Short and medium-term objectives of increasing Chinese weapons

The recent Pentagon report on the increase of the Chinese nuclear military arsenal, exposes very worrying data, which concern a forecast of about a thousand new warheads within ten years. This data means that the technological capacity of Beijing has grown to the point of allowing the achievement of an ever-increasing production of nuclear weapons, also integrated by other cutting-edge technologies for war purposes. China believes that increasing its atomic arsenal is a fundamental element in the context of its geopolitical ambitions and, that the current difference with the United States must absolutely be bridged, also in the context of the run-up to the role of the first world power. Currently, the American estimate speaks of 200 nuclear warheads available for Beijing, with the prospect of reaching 700 warheads in 2027, to reach 1000 in 2030. Furthermore, Chinese advances in hypersonic missile technology must be considered, leading China to one been very advanced in the ability to develop cutting-edge military technology. These considerations highlight the US need to adapt its armaments to maintain military supremacy, also in relation to the increased importance in US politics in Southeast Asia: but this brings to the fore the problem of the arms race, which still generates insecurity. major on the international stage. One of America’s biggest concerns is China’s technological ability to build ICBMs that have the potential to reach targets thousands of miles away. The Chinese strategy, in addition to the medium-term objective of establishing American primacy, in the short term for Beijing the growth of armaments serves to reaffirm its attitude on the desire to discourage the United States and its Western allies from not taking any military action. to put Taiwan’s protection in place. The question of Formosa, in fact, remains central in the current international political moment and the decision to send the first official delegation by the European Union has provoked strong Chinese resentment. Japan, for its part, denounced the circumnavigation of its main island by Chinese and Russian naval ships, formally engaged in joint military maneuvers, actually perceived by Tokyo as an explicit threat not to intervene in the Taiwan question. These Chinese behaviors are perceived as a threat to global stability, especially due to the strategic position that Beijing has taken on the state, so-called early warning counterattack, which provides for an immediate missile counterattack not only in the event of an actual attack, but also of an attack. potential or just an impending threat. The concern for the Chinese attitude does not concern only the United States, but above all neighboring countries, in the forefront the aforementioned Japan, which has launched a military spending program, which concerns two per cent of its gross domestic product, a share never allocated by Tokyo and which denounces the Japanese desire to play a leading role in containing Chinese bullying. Beijing could accuse the pressure that is being created around the island which it considers a continuation of its territory and therefore of its sovereignty, pressure, which, moreover, China itself has helped to create with intimidating actions, such as the overflight of hundreds of military aircraft on the sky of Taiwan. It is understandable that diplomatic initiatives, such as that of Brussels, could also contribute to changing the current precarious balance for the worse, but the possible consequences of potential armed threats out of control or human errors capable of unleashing remain more evident. rash reactions; the current high concentration of armaments is destined to rise, as well as the actors on the stage and the danger deriving from an uncontrolled rearmament, all represent factors of a situation where the military option can take on a very probable consistency. For now, however, the predominance of American military means may allow us to hypothesize that China can only exert disturbing actions, where the incident is always verifiable, but which are much less dangerous than a hypothetical direct attack, like the president himself. Chinese has repeatedly threatened. The time remaining, therefore, for the actual increase of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, should be used to give way to diplomatic action or to exert commercial pressure, to which Beijing is very sensitive, to penalize the Chinese economy: but we must to be able to do so and, above all, to make the appropriate renunciations; but for the maintenance of a democracy in the area this appears essential.