The decision of the European Commission of Ireland require the recovery of a sum of over 13 billion Euros from the Apple corporation, for unpaid taxes in the period between the years 2003 and 2014, it requires a serious reflection on the diversity of application the tax system among the states of the European Union. In fact, the possibility of applying different regulations within the union, following the non-harmonization of the tax systems of individual countries, has generated and generates significant differences on related tax revenues, which have created a kind of unfair competition among states that recognize the organization in Brussels. The first effect of the European Commission’s decision has been to threaten, by the American group, a decrease in investments, and consequently jobs, in Europe: it is the ever-present threat, which has the feeling of blackmail, who it is conscious of having taken advantage of the benefits that touch the illegality, if viewed in the internal context of the European Union. Decide, in fact, to deal with a market that goes far beyond the country where there settles, only for the tax advantages, it contains an incorrect behavior of principle, on which is not acceptable to base their business practice. However, in this case Apple is an American company and its behavior is no doubt influenced by the US legislation, which allows the relocation of companies abroad, in order to facilitate the tax system and only partly by taxing the profits of this company at the time of the return of capital in the United States. The US behavior, which has very labile ethical basis, seeks to generate liquidity from abroad, to create investment and demand in the US domestic market. Already this setting should be a matter of negotiation between Brussels and Washington, were it not that in the European Union, the situation from the point of view of tax looks different, fragmented, compared between members of Brussels. Basically the US exploit this yet another division within the Union to allow their businesses to grow and prosper. But it is not the fault of Washington if there are countries such as Ireland, but not only, that lizard tax laws such that they can be configured as unfair competition practices. Moreover, in the absence of shared general rules, Dublin will choose to appeal against the Commission’s decision to preserve its right to apply a favorable tax treatment to foreign companies, but certainly not correct to other members in Brussels. This phenomenon, which denounces a situation of confusion, substantially contributes to bad European economy, at a time where more uniform would need to have legislation possible, which guarantees a fair tax revenues, but also able to attract foreign investment necessary to stop the recession and start the growth phase. On the contrary this fragmentation of tax legislation fuels a kind of war between the poor, who favors the impossibility of reaching agreements on which to build European unity, if not political, at least economic. The output of Britain, who had a great ability to attract foreign capital, thanks to the strength of its financial system, is likely to aggravate the situation in Europe, with a rush to fill the vacuum English, through tax laws that can exasperate current differences between individual countries. In this scenario, Brussels has been more notable for the absence, that to have taken a crucial regulatory role, who knows how to prevent some states are excluded from the possible development of the future as a result of the presence of more and more different tax systems. It understands that heal this situation becomes a priority, if you want to get to equilibrium and non-confrontational relations between Europeans and maintain a non-confrontational dialectic states and ensuring concrete arguments to those who are against Europe as a supranational organization. To this end, the streets are essentially only two; the first is to be assumed within a regulatory regime built in a context of political union, for example the creation of a federal basis of the Member States of Europe, a situation still too far away, in sharp contrast to the need to find a quicker solution possible. The second, to find a less restrictive common law, but certain in its principles and also be able to apply safe sanction mechanisms, built on the basis of transposing the interests of individual states through the identification of common denominators and that, at the same time ensure a bargaining power and Representative to the European Union, able to guarantee the Member States, to other national and private subjects who have high bargaining power. A positive result in this field would be a tangible point to develop common economic strategies, the positive effects could be used to improve the economic situation of the European citizens and businesses, thus constituting a flywheel also political of the European INSTITUTIONS Against towards greater integration and more accepted by the social partners.