The bloodiest aspect of the Assad regime is back in the open with the bombing in the neighborhood near Damascus, which is still guarded by the Syrian democratic forces. Assad’s strategy moves on well-defined and proven plans in the seven-year war. As soon as the focus shifted to the Turkish intervention with the Syrian Kurds, the dictator took advantage of the attention on Erdogan, to regain positions on the ground, especially the area closest to the capital, which had not yet returned under his control. The military scheme applied is the repetition of particularly bloody and not very targeted bombings, which indiscriminately strike fighters and civilians, including more than four hundred dead, and destroy all the infrastructures, to create the conditions for an entry of the ground forces, with a task more than facilitated by the indiscriminate use of air power. The analogies with what happened in Aleppo are clear and can only prove that Assad should be indicted for crimes against humanity. However, the international reactions are different, especially in the attitude about the need for a truce as proposed to the United Nations from Sweden and Kuwait: this abstention of fighting should have a duration of about thirty days to allow access in the bombed area of humanitarian convoys , food and doctors. The proposal, supported by the USA, has been rejected by Russia, which fears that this period of time will favor the intentions of some Western governments, which aim at the fall of Assad. This event seems remote because Assad has reconquered the strategic areas of the country, however along with humanitarian convoys, Moscow fears the entry of weapons capable of threatening Damascus closely, a possibility that would put under threat continues the structure of Syria preferred by Russia and Iran. What, however, appears is a Russia that seems trapped in the role it has given itself as Savior of Assad. Moscow does not seem able to get out of a situation that had brought undoubted advantages, both internationally, where the Kremlin had returned to play a major role, both in the balance of the Middle Eastern chessboard, preserving Syria, and its strategic position under Russian influence. Assad, cleverly has been able to exploit the Russian ambitions to his advantage and this has allowed him to overthrow the course of the conflict and remain in power against all odds. Russia is still on the eve of the elections and a military role abroad held for so long is not well seen by the electorate; on the other hand, Moscow can not abandon the Syrian game and lose its accumulated prestige, even if it is not very productive to defend a dictator who is the author of brutality. In Moscow’s help there is the American attitude, always too cautious with Assad and the Turkish one, which makes it possible to justify staying with Damascus. Assad, at this moment moves on two fronts: the Ghuta district, to eradicate the rebels closest to him and thus avert the possible American rapprochement and exacerbate the confrontation with Turkey, to provoke an internal disagreement with the Atlantic Alliance . The Syrian move assumes the value of a gamble because it could bring Ankara closer to Washington, but this is a calculated risk because it also obliges Russia to continue its support to Assad and strengthens the Syrian alliance with Tehran in anti-Sunnite function. Certainly there are also other unknown factors to consider: the Iranian presence and the strengthening of Hezbollah risks triggering an Israeli reaction to which Damascus is not interested, but that for the Iranians could be part of the provocation plan towards Tel Aviv. Also not to be overlooked is the possible involvement of the Saudis, who have certainly not exhausted their interests for the overthrow of the Damascus regime. The future scenario is once again very uncertain because of Assad’s willingness to keep power, of Russia and Iran, to have focused on an unpresentable character to pursue his own interests, the uncertain politics of the United States and for the usual uselessness of the United Nations. The concrete danger of an enlargement of the Syrian conflict thus becomes very probable for a sum of divergent interests of foreign nations, which, at the moment, have the sole result of strengthening Assad in power with modalities and behaviors that should cause strong suspicions among his allies .
The analysis carried out by Amnesty International, in its annual report, presents a situation of violation of the most complete rights, which goes beyond the classical examination of the violations of human rights, which occurred through the use of violence, but also examines the decrease in social rights, which occurred due to the austerity and impoverishment of Western countries, which caused death due to the increasingly scarce health and food assistance. The general discourse concerns politics and is intimately connected to the rise to power of characters increasingly distant from a democratic vision, but based on social instincts caused by a distorted perception of the management of public affairs. The taking of power, always happened in a democratic way, by these rulers was due to political campaigns based on the management of hatred and discrimination of social groups already widely marginalized, such as minorities, refugees or immigrants. The success of these arguments is due to unfavorable economic and financial situations, which have diminished the capacity for bargaining power of the middle and lower classes, whose discontent has been channeled towards political forms that express interests completely opposed to those of the electorate from which they take the votes. In this way a sort of political short circuit has been created where the initial reduction of rights has fueled a further decrease of the same with the approval of those who have been damaged by these policies. In practice this has resulted in more deaths in industrialized countries due to health care restrictions and worse overall economic and social conditions. Western governments, often guilty of these failings, are the same ones who have not reacted to personal rights violations in countries like Syria, Iraq, Venezuela or Burma. There were no two types of interventions: the first in crisis areas, to avoid or limit the conflicts that have caused the death of numerous civilians, the latter in a detached attitude towards the problem of the resulting migrations. The rich countries have ended up in a sort of rejection of immigration that has taken on such seriousness as a humanitarian tragedy. In this they distinguished the countries of Eastern Europe and Australia, which have implemented particularly harsh policies against refugees. The worsening of the protection of the rights and the less protection of the populations hit by wars, did not concern only the states, but also the United Nations, which did not find suitable instruments, both diplomatic and military, to reduce the suffering of civilians in theaters of war. Particular attention has been paid to the increasing limitations on press freedom, a phenomenon that is expanding precisely with the reduction of rights: it is no coincidence that countries like China, Turkey and Hungary, just to give some examples , have reported cases of persecution of journalists, who have gone hand in hand with human rights violations. At the same time, the social manipulation that occurs through the dissemination of false news, often orchestrated on the mandate of state entities, is connected with the violation of rights, because it consists of an instrument of address and pressure towards specific objectives, such as immigrants. Because of the complexity of this scenario, according to Amnesty International, the world would have entered a situation of partially new degradation, precisely because the violation of rights would be spreading to the rich, industrialized countries and this would further aggravate the situation of the countries poor. Moreover, a minor commitment to the resolution of international crises is a fact, as well as the closure in themselves, typical of the US of Trump, or the lack of interest, such as China, or the interest for their own ends, such as Russia , are endogenous factors of the great powers, which influence, permit or facilitate the violation of the rights of minor states and always to the detriment of the civilian population. The general crisis is therefore exacerbated by irresponsible behavior of rich countries, both inside and outside, and this represents a very negative element, capable of determining the increase in denied rights and their specific weight, constituted by greater severity of violations.
The parliament that will be elected by the Italian legislative consultation of March 4, will be the expression of the popular will only in theory. The new electoral law will produce, in fact, a power expressed only by the parties and not by the civil society, with which the political class appears increasingly distant. What is foreshadowed is no longer a democracy, but an oligarchy of parties, as an expression of an increasingly narrow and often family-like dominant class. It is no coincidence that during the discussions for the elaboration of the electoral law that will be applied, there has been a uniformity between parties also of opposing sides to not admit the preferences, which could have given the elector citizen a form, albeit contained, of exercise a right of choice on which people to elect. On the contrary, the parties chose, with methods totally contrary to the democratic spirit, the members of the electoral lists, which were chosen only for their loyalty to the management team. Those that will be constituted will be parliamentary groups that are the expression of a small circle of parties that must always represent in a faithful and non-critical way. On the other hand, the electoral campaign of each training has so far been carried out on unrealistic promises and low-level reciprocal clashes, which have resulted only in pushing more and more citizens out of the electoral consultation. Not for nothing on all sides have we been urged to exercise the right to vote, for fear of abstention, which is announced large, which may not legitimize the vote in a comprehensive manner. The electoral campaign has shown a remoteness from the real problems of the country, which demonstrates the will to reinforce a restricted power justifiable only for the protection of circumscribed interests; hypothesis reinforced by applications for the protection of certain economic and social sectors. These factors, contingent upon electoral consultation, are added to a power that the parties exercise without being framed in legislation that sanctions its democratic functioning, so we are witnessing an overview of the exercise of power that starts from the control of the party system carried out through the exclusive financial power, up to the management that takes place through IT platforms. The classical party that provided for a large peripheral base no longer exists, because it had as a counter-indication the internal dissent, more difficult to contain. The affirmation of the so-called light party has served only to a total control of the ruling classes, which have also become practically the only ones within the political formations. But the detachment and disenchantment of the base also coincided with the increase in abstention, which was certainly formed by the perception of a policy away from the problems of citizens, but also by the lack of that force that was based on volunteering for keep the party active in a local dimension and that it was a force capable of dragging even non-members into the political agony. The destruction of this model, which occurred almost simultaneously on the left, in the center and also on the right, does not seem to have been random, even if it was meant to coincide with the end of the first republic. This was not the case: together with the destruction of the people’s party, a phase of denial of the increasingly compressed culture went hand in hand, thanks to what was disseminated by the television medium and by a quality of education in increasingly poor schools. The result is that we wanted to remove the popular class from political life: first indirectly and now with rules that limit the decision-making power of citizens to the choice of the political party, a pre-packaged choice that contains candidates expression of areas other than those where they are eligible and of controversial personalities to whom there is no alternative. An electoral bid is often very inadequate, which justifies abstention and favors the uncontrolled power of the parties, which have now become merely forces expressions of the exercise of an oligarchic power increasingly distant from the democratic intentions of the Italian constitution.
The mission of US Secretary of State Tillerson in Turkey has been very complicated. Relations between the two countries are at historic lows and there is a real risk of a diplomatic break, a scenario that until recently was not predictable. The question of US support for the Kurdish militias, traditionally allied with Washington, is only the last case of conflict between the two nations and represents a dangerous precedent of mutual threats, which could degenerate into armed conflict. Previously there were cases of visas denied to Turkish citizens by the US, followed by a similar measure by the Ankara authorities. One of the reasons for friction is the failure to extradite a Turkish preacher, resident in the US, who is believed to be one of the inspirers of the failed coup. All these reasons of friction are however secondary, if we consider the American perception, probably supported by concrete evidence, of the initial support from the Turks to the Islamic State, which was to be the tool to drop Assad and then transformed, thanks to huge financings, in a sovereign terrorist entity, which has subverted the order of Syria and, above all, of Iraq, a country in which the United States had been directly involved. The importance of maintaining good relations between the US and Turkey is also due to the fact that Turkey is the only Muslim member within the Atlantic Alliance, and for the United States, the permeability of Ankara in the Western alliance is considered an aspect indispensable in the face of the new world scenarios that are emerging. Washington fears that Turkey may end up in Russian influence; if this were to happen, Moscow would gain a strategic position on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea capable of increasing the apprehension of the countries that belonged to the Soviet bloc and which now fear Russia more from the military point of view. Furthermore, not being allied with one of the major Muslim countries would open an even clearer distance between the US and the Sunni world. One of the topics of discussion was the future of Syria: on this front Turkey seems to be particularly close to Russia, especially after Erdogan has identified Assad, after having fought it, a possible bank against the Kurds and their desire to constitute an entity sovereign on the borders of Turkey. The American position, although close to the Kurds, is not yet completely clear, just because Washington does not want to preclude any solution to have a better relationship with Ankara. On the future of Assad there is a wide divergence, proven by the support of Washington to the Syrian democratic forces, which are on the opposite front of the coalition in fact composed of Russia, Iran and, indeed, Turkey. It will be necessary to see how the talks will develop and whether the two sides intend to evaluate the relationship between the two states in a positive way. If with Obama it was understood how the distance between the two countries was justified by the political direction taken by Erdogan, with Trump one could foresee a sort of rapprochement, precisely because of the political inclinations of the current president of the United States. But as for Russia, the office of president is not enough to direct federal policy and therefore the diplomatic and military apparatus have kept the distance with Turkey. It remains to be seen whether this removal is still considered beneficial for powers outside the White House or if, on the contrary, a rapprochement that could prevent a definitive rupture has become necessary. Diplomatic work will not be easy: Erdogan does not want to give up fighting the Kurds and Washington can not betray faithful allies. However, Turkey does not seem to give up anything and the current situation is that there has only been a generic commitment between the two parties to find mechanisms capable of dealing with divergent issues. The respective positions remain distant and to this situation is added the probable agreement between Kurdish militia and regular army of Assad, which Damascus would be willing to use as a force of interposition between Kurds and Turks, to prevent them from further advancing in Syrian territory. If this eventuality were to materialize, the confusion among all the parties involved would be bound to increase again: in fact, the legitimate question is what will Russia do and what the United States will do if this new alliance were to become a reality.
A new reason for confrontation emerges between the United States and Europe: that of the arms market in the context of the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. One of the points of Trump’s political program is to reduce the military commitment to other states, including allies. For the president of the USA, a lower commitment involves financial savings to be allocated to American growth; starting from this point Trump has repeatedly urged, above all the European states, to a greater participation, also economic, to the programs related to the defense. The ways in which these solicitations have arrived have not been entirely diplomatic, even if it must be recognized, that the European attitude towards defense was based too much on American aid and commitment. The issue imposed serious reflection on European nations, where the need for common military programs within the Union was recognized. On the other hand, this need could also favor the adoption of a common line in foreign policy and be a decisive factor for the objective of political union. The exit of the United Kingdom from Brussels also constituted another reason to build new instruments able to favor common programs in the field of defense. Therefore, having established that the policy of military integration of the Union was now compulsory, it was necessary to create a fund, financed annually from the EU budget with a billion euros for armaments and five hundred million for research in the field. military. The goal is also to involve the contribution of individual states with significant financial contributions. The central point of the project, however, is that to access these funds companies will have to be European. In fact, this represents a closure for the country that is the largest arms producer in the world: the United States. Washington has openly accused Brussels of protectionism, contradicting the economic policy inaugurated by Trump at the national level, which is based precisely on the closure to foreign producers; moreover, the US arms market has always been reserved for local companies. According to the policy inaugurated by the Union, the United States would lose a substantial share of the arms market, especially if considered that the Union will be a market in clear expansion, located in one of the areas with greater wealth. Within the Atlantic Alliance, which at the beginning had positively judged the European plan, we now consider its effects from a different point of view. If from the economic point of view the major member of the Alliance will have a substantial loss, even from the political point of view the influence of Washington is destined to decrease precisely as hoped for by Trump: greater military autonomy of the European Union. Potentially these two added factors, can create an alteration of the internal balance of the Atlantic Alliance, already endangered by the position of Turkey, increasingly politically distant from Washigton. It must however be specified that US military protection is still the most important part of European defense and that autonomy in this sector can not be achieved in the short term, even if the funds available are much more substantial; what is needed, apart from the war materials, is an effective coordination, which is still far away, and a level of integration between the various armed forces of the different countries, which can not be achieved by well-defined programs in times that are certainly not short. These considerations expose Europe to a kind of blackmail, which the United States could implement if they are excluded from the market that is about to open. The Union must consider whether to renounce, at least in part, the policies of military development, which is also an opportunity for technological research and thus to benefit, in a certain way still of American protection or to clash with its major ally to arrive at greater autonomy in the defense sector. On the other hand, the United States will not be able to claim access to the European military market if it does not assume a reciprocal position and in any case the European allies are too important in the current scenario characterized by Russian protagonism and the Chinese role, just to mention some of the actors on the scene. The way to go will be the diplomatic one with all the difficulties of the case, but for Europe the opportunity to create one’s own armed force is unique and obligatory.
The recent incident in Syria, which involved the demolition of a sophisticated Israeli military aircraft, the first since 1982, raises several questions about the future of the Middle East region and the power relations that are going to take shape. The background is the Israeli retaliation for the drone crossing over the territory of Tel Aviv. Israel has carried out a retaliation, as it always happens, which appeared disproportionate to the offense suffered, after that, however, the drone already been shot down. The Israeli air force bombed the base from which the drone had left, causing the death of some Syrians, but a plane was hit by Assad’s contractor. The story highlights some points, which are necessary for a particular analysis. The first point concerns the nervousness of Israel, caused by the proximity of the Iranian enemy present in Syria and also in Lebanon through the support given to Hezbollah: this historic moment is where the traditionally enemy forces of Iran and Israel have come closer. The second point concerns a hypothesis that concerns that Israel has been lured into a trap to prove that its military air force, that which allowed it the undisputed military supremacy in the region and in the defense of its borders, can be scratched by the supplied weapons to the Syrians, from Russia, who provided the sophisticated missile systems able to shoot down aircraft equipped with any electronic countermeasure; in fact, the downed plane is a particular type of F16, reinforced compared to standard models and considered unbeatable by the weapons so far held by the army of Damascus. The third factor concerns Iran, which is the builder of the drone, which was supposed to have tasks against the Islamic State and which crossed the Israeli borders: this demonstration could have been directed against Trump, as a warning of what could happen if the United want to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement, making the sanctions heavier and causing a paralysis of the economy of Tehran, with obvious consequences on the internal level. The Iranian government wants to avert this possibility and participation in the provocation against Israel can also be read as a warning to Washington. The fifth point concerns international politics and the role of Moscow. After the demolition of the Israeli plane, Putin, in addition to expressing concern about the dangers to which the Russian military present in SIria will be subjected: a concern that serves not to hide a possible warning against Israel’s military policy, is also playing a leading role in the story, recommending prudence and moderation to the parties involved, but if Moscow wants to occupy a sort of role of arbitrator, it would be a referee certainly not impartial, given that the regime of Assad, Iran and Russia are always allies closer, even if the interests of Moscow and Teheran in the Tel Aviv are not converging at all; in the Kremlin it could rather involve a provocation to Israel as an indirect action against the US, but among all these actors on the scene the best relations are those between Russia and Israel. In the Israeli capital, however, the demolition of the military aircraft seems to have aroused an unexpected surprise, because the availability available to Syria, obtained by the Russians, but which can also be accessed by the Iranians, have not been adequately evaluated. If it is practically certain that neither Tehran nor Hizbullah could endanger the integrity of the Israeli state, these new developments show that it is in the possibilities of Israel’s enemies to create a strong state of tension precisely on classical military instruments. To this scenario must be added the deadlock of relations with the Palestinians, who were stuck after the decision of the White House to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The widespread discontent that has arisen among the Palestinians, both in the West Bank and in Gaza and therefore both among the moderates and the most extremist groups, could become the object of attention by Israeli enemy forces to open up internal theses, in turn to bring destabilization into the Israeli state. For Tel Aviv, then a particularly difficult time where the use of force would be strongly dosed to take on more diplomatic and compromising attitudes, starting with the blind Palestinian question which a radical change of attitude would be more than necessary. Finally, the question remains of the groups of the caliphate present in the Egyptian Sinai, fought by Cairo, but which have the aim, also for image reasons, of attacking Israel within its territory: a further factor aggravating the general situation.
The evolution of the Syrian war presents some dangerous motorcycles capable of developing military comparisons between different states, which are still trying to bring their interests beyond a pacification that does not come. With the defeat of the Islamic State the Syrian situation seemed to have a loosening of military operations, but the presence in the armies of different nations risks opening a new phase that goes beyond the internal confrontation of the factions of the country, to become a sort of comparison of opposite positions within the international scenario. On the one hand, the Russian presence serves to keep Assad in power: without the Moscow army, Damascus would probably have suffered a defeat. Russia, up until the beginning of the civil war, was interested in keeping Syria under its influence and this provoked its direct entry into the conflict, nominally justified by the desire to defeat the Sunni-dominated Islamic terrorism. For Tehran it was just as important to keep Assad in government, of which he has always been an ally, thanks to his religious closeness and as a bank against the Sunnis, partly because of the desire to limit Saudi expansionism. The United States has long tried to delegate to others the solution of the Syrian crisis, hoping for an English or European intervention that has never arrived. Obama has maintained a low profile, limiting himself to supporting the weaker part of the rebellion, the secular and democratic militias that have never reached a sufficient degree of autonomy. Trump’s will, initially, would have been to delegate to Putin the solution of the matter, preferring to devote himself to the internal reality, however the Pentagon pressures forced the White House to engage the issue more directly, also to protect the traditional Kurdish allies . In addition to these three powers, Turkey’s involvement is increasingly emerging. Ankara is adopting a wavering attitude: at the beginning of the conflict its greatest interest was to determine the fall of Assad, an interest that coincides with that of the Gulf monarchies and for which, probably, we wanted to use the Islamic State as an instrument of contrast, going, in fact, to determine the growth of Sunni terrorism. Erdogan has long been looking for an important role for Turkey and his ambition was initially to revive the Ottoman Empire in a modern version; the changes made to the Turkish society in the religious sense and the constitutional ones have led to a progressive isolation of the country and an increasingly difficult internal situation, culminating in the alleged coup attempt. Erdogan has shown an obsession with the so-called Kurdish danger, which must be interpreted as the occasion for the annulment of internal dissent within the country and as a factor of distraction from national problems, to direct them towards an external enemy. However, the Kurds have proved to be essential for the American strategy in the fight against the Islamic State, guaranteeing the military garrison of the territory. In this new phase of the Syrian war the Americans are militarily defending the Kurds and the democratic forces hostile to Assad, who occupy a territory that includes precious oil wells, a reason that adds a particular interest to the dispute. Current developments say that an approach is already under way between Russia and Iran, already formally allied, with Turkey, which considers Assad’s survival in power now a figure acquired as an anti-Kurdish function. This factor is likely to lead to an armed confrontation between two countries that are both within the Atlantic Alliance, generating a new case that can create a legal precedent within it. The continuing situation of possible military incident, due to the contiguity of the armed forces of the different countries in Syria, implies the potential occurrence of an incident capable of giving way to a diplomatic confrontation, which could have even more dangerous consequences than a limited military confrontation . Furthermore, the presence of armed militias acting on behalf of foreign countries constitutes a further factor capable of restarting the Syrian conflict on a large scale and this time with foreign international actors increasingly close.
One of the objectives of the President of the European Commission Juncker was the enlargement of the members of the European Union. The entry of new states has been stopped since 2015, when Croatia was admitted. Formerly in 2004 ten countries entered, most of the former Soviet bloc, the Baltic countries and Malta, while in 2007 it was the turn of Bulgaria and Romania. The Balkan countries, those coming from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, plus Albania, have long desired to join the Union and it must be said that geographically the proximity to Europe would justify these ambitions. However, only Serbia and Montenegro have opened negotiations with Brussels for admission, while other countries have, for now, fewer opportunities for entry into the Union. The intentions of the President of the commission and of the representative for the Union of foreign policy are to seek solutions for the entry of the Balkan countries in Europe, but, at the moment, the required requirements are not met. On the issue of fundamental rights these countries are still far from European standards and Brussels has required concrete reforms; also the contrasts between the Balkan countries for reasons of borders represent an important obstacle, as well as the great level of corruption and the very relevant presence of the underworld within the institutional life are arguments, which, at present block every possibility, if not will be solved. Within the European institutions the thought of inclusion is motivated by the desire to prevent a possible instability on the European borders, however there is no expectation of a general favor to the potential entry of new members. One of the reasons that most concern the opposites is the possibility that the Balkan countries, once they enter the European assembly, go to align themselves with the positions of the countries of Eastern Europe, characterized by deep Euroscepticism and with a very different behavior on fundamental rights. from western countries. The real risk could become that to be admitted to the Union would once again be countries that do not share the founding elements of the Union, but aspire to only improve their economic condition. Concretely there is a real risk that the European balances will be reversed in favor of the increasingly democratic vision of the Eastern countries, marked by the rejection of the division of common obligations, just look at the case of migration, together with the maintenance of a situation , currently privileged, of European contributions. The central point now is to ask whether the previous enlargement was positive or negative Europe and based on that reasoning for a further enlargement. The current situation of conflict with the states of the Višegrad group leads rather to a narrowing of Europe, than to an enlargement, which has not produced advantages for those states that were already members and for the very idea of union that was has been proposed. On the other hand, an enlargement with the conditions with which the previous ones occurred does not seem to be indicated, since mechanisms for possible expulsions should be envisaged for those states that do not conform to the founding values of Europe. The question is whether the Balkan states have become accustomed to democracy in the fullest sense of the term or, instead, are like the Eastern countries, which are still influenced by the communist regimes and express governments that tend to be illiberal. The risk is that it is the West, that is, the founding nucleus of Europe to have to adapt to a level of democracy lower than that of its own standards and that the Union, to widen numerically, has a compression of rights. If, on the one hand, the intention to increase the member countries is commendable precisely to try to widen the rights, on the other hand, it must be recognized that the countries of Eastern Europe, at the moment, represent a disappointment for the lack of evolution in democratic sense. Even if the road for the admission of the Balkan countries is still long, it is necessary to ponder well this eventuality and at least think of gradual entry forms, modulated over the long term, that can interrupt relations with those states, which, above all, in perspective, do not they will seem able to adapt to democratic processes that meet the required and expected standards.
Germany is heading towards the great coalition, not without various difficulties, not only in the Social Democratic electorate, but in the overall electorate. In fact, about 54% of Germans would be against the government solution to which the country is headed and recent surveys have predicted that in the event of new elections, the two major parties would fail to reach the quota needed to govern. In this context the necessary research of the balance between the two parties must aim at the internal mutation of each team and the most precarious one appears to be the social democratic one. It is no coincidence that Schultz is, with respect to Merkel, the most active in communicating the results achieved: having agreed with the former chancellor the end of austerity should be the argument to convince that part of his party against the great coalition. The young Social Democrats remain the most adverse to the political solution that is emerging, first of all because they did not want to leave the role of main opposition party to the extreme right and then because they were disappointed by the results of the previous government, whose formation is identical to what is being created. In fact, the Social Democrats, in the executive past, have had to give approval to a right-wing economic policy, contrary to their nature, which has exacerbated the social differences in the country, practicing a policy based on the containment of inflation, which has favored the income higher and deriving from capital and not from labor; this is the main reason for the division within German social democracy. The failure of the previous attempt, which was to see a government formed by the Christian Democrats with the Greens and the Liberals, has failed and this has led to the repetition of the formation of the previous executive. The position of Schultz, a man of the institutions, even before the party, was immediately difficult because he was forced to make a responsible choice towards the country, but that according to some he was at the disadvantage of the party. This last hypothesis, however, could be denied by an economic policy able to favor the most disadvantaged classes and the Social Democratic electorate in order to reverse the aversion of the party base. After all, Merkel herself seems to have realized that the time has come to change her attitude towards austerity policy, which must be attenuated to favor openings favorable to the social classes that have paid the most for the price of these policies. This new policy will have to materialize with an increase in public investment, an increase in youth employment and greater investment in Europe to foster the German future within an increasingly united Europe. On the European question there seems to be an identity of views between Schultz and Merkel, which identify a project that has as its aim the European political union, a change of attitude on the part of Berlin, which must leave the role of defender of the rigidity of budgets, to also provide a different perception to other European countries. In this sense also the increasingly close relations taken by Merkel with the French President, to promote greater European integration, to continue must be supported by concrete initiatives and not merely programmatic. The increase in work, greater purchasing power, ever greater guarantees on social rights and access to functioning welfare systems, are the conditions that can not be ignored to provide a different perception of the European institution, which must pass also for the recovery of internal markets, too compressed by years of austerity. If the great coalition is able to renew itself as political engineering and establish itself in Germany, this will work to open the way for the development of all that part of Europe that will still believe in itself and rediscover that centrality, even political that is not present, but it would be necessary in the current world scenario.
The Turkish president Erdogan makes a visit to the Vatican after fifty-nine years of absence, the journey continues with the meeting with the president of the Italian Republic and the head of government. On the real need to receive a head of state who has turned his country into a kind of dictatorship, based on the cult of his personality, through the denial of any dissent and the reduction of rights for the Turkish population, there are great doubts from more set off. If for the visit to the Vatican one can have plausible explanations, for the reception of Italian institutions do not see reasonable reasons to allow Erdogan an international visibility. An explicit request by Erdogan is the cause of the visit to the Vatican, where the Turkish intention is to speak mainly about the question of Israeli capital Jerusalem, after the US has expressed its willingness to move its embassy. The position of the Holy See is clear in this regard, and the hope of Turkish support on this issue, which may also occur, will certainly not compensate for the grievances that the Pope will make in private for the internal situation of the country and for the Kurdish repression. Of course, the Vatican will use the meeting to have the highest reassurance on the security of Turkish Christians and this makes it more understandable that the Pope did not refuse the meeting. But for Italy there do not seem to be similar motivations other than economic ones. Rome has always supported, eventually denied by the facts, the Turkish candidacy for entry into Europe, even when, for example, Paris opposed. The Italian attitude did not seem sufficiently determined against a political leader who transformed his country from a layman into a confessional, with all the implications that entails wanting to make the Islamic religious factor predominant in a civil and political society. Rome continued a sort of soft line even after the repression following the coup, whose true nature was never understood, limiting itself to formal condemnations and also against the repression carried out against the Kurds, no particular grievances were felt . It seems significant that Erdogan’s is the first visit abroad after the bombings against the Kurdish militias present in the Syrian territory, which have also made several victims among the civilians. This list says that there would be enough to isolate a very dangerous character for world stability, whose ambition threatens to create a dictatorship modeled on the fascist model on the borders of Europe. In his extreme politics Erdogan always needs international recognition, both for his internal and foreign side and the fact that he is received after breaking international law could become a fact that Turkey will be able to exploit for its own benefit. The Italian government will certainly have thought about how to increase the great economic exchange between the two countries, which reaches almost eighteen billion dollars, but in a more general framework, the one concerning international politics, even within the European dynamics, it is impossible that this visit is not perceived as an advantage granted to the Turkish president. Probably in this situation it would have been more desirable to have a more detached attitude with a head of state who has directed his country towards a considerable compression of those rights, which the Italian state and the European Union have always been bearers of. To give a hearing to Erdogan contradicts all the values on which the Italian Republic and Europe are founded, and this is a serious fact that denounces the need for coordination of the international policy guidelines, which must necessarily come from Brussels. On the other hand, one can not hope that this visit will change the direction taken by Erdogan, who, on the contrary, uses Italy for its purposes of international visibility, making Rome a bad figure.