Could the strategy of Saudi diplomacy mark a point in favor or a potential defeat at the summit, not officially recognized, with the Israeli president and the US Secretary of State, now at the end of his mandate? It is well known that the contacts, which have now become an unofficial alliance, between Israel and Saudi Arabia are known, above all in an anti-Iranian function, however the trip of an Israeli head of state welcomed to the Saudi capital represents a novelty; even if the signal of denying the veracity of the event represents the presence of a fear still existing among Arab politicians to make official what could be understood as a further step in relations between the two states. While Arabia has maintained a fairly explicit confidentiality, in Israel the episode has not been welcomed within the same government in office, for similar reasons. Netanyahu, officially did not communicate to the other members of his executive, a government certainly not solid due to its compromise composition, the trip to Arabia, which was immediately identified, thanks to the analysis of sites specialized in the analysis of air travel. If for Saudi Arabia the fears may coincide with the non-compliance with the agreements of the Arab League, which subordinate the recognition of Israel to the birth of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, for Tel Aviv we can glimpse a preventive maneuver by President Netanyahu to anticipate agreements that the new US administration may not endorse. It is no mystery that both Israel and Saudi Arabia would have preferred a reconfirmation of Trump, certainly aligned with the interests of the two states and a political vision where the US opposed Iranian action in the region. A convergence of interests that may not coincide with the intentions of the new American president, if the attitude towards Tehran were to change and the Iranian nuclear deal were to be reconfirmed, as signed by Obama. Even the presence of the current Secretary of State, not very understandable if framed in the expiration of his mandate, seems to want to give a preventive value of breaking with the future policy of the United States. If future diplomatic relations between the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia are more problematic, Trump reminds the two nations of his personal closeness, also in view of a possible return for the competition at the White House in four years. In any case, confirming this meeting, even with all the denials of the case, has the meaning of wanting to complicate the future political action of the new American administration, presenting as an acquired fact an increasingly close relationship between Tel Aviv and Riyadh on which the new president he will have to work, if he wants to give a different direction to regional structures, to be able to dampen the current potential dangers of a confrontation with Iran. Making the link between Israel and Saudi Arabia even more public is functional in Tel Aviv to have an almost certified relationship with the leading Sunni exponent, to present itself as an ally of this part of Islam, with the dual aim of having the highest number of interlocutors possible to protect his interests at home within the management of the Palestinian question and, at the same time, be a reliable partner for Sunni interests at the regional level against the maneuvers of the Shiites, therefore not only against Iran, but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria and too much power gained against the Sunnis in Iraq. In addition to the common interest against Tehran, Riyadh needs to increase its proximity to Israel to have support against the advance of Turkish expansionist policy in Islamic countries, in a confrontation that is all played out within the Sunni area. For Saudi Arabia there is also an increasingly pressing problem of gaining accreditation with world public opinion, after all the investments and efforts that have failed due to an internal situation that is still too serious for the continued use of violence, torture and repression, which do not allow for an adequate consideration of other countries, if the economic power given by oil is excluded. Riyadh cannot count on the exercise of its own soft power, such as China for example, and this relegates it to a position of inferiority and little consideration, especially in relation to Western countries. Losing an ally like Trump will aggravate this situation becoming more and more essential to establish relationships with as many subjects as possible, even if as uncomfortable as Israel.