European Union and United Kingdom: the implications of an agreement being defined

The continuation of the negotiations for the management of the situation after the exit of Great Britain from the European Union are continuing with the attention of the European Parliament, which remains firm on its request to be able to dispose of the final text as soon as possible, in order to be able to evaluate all the technical and legal aspects of an issue that promises to be difficult to understand even for the most experienced bureaucrats in Brussels. Without having the final text available, ratification could postpone after 31 December 2020 and therefore exceed the terms of the transitional agreement; in that case the possibility of a definitive agreement would become more concrete and the relations between the two parties would be governed by the world trade agreement, with the consequence of jeopardizing a turnover, than only for imports and exports it is around 500,000 million euros annually. If the aspects concerning the regulation for the guarantee of measures on competitive competition are moving towards a definition, which could guarantee access to the English companies to the European market in a practically unlimited way, the most difficult point to solve remains: that of quotas. fishing. It is a symbolic matter for the conservative government, with an almost irrelevant impact on the gross domestic product of the United Kingdom, but which in the collective imagination of the party in favor of leaving the Union, represents the maximum exercise of its sovereignty, together with the willingness to manage immigration in a totally autonomous way. On fishing, the European request is to be able to have a transition period, from six to ten years, to be able to allow access to the European fleet, but which concerns to a greater extent fishing vessels from France, to British waters, which ensure a 50% caught by Union vessels. London’s goal is a year-by-year negotiation, which does not allow industrial planning to Europe and above all gives an undoubted advantage to the British, who would have the possibility of substantially reducing access quotas and even reducing them entirely. This is a prospect that is not acceptable to the Union and which would cause an almost automatic reduction in the access of British products to the European market in proportion to the share of fishing rights reduced by London. If these mutual doubts are not resolved by the agreed term, a possible agreement could enter into force provisionally from the first of the year and then be voted on later by the European Parliament. This eventuality, however, is not to the liking of the European Commission, which fears preventive control over its decisions, a decision certainly democratic but capable of slowing down decisions that require a greater speed of decision, also because the agreement with the United Kingdom, in its procedure , should set a precedent for other similar situations. If in this decision one understands the necessity and urgency of the decision, however, the Commission’s fear does not appear justified as regards the future, but rather the need for a clear and adequately regulated process, which can reconcile the need for speed. decision, with the necessary sharing with the parliament, which is always the representative body elected by European citizens. Returning to the negotiations, it is also necessary to pay attention to the balance that a privileged agreement with the United Kingdom would affect: other countries that have separate agreements with Brussels may request to renegotiate the terms of collaboration. It should be remembered that no nation can enjoy access to the European market, the richest in the world, without quotas and tariffs and this privilege would be granted to the British for the first time: if the economic advantages can be considerable, from a political point of view this privilege a concession appears to be a sort of defeat, because it does not sanction those who wanted to leave Europe in the name of a sovereignty that is in full contrast with European principles; the desire to save jobs and market shares is a sufficient justification, also due to the value of the exchanges, but must be the only exception in order not to degrade the weight and prestige of the European Union; then if the United Kingdom continues to continue its intransigence, it is better to abandon all negotiations because the negative repercussions will be greater for London, which will have to return to dealing with positions of inferiority.