Russian mediation brings about a ceasefire in Nagorno Karabakh favorable to Azerbaijan

Eventually Russia was forced into a first-person engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it was not the kind of engagement that the Armenians were hoping for. In Yerevan, in fact, from the start of the conflict, the hope was that Moscow would deploy its soldiers alongside the Armenians, to balance the support given by the Turks to the Azeris. This is not the case; too many conflicting interests for the Kremlin to prefer just one side. If up to now Russia has been the main ally of the Armenians, it is also the main arms supplier to Azerbaijan, while the confrontation with Turkey is already considered potentially dangerous, without the need for further deterioration. The only viable solution from Russia was, therefore, a diplomatic commitment aimed at stopping the fighting, to avoid its own direct involvement, among other things unwelcome to a considerable part of the population, which does not see in a positive way the direct risk of the Russian soldiers, however, still engaged in Syria. Putin had to make a virtue of necessity and reconcile the too many negative aspects of a military commitment, which could worsen his popularity with the population, and a financial outlay, which was judged as an investment without great returns even in terms of international prestige. Even the current economic phase, conditioned by the pandemic, has resulted in the risk of losing an arms industry customer, such as Azerbaijan, as too high a price to pay. Finally, for relations with Ankara, already very compromised, it was preferred not to create further deterioration. However, Moscow exercised a mediating role, which allowed the achievement of the ceasefire and the beginning of talks between two very distant parties. The Azerbaijani advance was thus stopped with the conquest of the second most important of Nagorno Karabakh, only eleven kilometers from the capital. Following this agreement, the Armenian military will have to withdraw to be replaced by 2,000 Russian troops employed as blue helmets, to guarantee the ceasefire and to guard the corridor that will be created to connect Nagorno Karabakh with the Armenian country. The concrete result of the agreements will be that both sides will maintain their current positions and Nagorno Karabakh will be divided into two areas which will constitute northern Armenia and southern Azerbaijan, plus a strip of territory conquered by Azerbaijani forces. The head of the Kremlin says that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will guarantee the return of displaced people to their homes, both Azeris who fled the area in 1994, after the war of that period, and Armenians who escaped the last fighting; the agreements also include the exchange of prisoners and the recovery of the bodies of the fallen of the respective opposing forces. If in Baku these agreements were experienced with the euphoria of a military victory, which allowed the reconquest of a territory that has always been considered illegally, in Yerevan the defeat was experienced as a military capitulation that has the meaning of humiliation national; this provoked demonstrations by the population, most of whom proclaimed themselves in favor of the resumption of fighting; for the Armenians it is a sort of mutilation of the national territory, experienced with even more resentment for the decisive role of the eternal Turkish enemies alongside the Azeris. The fact remains that the Armenian government had no alternatives and made the only possible choice to avoid major losses, on the other hand, Turkish support for Azerbaijan was decisive for the fate of the conflict and the Armenian force could not compete. with the armaments supplied by Ankara. What worries, mainly the Armenians, but also international public opinion, will be precisely the role that Turkey will want to play following this agreement: Erdogan’s threats to annihilate the Armenians during the early stages of the conflict are well present. in the memory of the Armenian people and of international public opinion. Russia is present in the territory with its contingent of blue helmets, but a further presence would be advisable, preferably from the European Union to eliminate any ambitions of the Turkish president, who struggling with the probable economic failure of the country, could, time, try to distract attention with symbolic operations against the Armenian people. An eventuality to be absolutely avoided, both for the specificity of the case and for the geopolitical drift that could follow, capable of involving religious confrontation and to avoid yet another potential conflict capable of reflecting itself well beyond regional balances.