China hopes for Trump’s defeat, but bilateral relations will have little variation

There is an ongoing debate in the Chinese country about what the US presidential election results will look like. Political analysts and public opinion in China seem to agree in preferring not so much Biden’s victory as Trump’s defeat; if the two are intimately linked, and one is the consequence of the other, it seems essential for the Chinese that Trump not be re-elected and it does not matter that the victory goes to the challenger of the Democratic Party, because they consider any alternative better than the current tenant of the White House. In reality, as will be seen below, things for China will substantially change little. Beijing considers Trump too unpredictable a politician, difficult to manage in the custom of normal international relations. Trump, who, moreover, has a very good impression of the Chinese president, does not have a linear political reasoning, is too guided by the feelings of the moment and is surrounded by inexperienced advisors who are too inclined not to contradict him. Certainly his international vision provoked in the American country a hatred towards China, which, however, was easy to develop thanks to the previous Obama policy. Trump’s predecessor, albeit in different ways, has put in the first place the question of the supremacy of marine communications routes, fundamental for the transport of goods, present in the Chinese seas, which Beijing considers to be part of its exclusive zone of influence. Furthermore, the question of the growing Chinese willingness to compete, not only economically, but also geopolitically and therefore military, with the USA, to become the first world power, has provoked a negative cross reaction in both political camps. Trump’s action, certainly unsettled, can be placed in the continuity of the policy inaugurated by Obama. Certainly Trump’s ways have certainly not facilitated the dialogue between the two countries, which, on the contrary, have distanced themselves as never before. A change in the White House is considered preferable, at least as regards the possibilities and modalities of a dialogue that appears difficult in any case due to the contingent conditions present. What China can expect from a Biden victory is only a more diplomatic attitude in bilateral relations, but there is little room for convergence on the general issues of discussion. Certainly it will be possible to find agreements on climate change and also on the issue of Iranian nuclear power, this could favor a detente, but it will be practically impossible to go further. There is a very indicative indication of how the Democratic Party intends to deal with China, in fact the principle of one China has disappeared from its electoral program: it follows that support for Taiwan, which is also fundamental for the US from a strategic point of view , will continue; as well as that in Hong Kong, whose opposition has been practically canceled by the liberticide law. Having an antagonist from the Democratic Party, indeed, might be worse than confronting Trump on the issue of civil rights denied by the Chinese government; the current president has never shown himself too sensitive to this issue in which much of his political formation does not seem interested, vice versa the electoral base of Biden could demand a firm position from his candidate if he is elected. One impression is that Biden may seem more compliant to the Chinese, but this impression, if it is true, appears totally wrong, because the path of relations between the US and China in the immediate future cannot change from current standards. If there is room for resuming negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Association, this does not mean that Biden, if elected, will be able to compromise on the issue of rights, which, indeed, it could become central to the relationship with China. Above all, the question of sea routes and support for American allies in the area cannot be negotiated and this aspect promises to continue to be a major obstacle in bilateral relations, an obstacle that will remain substantial despite the forecast of a possible improvement in formal relationships.