Failure to reform the Dublin Treaty is a bad sign for Europe

The definition of a flexible compulsory solidarity mechanism is the bureaucratic definition of the set of proposals that should reform, but not supersede, the Dublin regulation; in fact, Germany and the Nordic countries, which were the most popular destinations for migrants, were added to the opposition to the unfair treaty made by Vienna and the countries of the Visegrad pact. If it is true that migratory pressure has created internal problems of a political nature in these countries, which governments prefer to govern in the easiest way, i.e. by seeking internal rules within the Union for distribution, it is equally true that the coastal countries most subject to arrivals, Italy and Greece above all, but also Spain, remain responsible for the migrants who land on their shores, leaving the question of a national nature and not yet completely supranational, that is, the responsibility of Brussels. Regardless of the fact that the approval of the new regulation must be approved by the member weights, we are faced with yet another improvised solution in the face of a problem that still cannot be curbed, for which solutions that go beyond European borders are needed, but which management is needed such that it must be able to guarantee reception without giving the sovereign and anti-European political forces the opportunity to have an excuse for their existence. The new mechanism provides that the countries of the Union can choose to provide aid to another state in difficulty with migratory flows with relocation or repatriation, according to quotas calculated through data on gross domestic product and number of the population; however, this redistribution could be little more than on a voluntary basis, in fact the possibility of the refusal of redistribution would be contemplated, offset by the obligation to manage the repatriation of migrants. Although Brussels presents the plan as a fair compromise between the countries that physically welcome migrants and the nations that reject them, the mechanism still appears too biased in favor of the latter, especially since it does not provide for effective sanctions, other than that of the obligation to welcome migrants who have not been able to get expatriate. The absence of tougher sanctioning rules, such as the cutting of European contributions, leaves the Union at the mercy of countries that have obviously not implemented the founding ideals of Europe and that use the Union only as an ATM, without obligation. The feeling is that the permanence of these states is functional to German economic interests, thanks, first of all to the low cost of labor, it would be necessary, instead, to question the real general convenience of these states within a Union of which they not only refuse obligations, but often enact laws contrary to European law. If we want to look at the positive aspects, which are few, we can record a timid progress on the search for a common policy on migratory flows, but which, on the aspect of the reform of the Dublin Treaty, leaves everything unchanged. The problem is also moral, and it is an aspect from which Brussels cannot continue to escape, limiting itself to colorless and pragmatic communications on solidarity with migrants. The cases of the concentration camps in Libya or the situation of the camps in Greece cannot be tolerated by those who set themselves up as examples of civilization. Italy and Greece have their faults, but they had to find questionable solutions because they did not have European help, however, these solutions were also beneficial for Brussels. The common attitude is marked by hypocrisy, which conditions political action in an attempt to bring together countries with too many conflicting interests and visions. If the economic aspect is still predominant, the political one can no longer be postponed: Brussels must be able to take a step towards that unity of purpose, which can ensure the future of the Union. Timid attitudes such as the current one on migrants and, above all, on the sanctioning mechanisms of those who refuse the sharing of burdens, indicate an approach that is too unconvinced which only serves those who want to take advantage of the opportunity to maintain a weak Union from a political point of view and, therefore, it will not be able to find that role necessary to balance the US and China. What is claimed is a short-term vision that also harms countries that do not understand that only an equitable sharing of all the burdens, of which the problem of migrants is only the most evident, can also guarantee the sharing of benefits, especially financial ones. . In the end, this is the crucial point that will determine European existence as an overall vision: those who do not understand it are better off getting out of it, as did Great Britain.

The introduction of welfare in poor countries as a factor of world stability

If one of the world problems is stability, not only that between states understood as international relations, but also that between populations, it is necessary to act on the deep imbalances present due to the increase in inequalities. This phenomenon does not only concern poor countries, where it is naturally exacerbated by contingent circumstances, but also the richer ones, highlighting a transversality of the phenomenon on a world level. It seems obvious that, in addition to the repercussions within individual national borders, the impact of poverty and inequality, which is recorded internationally, affects purely economic aspects, such as the production, distribution and consumption of goods up to general problem of migration, which many political problems continue to generate on a global level. World data on social protection say that more than half of the total population of the Earth does not have any form of protection related to health care, protection for new disabilities or services for the family and economic support for integration or replacement. insufficient income. All these supports could be a decisive factor precisely against poverty and inequality, also in consideration of the fact that, according to the International Labor Organization, an agency of the United Nations, only 45% of the world population benefits from some form of welfare benefits and of this 45% only 29% have complete forms of social tools. If the global figure for the payment of income in the form of a pension is about 60%, the situation that occurs in countries where the average income is lower and pension insurance concerns only 20% of people. If old age appears poorly protected, even childhood does not offer adequate aid: in fact, the percentage of countries that declare they have some form of assistance for children is below 60% of all nations and with significant differences between rich countries from poor ones. This scenario was aggravated by the pandemic, certainly exacerbating the most critical situations, but even in the most developed countries the unexpected event was too much of a surprise to quickly develop social countermeasures capable of providing answers to mitigate the economic effects. and health care of the crisis. According to United Nations estimates, the sum necessary for developing countries to ensure health services supplemented by a sort of minimum income is around 1,200 billion euros, a percentage that is around 4% of the gross domestic product of these. countries and representing an unsustainable financial commitment from underdeveloped economies. This situation of necessity, however, does not represent a contingent emergency due to the pandemic, but is an aggravation of situations already present, due, in addition to the recurring crises, also to the failure to comply with the commitments made by the international community and, therefore, by the rich countries, to provide concrete aid to developing countries. The lack of respect for these formal commitments, which were both political and juridical, places the rich countries in a serious defect as well as a moral and practical one, when it is highlighted the inability to manage migratory phenomena, not only those caused by wars or famines, but also and above all about the refusal of so-called economic migrants. In fact, if the conflicts and also the famines provide for another type of commitment, which, moreover, should be due and sought assiduously and not only functional to particular interests, the mitigation of the factors that determine the economic migratory flows, could be carried out. effectively in such a way as to at least reduce the number of people forced to leave their country due to poverty, with targeted and coordinated interventions that allow the development of economic activities capable of ensuring the livelihood of the populations. Social support is an integral and essential part of these aids because it allows greater independence of the productive age groups and constitutes a direct or indirect integration of income, which can free up human resources and also generate job opportunities to be placed in the total balance of employees. Coordination must start from international organizations, but rich states must provide for an adequate contribution, which must be considered an investment in their own stability.

The US wants to impose sanctions on Iran and isolate itself from the diplomatic scene

The issue of sanctions against Iran has always been a staple of Trump’s political agenda, now, on the eve of the presidential elections, when the electoral campaign is intensifying, the US president is putting his intention to restore back to the center of the international debate. full sanctions against Tehran. This will was announced by the US Secretary of State, justifying it with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. According to the American interpretation, Iran has not respected the commitments made by signing the nuclear agreement, an agreement from which the United States unilaterally withdrew. According to the White House, the notification to the United Nations, which took place last August 20, would have activated the process of restoring the sanctions with effect from 19 September 2020. The coincidence with the electoral campaign appears evident, however this intention places the United States in a further state of isolation, which aggravates the American position within the diplomatic landscape. The most eloquent reaction is that of the European Union, which denounces the illegitimacy of the US in wanting to reapply the sanctions. This is an illegality in contradiction with international law, as Americans cannot reapply the sanctions of a treaty from which they have withdrawn and, therefore, to which they are no longer subscribers. The contempt for the law, bent to the contingent needs of domestic politics, however, of only one part of the country, highlights how the attitude of the administration in office is a mixture of inexperience and amateurism, from which, for the umpteenth time, the country it comes out very badly. In fact, if the reactions of China, Russia and Iran itself are opposed for reasons of national political interests, the position of Europe stands out as a progressive move away from the United States, at least if this president remains in charge. The clash is not only on the provision of the application of sanctions on the basis of an agreement from which Washington unilaterally withdrew, but also on the American threat to apply sanctions to those states that will not comply with the decision of the White House. The American attitude is also a challenge to the United Nations, a head-on confrontation that can have serious consequences on the balance of international politics; in fact, the threats to sanction other states, which will not want to comply with the US decision, is a potential consequence of the almost certain decision of the United Nations not to want to comply with the implementation of the sanctions. It is understood that a diplomacy now made up only of threats and which rejects any dialogue and also the application of normal rules of conduct represents a sign of weakness, both in the short and medium term. But it is also a question of the formal abdication of the role of a great power by a country that is withdrawing more and more on itself at a time when the need for a common front of Western democracies against China and Russia no longer appears to be a need. postponable. Not only does the “America First” program, the slogan accompanying Trump’s political action, also seems to be betrayed by this excess of leadership which is certainly against the interests of the United States. Washington cannot propose itself against Chinese expansionism or Russian activism in a singular way, because it needs the joint action of Europe, which is always given as certain, but wrongly: in fact, it cannot be expected that the greatest ally the American, already intolerant of Trump’s action, is passively subjected to these impositions; from a commercial point of view, the European Union cannot tolerate being subjected to sanctions in an illegal way and the consequence can only be a tightening of relations even on issues where American interests had found an agreement with Europe, such as scenarios of telecommunications developments, with the exclusion of Chinese technology. This case once again highlights how Europe must find a way to be increasingly independent from other international actors; if there is an enormous distance vis-à-vis China and Russia on issues such as human rights, computer violations and even commercial relations, which increasingly places them as unreliable interlocutors; the United States, despite Trump’s policies, still remained the natural interlocutors, however the White House seems to want to exercise an increasingly hegemonic role, which cannot be tolerated by Europe. If the American presidential elections do not give a different result from the one produced four years earlier, the distances with Trump are destined to increase: at that point Washington could become not so different from Beijing or Moscow.

The pandemic favors the phenomenon of child brides

In addition to the health effects caused by the pandemic, the effects on the economy have been discussed several times, highlighting the heavy contractions of the gross domestic product of the most advanced states. Evidently the problem exists and causes social problems, which, for now, only social safety nets developed only in the most advanced countries have allowed its containment. The economic crisis of the richer countries has effects in the poorer economies, in countries where the income available to the weaker sections of society is on the verge of survival. The combined effect of the crisis in the richest economies, which cause the decrease in orders and aid to the poorest countries, has generated a reduction in wealth in the nations that has directly impacted on household incomes, significantly reducing a quantity financial available often already insufficient. The exponential increase in inequalities in societies that are not structured for social mobilization has caused other effects to contain the low spending capacity. One of these is the increase in the phenomenon of child brides, who come from the poorest families in a state of severe poverty. This custom is present in Asia and affects an increasing number of adolescents between the ages of 9 and 14, but according to the United Nations, the cases involve girls up to the age of 18; the United Nations itself estimates that the serious problem affects about 12 million girls. The action of humanitarian associations and non-governmental organizations had reduced the phenomenon thanks to an action that favored access to education and more advanced health services for Asian girls. However, the increase in poverty caused by the pandemic has associated a cultural process that has never been canceled with the situation of need of many families, to which must be added the state of financial difficulty of humanitarian and non-governmental associations, which cannot have the necessary liquidity to perform their duties. The phenomenon seems to be underestimated by Western states, engaged in internal problems inherent to health crises and economic problems, but it represents an element that, in addition to the intrinsic gravity of the problem, contributes to maintaining a climate that implies a series of cultural causes that can go to favor the development of situations favorable to radicalism. It should be remembered that the practice of early marriage is typical of many Islamic countries affected by extremism and undermining early marriage could mean undermining radicalism in its cultural foundations. Beyond this vision, the need to raise the incomes of the poorest families must be well-known in order to reduce the poverty that generates inequality and, specifically, traumas deriving from violence and unwanted pregnancies in child brides, also because this practice does not occur only in Islamic communities. but also in Hindu and Christian ones. The action of humanitarian associations and non-governmental movements is essential to continue fighting for the decrease of child brides and the United Nations should also increase their action pending the defeat of the pandemic; Precisely for this reason it would be important that institutions such as the European Union put in their programs the necessary investments to intervene personally and to support those who already work in the field.

China hopes for Trump’s defeat, but bilateral relations will have little variation

There is an ongoing debate in the Chinese country about what the US presidential election results will look like. Political analysts and public opinion in China seem to agree in preferring not so much Biden’s victory as Trump’s defeat; if the two are intimately linked, and one is the consequence of the other, it seems essential for the Chinese that Trump not be re-elected and it does not matter that the victory goes to the challenger of the Democratic Party, because they consider any alternative better than the current tenant of the White House. In reality, as will be seen below, things for China will substantially change little. Beijing considers Trump too unpredictable a politician, difficult to manage in the custom of normal international relations. Trump, who, moreover, has a very good impression of the Chinese president, does not have a linear political reasoning, is too guided by the feelings of the moment and is surrounded by inexperienced advisors who are too inclined not to contradict him. Certainly his international vision provoked in the American country a hatred towards China, which, however, was easy to develop thanks to the previous Obama policy. Trump’s predecessor, albeit in different ways, has put in the first place the question of the supremacy of marine communications routes, fundamental for the transport of goods, present in the Chinese seas, which Beijing considers to be part of its exclusive zone of influence. Furthermore, the question of the growing Chinese willingness to compete, not only economically, but also geopolitically and therefore military, with the USA, to become the first world power, has provoked a negative cross reaction in both political camps. Trump’s action, certainly unsettled, can be placed in the continuity of the policy inaugurated by Obama. Certainly Trump’s ways have certainly not facilitated the dialogue between the two countries, which, on the contrary, have distanced themselves as never before. A change in the White House is considered preferable, at least as regards the possibilities and modalities of a dialogue that appears difficult in any case due to the contingent conditions present. What China can expect from a Biden victory is only a more diplomatic attitude in bilateral relations, but there is little room for convergence on the general issues of discussion. Certainly it will be possible to find agreements on climate change and also on the issue of Iranian nuclear power, this could favor a detente, but it will be practically impossible to go further. There is a very indicative indication of how the Democratic Party intends to deal with China, in fact the principle of one China has disappeared from its electoral program: it follows that support for Taiwan, which is also fundamental for the US from a strategic point of view , will continue; as well as that in Hong Kong, whose opposition has been practically canceled by the liberticide law. Having an antagonist from the Democratic Party, indeed, might be worse than confronting Trump on the issue of civil rights denied by the Chinese government; the current president has never shown himself too sensitive to this issue in which much of his political formation does not seem interested, vice versa the electoral base of Biden could demand a firm position from his candidate if he is elected. One impression is that Biden may seem more compliant to the Chinese, but this impression, if it is true, appears totally wrong, because the path of relations between the US and China in the immediate future cannot change from current standards. If there is room for resuming negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Association, this does not mean that Biden, if elected, will be able to compromise on the issue of rights, which, indeed, it could become central to the relationship with China. Above all, the question of sea routes and support for American allies in the area cannot be negotiated and this aspect promises to continue to be a major obstacle in bilateral relations, an obstacle that will remain substantial despite the forecast of a possible improvement in formal relationships.

Some reflections on the Italian referendum on the reduction of parliamentarians

The question of the Italian referendum on the reduction of parliamentarians is part of a general scenario of the use of political issues from a populist point of view, which has become a common element worldwide. The Italian political scene is characterized by a profound disappointment of traditional political forces, which has been directed, certainly not unconsciously, towards anti-system forces, capable of exploiting widespread discontent, which has generated a large number of voters without references. The appearance on the Italian political scene of new movements or movements that have undergone a transformation in a populist sense has increased attention to issues that are not functional to the improvement of the political system, but has varied their action with the intent of moralizing the system, even if with practical effects often contrary to the declared intentions. The intention to reduce the number of parliamentarians, formally and practically the representatives of the population, to reduce the operating costs of the Italian parliament was presented as a fundamental success for the Italian country. In reality, the first natural objection to this reading is that the same effect can be obtained with the reduction of general costs, while maintaining the same number of elected representatives; also because this reform, without an electoral law built on this reform, will generate profound differences between region and region due to the number of votes that will be needed to elect a deputy. Currently, according to forecasts, there are cases where in some regions to elect a member of parliament it will take three times the number of consensus than in other regions and there could also be a lack of representativeness for other smaller regions. That the issue is purely symbolic would also be evident from the modesty of the size of the savings. However, beyond these considerations, it seems evident that the first negative fallout is a lack of political representation that compresses the relationship between elected representatives and voters, further increasing the distance between the two parties and therefore political discontent. But the greatest suspicion is that this reform, which undermines the constitutional dictates, is functional to greater control of elected deputies, a sort of solution for the failure to abolish the mandatory mandate prohibition envisaged in the constitutional charter. The developments of the latest electoral laws have canceled the possibility for the active electorate to exercise the choice of preference, favoring the power of the party secretariats both on candidacy and on the real possibility of election during political elections; the real intention was to limit the individual and personal action of elected individuals, in order to bring parliamentary activity back to the wishes of the more restricted management groups. If, on the one hand, they wanted to officially combat the practice of changing parties during the legislature, on the other there was a desire to reduce the autonomy of the elected in favor of political strategies developed in more restricted fora, which, in fact, were and they are the only ones authorized to address the party or movement, thus preventing a multiple vision, essential for the debate within the parties. A reduction in the number of parliamentarians would favor greater control of internal conflict, especially in an era where the leadership aspect of political movements prevailed over the grassroots discussion. This aspect of wanting to contain opinions contrary to the management group is a factor that unites every political movement or party present in the Italian political scene: this is due to a low propensity to consider non-aligned positions, often experienced with annoyance by the management groups, but also to an ever decreasing political practice of party leaders, unable to provide quick answers to the questions of the electorate, especially if hindered by different ideas within the party. Internal dissent is no longer contemplated, and is seen as an impediment, a commitment that is an obstacle to the political struggle against opponents. One of the reasons is that the level of executives has dropped hand in hand with the level of discussions brought before the voters: an increasingly simple level, basic arguments that do not require the explanation of an articulated political project but only polarized in its meanings. opposite. Here, then, is the scenario where the conditions have developed to carry out the project of the reduction of parliamentarians with a more or less almost total approval of the political forces, aligned on the ground of anti-politics and unable to say no, even for reasons of convenience.

Moscow and the Belarusian crisis

The situation in Belarus risks becoming dangerous for Putin and Russia. For the Minsk dictatorship, the moment is difficult, despite the violence of the police and the repression following the electoral fraud, the protests continue to spread with heavy repercussions on international reactions. The European Union would have identified the Belarusian country as a possible target by comparing it to Ukraine: a situation of potential expansion of the Brussels area of ​​influence, probably under Washington’s proxy. Within the international framework, the legitimate aspirations of the people of Belarus take on a functional aspect to the interests of the external forces at stake. Of course, the subject that has the most to lose from the evolution of the Belarusian affair is the Kremlin; for Moscow the repetition of an event like the Ukrainian one on its border would mean a decisive decrease in its regional influence and also in its internal prestige, especially with a view to replicating the power of the Soviet Union, a project that contributes to the prestige in Russia of Putin. An unlikely victory by the opposition would favor the country’s transition to the West and this is the first goal that Moscow must avoid, but achieving this is neither simple nor straightforward. The Belarusian dictator has been in power for twenty-six years and does not seem willing to give up and even before the vote, during the electoral campaign, he accused Moscow of wanting to interfere in the elections; with this move, essentially, he warned Russia that it was able and willing to exert pressure so that the Kremlin is ready to provide the necessary support, including military support in case of need. For Moscow the situation with Ukraine is slightly different because in that case there were territories where the Russian ethnic presence is substantial, Crimea and Donbass, and the territorial claim could have some justification even in a position of violation of international law, In Belarus, any armed intervention would be interpreted as an exclusive support of the Belarusian dictatorship, with the consequent reaction of the enactment of new sanctions and, probably, a massive presence of Western soldiers on the Belarusian borders. The military option, therefore, despite being in the list of possibilities, appears as the last possibility that the Kremlin could resort to. The best solution would be that a figure could emerge in place of the current dictator, able to make concessions to the opposition, but who would allow the permanence in the Russian orbit, but, at the moment, this option does not seem to be present, precisely because the tenure for twenty-six years in power of the current dictator, did not allow the development of alternative figures, even within the president’s party. The best possible option for Russia is to exert diplomatic pressure on Minsk to ease the repression, so as to attenuate international attention; this operation, carried out in the interest of keeping Belarus in the former Soviet orbit, can only be carried out with political persuasion combined with an increase in economic aid, a considerable effort for an economy not in good condition like that of Moscow. The point is how far Minsk wants to go in its demands, which take into account the Russian reluctance of a military engagement on the ground, and, on the contrary, where Moscow can go; for the moment the Kremlin seems to shyly distance itself from Minsk, recognizing that there were unclear modalities in the elections, on the sincerity of these statements the question is whether they are sincere or a symptom of functional opportunity to exert pressure on the Belarusian government, but, at the same time, Moscow denied having contacts with the opposition: a necessary denial to indirectly reaffirm support for the dictatorship. On the international level, the Kremlin warned European countries not to intervene in the Belarusian crisis, thus reaffirming its desire to maintain pre-eminence in what it considers an area of ​​exclusive influence. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that the Belarusian opposition, while maintaining a certain numerical level, is struggling to increase: this is demonstrated by the difficulty in raising funds to support it and the decrease in strikes that engulfed the country after the results were made public. electoral, with factories that are back to work. The holding of the dictatorship, after these critical phases, seems to be the best solution for Moscow to maintain the status quo, even if this aspect is certainly certain in the short term and perhaps in the medium, but in the long term alternative strategies will have to be developed to continue to exercise the desired influence.

Biden chosen to mediate between disappointed Republicans and the Democratic left

Beyond the widely anticipated confirmation of Joe Biden as Democratic presidential candidate, who will challenge Trump in the race for the White House, two prominent points emerged in the Democratic convention, which should not be underestimated because they indicate an evolving political line within the party: a necessary dialogue between right and left that will necessarily have to evolve, both in the electoral campaign phase, but, above all, in the event of victory. Biden, politically, is a man of the center and his choice for the presidential candidacy is mainly due to this characteristic: a median position capable of gathering political positions around his figure that are also distant but united by the need to change the leadership of the White House. The presence of several Republican speakers at the Democratic convention indicates a malaise of a large part of Trump’s party, intolerant of its poor attitude to politics, sudden changes of course and also its inexperience and inadequacy. Republicans who support Biden are part of the tradition of the party, perhaps now a minority, that defeated by the tea party and how badly they digested the characteristics of such an anomalous head of state. Their support appears sincere and it is a support they would never have secured for Sanders; Biden, despite some differences, is probably closer to traditional Republicans than Trump is, but this support will not be free, that is, it will not be enough to defeat Trump and change president, in addition to a new conduct in the national and international field, Biden will have to please the Republicans who will support him with decisions close to their positions. It could be a return to the past, when the differences between Democrats and Republicans were not many, however recent times in US politics have seen a radicalization of political positions, which have evolved towards a greater polarization typical of the right-left confrontation. If in the Republicans the supporters of the tea party prevailed, in the Democratic party a similar situation did not occur, the center component still prevails, but it is also true that the left has grown to high levels, especially among the younger ones, by placing a mortgage on the party’s future addresses, which, however, still appears distant. In any case, the success of Bernie Sanders, despite the defeat, highlights a substantial relevance of the left in the Democratic party, a party that claims social reforms certainly in contrast with the Republicans who support Biden. For now, the great need to defeat Trump forces the left to adapt to a pattern it doesn’t like (some of Sanders’ voters don’t like Biden, but probably won’t want to repeat the mistake they made with Clinton), but after what relations may be between these different components of the alliance? The perception is that any problem of this type is postponed after Biden’s eventual success, leaving a glimpse of a path in small steps, which could reveal an underlying weakness on government programs: a factor capable of subverting the forecast, which is favorable for now. to the democratic candidate. Perhaps this has decreed the need to create an electoral base as extensive as possible: the recruitment of Republicans must serve to take the votes of those disappointed by Trump, but also to prevent the repetition of a possible Clinton effect, which resulted in the victory of the president in charge thanks to the abstention of the democratic left. In any case, the aversion to policies and ways combined with the awareness of being able to do better than the current tenant of the White House remains the main electoral program, capable of uniting such different political souls. In the event of a victory, mediating between these almost opposite parties will represent the greatest difficulty for Biden, who will have to draw on all his political and mediation experience to have the leadership of the country: but, basically, he was chosen precisely for this reason. .

The implications of the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates

The main meaning of the agreement, which formalizes an already existing but unofficial situation, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, is to anticipate Trump’s possible defeat and prevent a new Iranian nuclear deal, which could be part of Biden’s plans in the role of the new president of the United States. Israeli national security is worth much more than expansion into the West Bank, which has only been temporarily suspended. The interest in preparing for a possible return of Iran to the diplomatic scene has been shared with the Sunni states of the Gulf for some time, but an official agreement represents a significant novelty. First, because it probably represents only a first episode to which others will follow: in fact, there are great possibilities that Tel Aviv will also enter into diplomatic relations with Oman and Bahrain, where the headquarters of the US fifth fleet is located; the two countries expressed their congratulations to the United Arab Emirates for the agreement which represents a strengthening of regional stability. Netanyahu himself defined the informal alliance that is becoming official between Israel and the Gulf monarchies as the region’s peace circle. In fact, the surprise for these agreements is not justified because it represents the natural evolution of relations that have been established and developed with the common denominator of creating an alliance from an anti-Iranian perspective. At the moment Tehran is suffering from American sanctions and is also in difficulty due to the Lebanese question, which sees Hezbollah, its main ally, in sharp decline even among the Shiites of Lebanon. A change at the top of the White House could improve the Iranian condition, even if it is not taken for granted, with a different direction of US foreign policy: this scenario obliges Israel and the Gulf states to formalize their respective relations to facilitate speed and coordination of any diplomatic responses that may become necessary. Apparently to have the greatest disadvantages, at least in the immediate future, would be the Palestinians who see the Arab world’s hostility against Israelis officially broken; in reality Tel Aviv already has agreements with Egypt and Jordan and for some time the Sunni leaders in the Gulf have only maintained a facade attitude towards the Palestinian question, in favor of a more pragmatic and functional conduct to their most immediate and direct interests . A further target of the agreements, in addition to the aforementioned Iran, would also be Turkey, which is proposing itself as a Sunni alternative to the Gulf monarchies, to politically guide the Sunni Islamic faithful. It is no mystery that Erdogan has for some time been trying to expand Turkish influence, trying to replicate the experience of the Ottoman Empire in a modern version. Indeed, Ankara did not welcome the news of the agreement, but its reaction, based on the betrayal of the Palestinian cause, reveals its hypocrisy and the few arguments available; Turkey, once close to Israel, is seeing an increase in the political weight of Gulf diplomacies capable of bringing the Israeli country to its side, certainly for a common advantage. But internally to the protagonists of this agreement not everything is without problems: on the Arab side the protagonism of the prince of the United Arab Emirates signals the growth of a new political protagonist with respect to the position of the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, compromised in various events damaging the prestige, however this contrast could complicate the ties with Israel of all the Gulf countries, even if it is more likely that common geopolitical interests will prevail. On the Israeli side, apart from the problems with the Palestinians, the opposition of the settlers and the parties that support them must be recorded for having interrupted the process of annexation of the settlements, the only electoral program that has allowed Netanyahu his political longevity, despite the various judicial problems. However, the right-wing parties that support the settlers seem to become more marginal in the interests of national security and the apparent turnaround of the Israeli president seems to be yet another move of great political experience.

The pandemic blocks education in the world

The UN secretary general has sounded an alarm about the school situation; it is a world-wide alarm caused by the closure of schools and universities, which affects over 160 countries worldwide, equal to one billion students, of which more than 40 million children. The lack of possibility of school attendance, especially in the age groups that concern kindergartens, elementary and middle schools, means a deficit ranging from that of learning to that of socializing and the ability to be together, which will be potentially capable of creating large relational deficits in the adults of tomorrow. A further aspect is linked to the school as a social tool also as a shock absorber for families who cannot count on help in custody of their children. This lack risks causing loss of income if a parent has to leave work. The emergency solutions with distance learning have shown that this choice has only partially filled the gaps caused by direct teaching, both for the lack of preparation of teachers for this sudden solution, both for the technological difficulties and also for the unequal distribution of IT tools in families. However, the invitation of the United Nations secretary to reopen the schools, compatibly with the control of the possible transmission of the virus, raises questions about the appropriateness of this choice without adequate security regarding the control of the spread of the virus and its treatments. According to some virologists, the danger of a greater spread of the contagion or a return of the same in countries where the numbers of the pandemic have dropped, would seem to be linked to the younger groups of the population, which could act as a preferential vehicle for the virus. If there is no absolute certainty of these hypotheses, there is also no opposite certainty. The choice, at the moment, seems to be limited exclusively to limiting the immediate effects of the pandemic with the price to be paid in terms of lack of education and also the loss of socialization of the younger population. This is a terrible dilemma, which affects the economy in the short and in the very long term, a choice that cannot be all on one side rather than the other. The solutions that must be found must necessarily be mediations, also capable of finding immediate solutions that may no longer be valid in the same short period. What is missing to stabilize the situation, but not only with regard to education, is to have a safe and affordable method of examination, a certain cure and a vaccine without contraindications, which can be spread worldwide, therefore with a minimal cost. At the moment these three conditions do not seem to be close, so efforts must be made to find temporary solutions. On the other hand, the dangers denounced by the United Nations are undoubtedly true and certain: an educational crisis would have the result of increasing inequalities both between rich and poor states, and within advanced nations themselves, with students belonging to the upper classes certainly favored compared to those of the middle and poor classes. Only temporary solutions, but who knows how much, elaborated by local or supranational governments, when they have the possibility to provide political guidelines, they can create presuppositions, however temporary and never definitive, because classroom teaching is not replaceable, to limit the damage of the current situation. The remedies have already been used, albeit in a limited way, the increase in distance learning, which must however be interspersed with periods of return to class (with all possible precautions) requires contributions for the purchase of computer equipment for families (an obstacle not difficult to overcome, thanks to the ever lower cost of IT equipment), but above all with the greater diffusion of IT transport networks, both in the diffusion of optical fiber and in the acceleration of the 5G service. What the pandemic highlighted was the lack of preparation, on a general level but above all of poor countries, regarding the delay in communication infrastructures, which are increasingly essential to social and economic development, understood as a factor capable of limiting the effects of isolation on education but also as a multiplier of production capacity.