Perhaps the British parliamentarians, of any party, are thinking that the United Kingdom can access the benefits of a transition without any withdrawal agreement, however, as specified by the EU negotiator, there is no transition without an agreement. The negotiation foreseen by article 50 seems to have failed and the danger of a British exit from the European Union without agreement is more concrete than ever. Now the House of Commons wants to try to verify how much approval the proposal of a new referendum could get: attention, we already know that this proposal will be rejected by majority, what we want to verify is only if the number of favorable ones can indicate a new road to run across. This fact is the symbol of English inconclusiveness and the fact that it occurs a few days before the March 29 deadline is quite eloquent. The Macron proposal would also have arrived for a technical time, however before the European elections, to allow the British to find a solution in extremis. This solution seems to be pleasing to the London government, which still hopes to find a way to allow an exit agreed with Brussels. The question is whether this makes sense. If we understand the need to maintain a privileged relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom, on the other hand it is not clear how an agreement can be reached within the House of Commons. In fact, if on the continental side there is the awareness and also the certainty of having tried in any way for an agreed solution, it is not possible to have a mutual sensation on the part beyond the English Channel. The perception is that in Brussels there is a certain irritation more than justified, which leads to a tiredness in a possible continuation of the negotiations and this can only negatively influence other potential meetings. Beyond the objective assessments we must take into account mainly the orientation of the twenty-seven European countries, which will have to decide whether to grant a possible offer on the basis of the reasons that London will want to present, a decision that must be unanimously and therefore more difficult to to reach. The border of the European elections represents an obstacle for both sides: for Brussels, which does not want to have English deputies, nor for London, for which the conduct of the European electoral competition would represent the betrayal of the referendum vote and the official incapacity of its political class . So a decision will have to come by force either on March 29 or before the European elections, which, it has this point, are a fundamental date, to arrive at the British decision. Certainly this deadline obliges London to make a decision in a tight time frame, whatever it may be, without having the possibility of new elections that could favor a clearer picture of the situation. It must, however, be remembered that from the result of the referendum time was sufficient to arrive at a timely decision without being reduced in this way. For the rest of Europe this story represents a lesson, of which, hopefully, there is no need to resort, but which can serve to keep a less available attitude with those who do not want to share the feelings of belonging to the Union. The United Kingdom already enjoyed more extensive privileges than the other members and lingering in further favors does not appear to be fair or even useful to the common cause.