort of parallelism of the Kurdish situation with that of the Armenians, who historically remain enemies of Ankara; but if for the Kurds on the Syrian border it is, from the Turkish point of view, a threat because it can awaken the sense of belonging of Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity, for Armenia it seems to be more than a symbol to curry favor with public opinion particularly sensitive to the Ottoman policy of the Turkish president, a cause that also serves to distract the Turks from the serious economic problems of their country. Azerbaijan does not want to give up on its intention to reconquer the territory it deems it belongs to, but Armenia is not willing to back down because it sees in its defeat the return of the danger of the Turkish genocide. The analysts’ feeling is that, despite Ankara’s efforts, which have brought an indisputable advantage to the Azeris, this is a conflict that no one can win. This, if possible, aggravates the situation in the war zones, because the international powers do not seem to have any intention of engaging in diplomatic action that does not offer great possibilities for a solution. A development that does not even benefit Turkish ambitions, Ankara is already committed both on the Libyan and Syrian fronts and for a prolonged commitment also in Nagorno Karabakh it does not seem to be sufficiently equipped; if this assessment concerns both the economic and military aspects, on the political level the consequence for Turkey is greater isolation with the increase of its opponents. Despite this situation there have been ceasefire efforts, the problem is that this measure is constantly being violated with mutual accusations of responsibility for resuming the use of weapons. There would be the Minsk Group, structure of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which should, as an institutional task, find a peaceful way to the solution of Nagorno Karabakh, since its foundation in 1992. The leadership of the group is composed of a three-party presidency, expressed by France, the USA and Russia; this institution plays a mediator role between the two parties and does not have the powers to stop the conflict, furthermore for the Azeris France should be replaced by Turkey, while for the Armenians a representative of Nagorno should also be included among the members of the negotiations Karabakh, which, however, is not recognized internationally. For these reasons, the Minsk group appears to be an outdated institution, if only for not having avoided the conflict, it would be better for a single level pressure from the USA, and also from the European Union, on Turkey to stop the current situation with the intervention of the blue helmets to ensure the truce. After starting negotiations capable of defining the problem once and for all; certainly with the pandemic underway and the upcoming American elections this hope seems difficult, however getting out of the current situation is necessary to avoid potential negative repercussions on the entire region.