The debate taking place in the European Union and, in particular in the European Commission, on the occasion of the visit of the Chinese president, takes on particular importance, both because of the visit of the Chinese head of state, and because of the developments towards which this discussion will lead. It has not become an urgent topic just now, that of guaranteeing reciprocity and equality of treatment to European companies when they operate outside the Union; the current situation, in fact, presents several obstacles in many countries to which companies operating in Europe belong freely and which hinder European companies with customs barriers, especially in the context of public procurement. Nations like China, India, Turkey and Indonesia, just to name a few of the most important, actually prevent access to European companies from the public procurement market, while the same countries compete freely for the same market in Europe; the presence of China, then, takes on preponderant values and obliges considerations that go beyond economic considerations to invest in the areas of security and data protection. If the head of the White House has long raised this problem, to try to impose a protectionist and anti-globalization vision without controls, with ways that are certainly not diplomatic, one can disagree on its modalities, but one cannot fail to recognize that this difficulty actually exists. We find ourselves in an unfavorable global economic situation and where Europe suffers from the scarce availability of investments, which compress the ability to create jobs and redistribute wealth. The role of China, which has large financial resources, has assumed a strategic importance that has entailed the danger of an entry into the European economies which entails counterparts that may be too high in the economic sector, but also in politics. Behind the lack of reciprocal treatment of companies there is a sort of protectionism on the contrary, which creates alarm in the social and political sectors of the Union. For the European Commission this danger is real and the first step it wants to take is to create mechanisms capable of applying restrictions for companies in countries that hinder the entry of European companies into public procurement markets. To do this we need the adhesion of the governments of the member countries, which appears to be anything but defined. Germany, Spain, although heavily hit by this phenomenon and the Nordic countries are opposed to this decision because they identify a protectionist will, contrary to the policy of opening to the market that must distinguish Brussels. Now the distinction between politics and economics is not always possible, but in this case what seems important is the achievement of a common goal that can go beyond the short-term benefits of a possible investment. If on the one hand the reciprocity of treatment of companies from different countries in the same markets, it should appear as a matter of economic justice, because it ensures a stabilization of free competition, eliminating the factors of imbalance, on the other hand the importance of a decision common that protects the political aspects of ensuring free competition, should have a value even higher than the opportunity of economic gain as a single and isolated. Too many times Brussels’ inaction has been complained: in this case, where the Commission seems to have taken the initiative, Brussels deserves more support, also in recognition of the unity of political action on behalf of the Union. The attitudes of those who say they are against protectionism reveal, instead, a clear political protectionism particularly akin to that sovereignism, to which those governments say they are against. The growth of the importance of Europe must not only refer to its potential as a market, but also to its authority as a political interlocutor precisely to allow a dialectic that facilitates work for its businesses in order to create wealth for its citizens. Placing conditions on access to public procurement can be the first step to combat even those imbalances, based on the failure to take into account labor rights and too low wages, which facilitate the private industry of emerging countries and which have created the conditions for current concentration of manufacturing.
Perhaps the British parliamentarians, of any party, are thinking that the United Kingdom can access the benefits of a transition without any withdrawal agreement, however, as specified by the EU negotiator, there is no transition without an agreement. The negotiation foreseen by article 50 seems to have failed and the danger of a British exit from the European Union without agreement is more concrete than ever. Now the House of Commons wants to try to verify how much approval the proposal of a new referendum could get: attention, we already know that this proposal will be rejected by majority, what we want to verify is only if the number of favorable ones can indicate a new road to run across. This fact is the symbol of English inconclusiveness and the fact that it occurs a few days before the March 29 deadline is quite eloquent. The Macron proposal would also have arrived for a technical time, however before the European elections, to allow the British to find a solution in extremis. This solution seems to be pleasing to the London government, which still hopes to find a way to allow an exit agreed with Brussels. The question is whether this makes sense. If we understand the need to maintain a privileged relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom, on the other hand it is not clear how an agreement can be reached within the House of Commons. In fact, if on the continental side there is the awareness and also the certainty of having tried in any way for an agreed solution, it is not possible to have a mutual sensation on the part beyond the English Channel. The perception is that in Brussels there is a certain irritation more than justified, which leads to a tiredness in a possible continuation of the negotiations and this can only negatively influence other potential meetings. Beyond the objective assessments we must take into account mainly the orientation of the twenty-seven European countries, which will have to decide whether to grant a possible offer on the basis of the reasons that London will want to present, a decision that must be unanimously and therefore more difficult to to reach. The border of the European elections represents an obstacle for both sides: for Brussels, which does not want to have English deputies, nor for London, for which the conduct of the European electoral competition would represent the betrayal of the referendum vote and the official incapacity of its political class . So a decision will have to come by force either on March 29 or before the European elections, which, it has this point, are a fundamental date, to arrive at the British decision. Certainly this deadline obliges London to make a decision in a tight time frame, whatever it may be, without having the possibility of new elections that could favor a clearer picture of the situation. It must, however, be remembered that from the result of the referendum time was sufficient to arrive at a timely decision without being reduced in this way. For the rest of Europe this story represents a lesson, of which, hopefully, there is no need to resort, but which can serve to keep a less available attitude with those who do not want to share the feelings of belonging to the Union. The United Kingdom already enjoyed more extensive privileges than the other members and lingering in further favors does not appear to be fair or even useful to the common cause.
Iran’s President Rohani’s visit to Iraq signals a turning point in Tehran’s strategy, both in the diplomatic and economic fields, to face US sanctions. The two countries share a common border of about 1,500 kilometers and, at the moment, seem to have overcome the historic rivalry present when Saddam Hussein was in power. The Iraqi country is composed of a high percentage of Shiites, about ninety percent, and for this characteristic it has a remarkable affinity with Iran. Tehran has identified a possibility in the neighboring country to overcome US sanctions, which are heavily affecting the Iranian economy. The project is to increase trade between the two countries, which now amount to about 12,000 million dollars, up to 20,000 million dollars; to do this, agreements have been signed in important sectors for both countries, such as: energy, transport, agriculture and industry. However, the problem that most haunts Iran is that of circumventing the effects sanctions produce on the payment system to Tehran. Washington has built a sanctioning system that relies heavily on money transactions to the Iranian country, penalizing banking institutions that allow the flow of money to the Ayatollah republic. The respective central banks would have thought up a system for exporting Iranian hydrocarbons to Iraq and from there sold to third countries by paying no more in dollars but in euros. If the United States has already threatened Baghdad and its banking institutions, it is necessary, however, to keep in mind the needs of the Iraqi country, which depends very strongly on Iran’s gas supplies. Washington’s requests to diversify suppliers clash with the greater economic viability of Iranian gas, due to lower transport costs, precisely because of the proximity between the two countries. Iraq finds itself, however, in the awkward situation of having two countries that are deeply enemy to each other as its main allies, this difficulty could be converted into an opportunity by the Baghdad government, which cannot renounce its relationship with the United States, but even, precisely because of the reasons expressed above, he can move away from Iran. Iraq could play a role, if not of pacification between the two sides, at least try to reduce the tension: it should be remembered that the starting point of the war against the Islamic State exists, where Tehran’s fundamental role has been recognized, albeit implicitly , also from Washington. The US, despite the threats, cannot subject the Iraqi country to sanctions, because the consequences would be the impoverishment of a nation already in economic suffering and this could lead to a return to Islamic extremism. From a diplomatic point of view, President Rohani’s visit could have the objective of making the relationship between Iraq and Iran more privileged than that between Iraq and the USA; this could be part of the strategy to counter the coalition of Sunni monarchies with the US (and Israel) and break the international encirclement in which Tehran is. The fact remains that in Washington a Shiite-speaking interlocutor is essential in the Middle Eastern chessboard, however Baghdad may not have liked Trump’s direction in American foreign policy, which interrupted Obama’s equidistance between Shiites and Sunnis, to favor relations with the latter. This imbalance, however, forces Washington to take the greatest possible caution against Baghdad, but it also offers the opportunity in Tehran, a victim of US sanctions following the unilateral withdrawal of the White House from the nuclear treaty, to exploit the greater affinities with the Iraq. The question is not secondary because the friendship with Iraq serves the United States to present itself in a sort of equidistance in the face of the religious question that divides Islam, but it is also important from the geopolitical point of view, because it allows us to maintain the his troops on the borders with Iran. The feeling is that this visit opens up to a variety of different scenarios, but all of them can influence the future of the region.
With just a few weeks left on March 29, the United Kingdom and the European Union are trying to find an agreement that can be, at least partially, satisfactory for both parties. The most relevant issue is that of the border between Eire and Northern Ireland, because it involves both economic and social problems. This last aspect is much feared for stability in the Ulster region long battered by tensions between Catholics and Protestants. A return of the border is considered dangerous for an area in which the problems linked to the relations between the members of the two religious denominations are always considered potentially critical. From the economic point of view the restoration of the border has generated the fear, in the Eurosceptics, of obliging the United Kingdom to stay in a customs union with Brussels, which would, in effect, prevent independent agreements with third countries from London ; this would represent the failure to fulfill one of the main issues, which contributed to the victory of the referendum, for those who wanted to leave the Union. However, the solution reached between the British premier and the president of the European Commission is not definitive and allows to avoid the restoration of the border not in a definitive manner but in time, to give the British nation the opportunity to accept the situation. This temporary solution will come into force at the end of the transitional phase of the exit from Brussels, until the end of 2020 and, above all, pending an agreement between the two parties, which can avoid an English exit without any shared agreement. The perception, that the problem of the Irish border represents the main obstacle for the definition of the question in a total way, is that currently it is the most central topic of the discussion, however, behind this negotiation the split of the political society appears in a continuous way English, which also runs across the two main parties. The profound uncertainty that the British political scene is going through obliges the twenty-seven countries of the Union to try to interpret the situation in London, but with almost certainty, that if this proposal fails too, there would be no other and the road to exit without agreement. the only valid option would remain. It is, however, a solution that is unhappy with both parties, but that harms the United Kingdom the most, where the split is not only political but also social, as the small distance between the two votes in the referendum has shown. This perception has prompted the repetition of the referendum from many quarters, but this hypothesis has never been taken into consideration by the current premier. However, the British parliamentarians are unable to get out of the legislative impasse in which they ended up: cross vetoes due to the belonging of their respective parties, intransigent positions due to the electoral college’s duty and other behavior far from the political responsibility that would be necessary contribute to this situation. The lack of effective mediation has done the rest, but what emerges is the absence of common interests, which should be sought and achieved, based on compromises able to guarantee a minimum of common interests, which at otherwise, it is far from secured. What emerges is a political class that is facing the failure of the nation without having the consciousness of what will happen. When the country is literally impoverished by this decision, with the increase in inequality at an exponential level, then the hunt for those responsible will occur, but this will happen without any success, because everything will be marked by a mediocrity of the political class, incapable of assuming their responsibilities, a condition that is too common throughout the continent.
The beginning of the Chinese Communist Party Congress, where Xi Jinping’s leadership must be reaffirmed, does not coincide with comforting data for the country’s economy. The issue is central to Beijing’s political programs: the objective of maintaining a high level of growth is considered a priority to allow the country to play the role of great economic power that the Chinese government wants to pursue. Up to 2020 the average targets were about a 6.5% annual growth rate, currently the official figures show a growth of less than half a percentage point, but this estimate would have been built upwards, artificially, to avoid presenting to the financial world too compressed data. In reality it seems that there are studies with real values even much less than 6% official. The deterioration of the data should take into account a structural factor of the Chinese economy, due to the indebtedness of the peripheral administrations, which is not counted in that of the central administration and whose amount is not known. However, this data, in previous years, was masked by high growth rates, which were not influenced by endogenous factors that are now decisive. The main of these factors was the election of Trump in the White House and its economic policy, focused on the commercial war declared against Beijing. One of the responsibilities of Chinese rulers is to have underestimated the effects of the introduction of tariffs on goods to the United States, which are among the real ones responsible for the decrease in growth. It should be remembered that China has also neglected the internal market and its growth for too long, with policies aimed more towards increasing trade with foreign countries. Large investments in foreign countries, acquisitions and participation in foreign companies and large infrastructure spending, such as those incurred for the Silk Road or in African countries, have committed great liquidity aimed at long-term projects, but which have diverted resources for the internal market. The attention on this side has now become an obligation and the Chinese government is about to launch tax incentives for companies and, above all, to encourage domestic consumption. In order to stimulate domestic consumption, Beijing relies on a series of public works in the railway sector and the growth of military spending with orders to Chinese companies, spending on the armed forces serves to bridge the difference between commercial power and military power of the Chinese nation, a mandatory condition to exercise the role of superpower on a par with the USA. Significant investments are also planned for the telecommunications sector, where the infrastructure for the 5G standard is considered a priority by the National People’s Congress. But internal development is not just an economic priority, the condition of Chinese workers has caused several strikes that, despite the repressions made by the regime, threaten social stability; until now the greatest antidote to discontent has been the promise of an increase in the quality of life of the Chinese people and now this goal is no longer postponed and can only be pursued with a greater possibility of per capita spending for workers and families . Within this internal market policy there is a willingness to allow 10 million Chinese people to leave poverty. This value can be achieved with the reduction of unemployment, but also with the search for greater stability in the condition of workers, up to now too subject to market trends. However, there is a contradiction in the policies announced: if, on the one hand, there are strong tax cuts, including the decrease in value added tax, on the monetary policy side a reduction of public spending is expected, which will have to be interpreted the implementation: in fact if the reduction of expenses will have to concern activities of support to the population, the phenomenon of poverty will be difficult to reduce, vice versa if you want to work on aspects such as the functioning of the bureaucracy and corruption, these measures can contribute to the gain of points percentages of the gross domestic product, given the important weight they have on the economy of the country.
The United States is increasingly closer to establishing an agreement with China, but at the same time, they open up new controversies with India and Turkey. The question is always that of the lack of reciprocity of commercial treatments. India, in fact, has a preferential treatment, which allows it to export US $ 5.6 billion worth of goods, totally exempt from duties imposed by the US administration. A treatment similar to that enjoyed by Turkey, destined to end at the behest of President Trump. Within the reasons that allowed these exemptions, there are strategic considerations that took into account the importance of India and Turkey, as allies considered important in their respective geographical areas and with a view to balancing the balance of power with other powers, such as the Chinese one, in the Indian case. Trump’s lack of consideration for the reasons of foreign policy, in favor of the commercial and industrial interest of the United States, considered pre-eminent, has certainly influenced these decisions, but we must also consider the deterioration of relations between Washington and Turkey, always considered less reliable, also in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and the desire for leadership in the Indian country, which has manifested with the new government ambitions not always in line with the US government. The rapprochement with China could also have influenced the decision to include the duties for India: in the traditional rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi, the United States seeks a sort of equidistance, which sacrifices the political alliance with India, in favor of a gain in the trade balance. Moreover, this aspect is fundamental in Trump’s policy and the achievement of the agreement with Beijing, now almost certain, is considered a victory by the White House. The signing of the agreement should also, albeit partially, cancel the disappointments of the recent Hanoi summit with Kim Jong un, which represented a failure for US foreign policy. The terms of the trade agreement between the US and China should include Beijing’s reduction of a share of duties introduced on US products such as soy, cars and chemicals; in addition, Beijing has committed to the purchase, starting from 2023, of American natural gas for an amount of about eighteen billion dollars. The American counterpart is to lower the tariffs introduced by Trump on a value of about two hundred billion dollars of goods, allowing Chinese products to enter the American market again. If part of the US administration is optimistic about the outcome of the agreement, there are also skeptics in the White House, who see dangers arising from the agreement, due to Beijing’s lack of guarantees on very relevant issues and issues such as requests for structural reforms in the commercial sphere relating to currency exchange and therefore of Chinese financial policy, up to compliance with international regulations on intellectual property rights and state aid to companies operating abroad. The evaluation of the outcome of the negotiation is not as simple as it would be to believe if a positive result occurred. Trump is aiming for an immediate result, which may not take into account the objections of the White House skeptics, a positive result in the short term could alleviate the controversy surrounding the statements of the former lawyer of the president and therefore, perhaps, would give an advantage in the internal front; however, in the medium and long term, if the fears of the skeptics were to be founded, the negative effects on the American economy could affect relations with China. Consequently, even the objective, even if not too hidden, to create the conditions for a pact between the two world superpowers, which goes beyond commercial issues, and favors the normalization of relations and the overcoming of geopolitical tensions, could be negatively affected. When it comes to international politics and Trump the boundaries of the discussion are always very uncertain and the direction that could make a decision by the American president represents a variable difficult to predict and in this case all solutions are possible.
Despite the good conditions, which according to the US president, were created with North Korea, the Hanoi summit ended with nothing. Trump probably overestimated his ability as an international negotiator, based only on his experience as a businessman. The result was an interruption of the negotiations that shows how the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is still very far and everything to be defined. For the US and, above all for the White House tenant, one has the feeling that this conclusion was a sort of diplomatic defeat. If the expected outcome was the definition of the denuclearization process of North Korea, which remains one of the main, if not Trump’s main foreign policy objectives, the result is completely contrary to this expectation. The American president probably expected a total remission from Kim Jong’s attitude, based on the poor economic status of the North Korean country and on the need to suppress internal dissent that seemed to be growing. Trump’s assessment, and certainly most of his analysts, turned out to be completely wrong, because the Pyongyang leader’s request was deliberately inadmissible. Ask for the cessation of sanctions without safe counterparts, in fact it was a showdown that Kim Jong a has long prepared to show that he still has all the control of the internal apparatus in front of the leader of the world’s first power. The meaning is clear: to have made Trump sit at the negotiating table for nothing, means that North Korea, in addition to having nuclear power, has, from this moment, also the diplomatic force to deal on a par with the US. Although this of course is not true, the American president has given an unmissable opportunity to the North Korean dictator, who gave him a lesson in foreign policy difficult to forget. Thanks to Trump’s poor attitude to being a man of government, the political visibility of North Korea has grown considerably since the American billionaire resides in the White House, an impossible result when Obama was the president, even if he did not excel in foreign policy either. . Not having understood that for the North Korean regime, possession of the atomic weapon is essential from its very survival is a huge mistake, in which Trump fell thanks to the effective tactics of Kim Jong, who avoided exposure to the media international, avoiding threatening the US and South Korea and not launching more trial missiles in the ocean. This period of tranquility was assessed by Trump as sufficient to expect a positive outcome of the negotiation, despite the news that the American secret services communicated to the White House. In reality, nuclear plants have never been turned off and atomic tests continued, but only in absolute silence. The suspicion is that Kim Jong un used Trump to weaken the American image: a result certainly pleasing to China. If the North Korean laeder has acted alone to please Beijing or if it has been an instrument of awareness of the Chinese country, it is of little importance. The reality is that North Korea and China have improved relations, as demonstrated by the four visits of Kim Jong a carried out in Beijing, which signal that relations between the two countries are back friendly, after very difficult periods. For Beijing it is important that Pyongyang maintain a different attitude so as not to allow the dreaded union of the two Koreas, which would bring the US military to the Chinese border. The fundamental error, which triggers Trump’s failure to negotiate with North Korea, is precisely that of not taking into account the variable China in question: a decisive undervaluation, which indicates the shallow depth of analysis of the White House.
The action of Indian military aviation in Pakistani territory, constitutes an anomaly in contrast with the behavior that New Delhi is used to have, even in critical situations, with Pakistan. It is very rare indeed that Indian airplanes cross their border. The military action is part of a situation of growing tension between the two countries, especially after the terrorist attack, which took place in Indian Kashmir and which caused the death of 42 Indian police officers. India’s strategy would be based on the prevention of new terrorist attacks, considered very probable by the New Delhi government. The attitude of the Pakistani country is, for now, to diminish the Indian action, which according to the sources of the Foreign Ministry would have caused the death of 300 militants of Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Pakistan has a double interest to deny the effects of the Indian attack: the first is to not show its weakness in defending its borders, but it is the second that is considered most important by analysts: the confirmation of the victims of the bombing in Pakistani territory, it would also imply admitting the existence of Islamic fundamentalist training camps in areas bordering India. These terrorist formations would be close to Al Qaeda and included in the list of terrorists drawn up by the UN since 2001. The aversion of these militias against India is a known fact and the suspicions of connivance with the Pakistani government have been present for some time. , both in New Delhi and in Washington; the ambiguous position of the Pakistani government towards Islamic terrorists has long provoked a lack of confidence on the part of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance and in this case one can even suspect the instrumental use of fundamentalists to raise the level of conflict along the border between the two countries and affect India indirectly. The fact remains that at this time the Indian country has become the protagonist of an act that, formally, can be defined as war against another nation invading its territory, albeit for a limited period of time. The caution of Pakistan, which has not even implemented diplomatic protests, increases suspicions about Islamabad, but does not allow us to fully understand the intentions of the Pakistani government. If, on the one hand, there is every interest in minimizing the incident to avoid compromising admissions, on the other hand there is the fear that Pakistan has embarked on a new tactic in the undeclared war against India. use of terrorists pursues a dangerous intent to destabilize the border area, which has always been the subject of litigation between the two parties. Although it is superfluous to remember that both countries are nuclear powers, this figure should not be kept in mind to try to make a prediction of the possible scenarios. In addition, we must consider other actors that are present in the scenario: China, a traditional regional opponent of India, which is operating in Pakistan with large investments, while the United States is closer to New Delhi, even if Pakistan remains an unreliable ally , but strategic in the Afghan question. The interweaving of international interests is completed with the desire to re-emerge organizations like Al Qaeda, as already said very close to the Pakistani terrorists, who could try to fill the gap left by the Islamic State by launching a large-scale terrorist campaign, as it is its own mode of action, which could also include the border between Pakistan and India just as a factor of world prominence and resonance. The impression is that India’s action may mark an important and very dangerous development in the Indo-Pakistan question, with largely unpredictable consequences, which international diplomacy will have to constantly monitor to prevent the crisis from having dangerous enlargements.
The part related to the international issues of Russian President Putin’s speech to the nation focused on the issue of American behavior after the US exit from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. First, however, Putin wanted to underline the good relations that Moscow has undertaken with Belarus, China, Japan and India. After this prologue the head of the Kremlin accused the United States of wanting to bring instability on the European continent, precisely for which the treaty had been signed and which had as its objective the maintenance of peace in the old continent. The question invests the American will to install missile defenses in the countries that joined the Atlantic Alliance, which were part of the Soviet bloc and are very close to the Russian country. On the one hand, Putin says he has no interest in coming into conflict with the United States, which defines global power, but, on the other hand, maintains that, although Russia does not intend to be the first to deploy missiles with a radius of action between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, can only respond with measures similar to American provocations. From Trump’s point of view, the exit from the treaty was justified, not only, to equalize the situation with China, which was not a signatory of the agreement, but also because Russia was suspected of having violated the treaty, thanks to operations of rearmament and to respond to the need of the American allies of Eastern Europe, who have always supported the danger of Russia, to have sufficient defense systems to balance the threat of Moscow. From the point of view of Putin, the United States, with the installation of missile systems on the Russian border, aim to destabilize the area of influence that Moscow considers as its own, the answer would also be necessary to prevent the repetition of similar cases to the Ukrainian question, whose possible entry into the Atlantic Alliance is deeply opposed by Russia, which could see the US military on its borders. The American attitude provides the perception of a very high threat, so much so that the Russian president affirms that the countermeasures that will be adopted in response to the installation of missiles that can reach Moscow in ten minutes will concern not only the missile bases that will host these weapons, but also the decision-making centers from which they could take orders for their use. The threat, not so much hidden, therefore, concerns the American territory. It is clear that these statements are the consequence of the withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and lead directly to the cold war situation. Putin’s statements seemed almost obligatory, a peer-to-peer response with the United States, which was also functional in balancing admissions about the country’s internal state. The Russian president must measure himself with a decline in people’s confidence due to a difficult economic situation, with long-standing structural problems due to the lack of industrial development due to the excessive importance of the primary sector, linked to energy products and therefore subject to changes in raw material prices , of which Russia is exporter; to this must be added an unstable social situation due to the increase in the retirement age, little appreciated by the Russian people, and to the over-widespread situation of extreme poverty, which affects nineteen million Russians. In this context the decline in the population of the country is seen with concern, which did not happen since 2008. If this time the chances of attenuating the discontent of the Russian people with declarations of the will to bring Russia back to the world power level can not the effects of previous years, the warning speeches to the United States were a necessary, but not sufficient, corollary, which was valid for integrating the promises in economic and social matters most requested by the population. The fact remains that Russia, although in economic difficulty, possesses the technical and financial capabilities to implement the threats against the United States by bringing back the clock of history, even at the cost of further worsening the internal situation due to the probable pressure diplomatic that will follow the eventual installation of missiles and that will materialize with new sanctions, ulterior step towards the worsening of the east-west relations.
The request of the American president Trump, aimed at European countries, to take into custody their citizens engaged as fighters in the ranks of the Islamic State, appears correct and just. The international community can not oblige the United States to create new prisons on the model of Guantanamo to keep the militiamen of the Islamic State in custody, which possess European citizenship: on the one hand there is a role that Washington no longer wants to cover, from the legal obligation to take custody and to judge citizens who have committed terrorist acts and violence seems to be corrected. However, the proposal by Trump, which, as an alternative, proposed the liberation of terrorists, was not welcomed favorably by European countries, which objected to contradictions of a normative nature and of political and social opportunities. The most interested European states are Germany, which has declared its willingness to prosecute a part of its fighting citizens, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium. In essence, the opposition to Trump’s proposal concerns the refusal to consent to the return of terrorists for fear of the creation of new fundamentalist cells in the territory of origin. The question of the outcome of the trial, in fact, is not at all certain that it can end with a prison sentence because the crimes committed were committed outside the national territory and there may not be sufficient evidence to determine the sentence and therefore , make terrorists harmless from the social point of view. If Trump’s request is legitimate, the grounds for refusal, based on legal aspects, of the European countries appear unexceptionable. Possible acquittals in technically difficult processes, would determine the liberation of militarily prepared and ideologically highly motivated people, able to create networks and nuclei of adherents to carry out terrorist acts in the country of origin, or in neighboring ones, in the name of fundamentalism. The question thus becomes very controversial and complex: if the US or even its allies in Syria can not or do not want to keep European citizens in detention, can the countries of origin refuse to return? The general case must be framed not only for the protection of the individual state or groups of states, in the European case, but must also include the danger of these individuals in the former war zones, where the period following the fighting is always conditioned by situations of instability and uncertainty. The most probable consequence, without the coercive control of the former combatants, is that they become terrorists and carry out attacks against those who attempt the government in the territories that were the theater of war. Seen from this point of view, the question once again appears to be the refusal of its responsibility on the part of the states of origin of the terrorists, who first did not properly control their own citizens and then refuse their repatriation for their social dangerousness. The absence of the states of origin is therefore evident, as is evident the refusal of a possible reparation to protect their territory and leave the terrorists to those who have already suffered their actions. If the concern for regulatory uncertainty is justified, it is necessary to develop alternative solutions to ensure the right punishment for those who have been responsible for atrocious crimes and, at the same time, make it harmless. A solution could be of a supranational nature, investing in the competence of the crimes committed, international bodies able to overcome the single state legislations and widely expected for crimes against humanity. It is a solution that provides for collaboration and agreement between state and supranational subjects, but which can become a tool to solve a situation that could have dangerous effects if it was not properly governed.