Moscow and the Belarusian crisis

The situation in Belarus risks becoming dangerous for Putin and Russia. For the Minsk dictatorship, the moment is difficult, despite the violence of the police and the repression following the electoral fraud, the protests continue to spread with heavy repercussions on international reactions. The European Union would have identified the Belarusian country as a possible target by comparing it to Ukraine: a situation of potential expansion of the Brussels area of ​​influence, probably under Washington’s proxy. Within the international framework, the legitimate aspirations of the people of Belarus take on a functional aspect to the interests of the external forces at stake. Of course, the subject that has the most to lose from the evolution of the Belarusian affair is the Kremlin; for Moscow the repetition of an event like the Ukrainian one on its border would mean a decisive decrease in its regional influence and also in its internal prestige, especially with a view to replicating the power of the Soviet Union, a project that contributes to the prestige in Russia of Putin. An unlikely victory by the opposition would favor the country’s transition to the West and this is the first goal that Moscow must avoid, but achieving this is neither simple nor straightforward. The Belarusian dictator has been in power for twenty-six years and does not seem willing to give up and even before the vote, during the electoral campaign, he accused Moscow of wanting to interfere in the elections; with this move, essentially, he warned Russia that it was able and willing to exert pressure so that the Kremlin is ready to provide the necessary support, including military support in case of need. For Moscow the situation with Ukraine is slightly different because in that case there were territories where the Russian ethnic presence is substantial, Crimea and Donbass, and the territorial claim could have some justification even in a position of violation of international law, In Belarus, any armed intervention would be interpreted as an exclusive support of the Belarusian dictatorship, with the consequent reaction of the enactment of new sanctions and, probably, a massive presence of Western soldiers on the Belarusian borders. The military option, therefore, despite being in the list of possibilities, appears as the last possibility that the Kremlin could resort to. The best solution would be that a figure could emerge in place of the current dictator, able to make concessions to the opposition, but who would allow the permanence in the Russian orbit, but, at the moment, this option does not seem to be present, precisely because the tenure for twenty-six years in power of the current dictator, did not allow the development of alternative figures, even within the president’s party. The best possible option for Russia is to exert diplomatic pressure on Minsk to ease the repression, so as to attenuate international attention; this operation, carried out in the interest of keeping Belarus in the former Soviet orbit, can only be carried out with political persuasion combined with an increase in economic aid, a considerable effort for an economy not in good condition like that of Moscow. The point is how far Minsk wants to go in its demands, which take into account the Russian reluctance of a military engagement on the ground, and, on the contrary, where Moscow can go; for the moment the Kremlin seems to shyly distance itself from Minsk, recognizing that there were unclear modalities in the elections, on the sincerity of these statements the question is whether they are sincere or a symptom of functional opportunity to exert pressure on the Belarusian government, but, at the same time, Moscow denied having contacts with the opposition: a necessary denial to indirectly reaffirm support for the dictatorship. On the international level, the Kremlin warned European countries not to intervene in the Belarusian crisis, thus reaffirming its desire to maintain pre-eminence in what it considers an area of ​​exclusive influence. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that the Belarusian opposition, while maintaining a certain numerical level, is struggling to increase: this is demonstrated by the difficulty in raising funds to support it and the decrease in strikes that engulfed the country after the results were made public. electoral, with factories that are back to work. The holding of the dictatorship, after these critical phases, seems to be the best solution for Moscow to maintain the status quo, even if this aspect is certainly certain in the short term and perhaps in the medium, but in the long term alternative strategies will have to be developed to continue to exercise the desired influence.