What is being consumed in Britain seems increasingly to be political suicide. The work of the Premier, but also of the head of the Labor Party, reveals an insecure conduct that is incapable of taking a firm and convinced position. It should be remembered that the referendum on the British exit from the European Union was only consultative and therefore not binding, but this did not prevent the political forces from transforming it into a functional medium with which to try to satisfy an angry electorate, but to which they were not clear the consequences of this decision. Suddenly the part of the voters opposed to the Union, even if of little majority to those who wanted to continue to be part of Europe, had greater relevance in the British political scene. The appeals of those who clearly illustrated the destiny to which the United Kingdom would have gone were not useful: the deep nationalism and the wrong resentment against the continent have determined a direction of the confused and inconclusive English politics. The bad management of the issue was conditioned by the desire not to upset the electorate who won the referendum, but also not to irritate the losers too much. The lack of important politicians capable of managing a difficult situation, however, has completed the picture, so we have reached the absurd obligation to participate in the European electoral competition, where the worst face of the British political society is given the advantage, thanks to an overt ignorance of government and London opposition. The conservative party, already severely punished in the administrative elections, is deeply divided into at least three parts: those in favor of leaving without agreement, those in favor of the exit agreed with Brussels and those against. The Labor party has not been able to take advantage of this division because it is also internally divided, the Liberal Democratic Party is the only political force declaredly opposed to leaving Europe, but does not seem to have the necessary strength to collect all the in favor of remaining in the Union, confirming that it is still a marginal political subject in British politics, and finally the panorama seems to be dominated by skeptical training on Europe, where probably the votes of conservatives who want to leave without agreement and the disappointed will converge. political action of the Premier. In this scenario, the proposal for a new referendum arrives out of time because it had to be done a long time ago, but with more information and the political weight of being a binding decision for the executive. The experience of having called a referendum in a hasty manner and without the due information to an audience of voters conditioned only by the Eurosceptic action is not served. The traditional parties are opposed to re-engaging the electorate directly in the matter, preferring a clumsy gestone of the story, when, instead, a clarifying and definitive referendum could put things in the right perspective for a conscious evaluation by the electorate. It is not clear if there is a will of omnipotence or the fear of losing control of political activity, something that has already partly happened, in any case there is also the aspect, not secondary, of having worn down the negotiation with Europe losing all kinds of international credibility. The referendum, in short, will not be repeated, the fate of the Premier is that of resignation, which will conclude only part of the story, because the future is impossible to imagine, if not with a scenario of maximum division of national integrity and a relative development to the totally disastrous economy.
The relationship between the US and Russia must be distinguished between that of the respective heads of state and their governments with what is the natural aversion that exists between the two administrations. The political affinity between Putin and Trump is well known, as is the Russian activity to promote the election of the current US president. However, there is a mistrust of much of the American administration in the broadest sense towards Moscow’s political action; this mistrust derives both from historical situations, which are also present in the opposite sense, and from the obvious geopolitical objectives of Russia, which are at the base of the Kremlin electoral and political programs. The visit of the American Secretary of State to the Russian Foreign Minister and, subsequently, to Putin, shows that the dialectic between the leaders of the two countries continues in a collaborative way, because both need to reaffirm a functional relationship to maintain their role in politics international. The USA is currently in difficulty on several diplomatic fronts: with North Korea they have failed to conclude an agreement that would have been significant, in Venezuela, considered within its own area of influence, Washington is not able to effectively affect favor of opposition to the caracas regime, the Iranian question risks going beyond the already dangerous level of tension underway for a bad management too conditioned by incautious allies and, finally, the relationship with the European Union undergoes continuous deterioration mettemdo in danger the normal and historical development of the transatlantic relationship. Trump has set up a policy of substantial isolation in the international arena, but has not been supported by parts of his administration so as to prevent unfavorable effects for the US and the difficulties for American diplomacy derive largely from these reasons. The relationship with Russia, although conditioned by different and often conflicting visions and interests, is essential to find a collaboration to resolve contingent questions and not oblige the US to make a first-hand but solitary commitment. Russia, on the other hand, needs to have a relationship with the greater power of the planet, which after the invasion of Crimea, has worsened significantly (but not so much for Trump, as for parts of the administration opposed to Moscow). The importance of good bilateral relations, as stated by the Russian Foreign Minister, is essential to prevent the tensions in the various regions from evolving into situations capable of altering the books on which world peace is based. This awareness can favor a resumption of much closer relationships, which can favor a mediation able to satisfy the objectives of both parties. In particular, the issues of Korean denuclearization, which is of strategic interest to the US, have been addressed, but for Russia it is essential, given the proximity to the Asian peninsula, the Venezuelan question, where Russia has expressed its opposition to an export of democracy through arms, of the Syrian and Ukrainian situation and, finally, of the Persian Gulf emergency, which continues to remain so, despite the American declarations of not wanting to embark on a conflict, which would be highly unpopular for Trump. If this visit by the Secretary of State can represent a rapprochement between the two powers, we must also consider the effects this will have on China, as an alternative subject to the USA, to which Russia seemed to have approached; Moscow, despite a framework of normal international dialectics, could play on two tables to exploit the complicated relations between the two countries, due to the ongoing trade wars. This could lead to questioning, but certainly not in the short term, a series of international assets including the Iranian one, the USA will probably not be able to make Moscow withdraw from the nuclear treaty, but a greater diplomatic action by Russia between the USA and Iran could force China to derogate from its principle of non-intervention in order not to renounce its role as a great power to which it also aspires in the diplomatic field. It will be necessary to wait for the developments that this approach, if it really exists, will be able to provoke.
The difficult dialectic between the US and the European Union seems to get worse every day. After the problem of the European armed force and the threat of sanctions by Washington, due to the question of European armaments, the dispute moves to respect the Iranian nuclear treaty. While it is known that the two sides are on opposite positions, the developments of the events in the Persian Gulf, where two Saudi oil tankers would have been sabotaged, aggravate the comparison. The episode of the sabotaged oil tankers, without consequences for the crew and the ships themselves, seems to have been created specifically to raise the tension between Saudi Arabia and then USA, with Iran. Tehran has denied having played an active role in sabotage and the extent of the serious damage appears to favor an act used as a pretext, just when Brussels and Washington are discussing the application of the Iranian nuclear treaty. The starting point of the signature on this agreement was not a sign of friendship of the West towards Iran, which remains a country where democratic freedoms and civil rights are increasingly denied, but an opportunity reasoning to contain in a legal manner a potential military nuclear development of the Islamic Republic. Trump has overturned this assumption also because of the pressure of the Sunni monarchies and of Israel, triggering a situation of tension due to the renewal of the sanctions towards Iran, imposed also to the European companies that intend to collaborate with Tehran. Perhaps the intention of the American president is to provoke a revolt in the population, which constitutes the real victim of the economic blockade, which causes the country’s financial crisis. Once again it is a wrong calculation, because the opposition has no chance within a regime that exercises rigid control. The American pressure on European diplomacy has the aim of achieving the alignment of Brussels on the White House positions, but this appears very difficult: the achievement of the signature on the nuclear treaty is one of the greatest diplomatic successes of the Union and a unilateral withdrawal like the American one would represent a loss of image and credibility that would be difficult to recover, for an international subject that, at the moment, has one of its greatest strengths in diplomacy. For the awareness of the importance of this aspect, in fact, Iran is pursuing its strategy of seeking compliance with the agreements by the signatories who have not withdrawn. The relevance of the issue increases with the development of the events of the Persian Gulf, where the danger of an accident that could also trigger a conflict is increasingly present, together with the visit of the US Secretary of State to the meeting of foreign ministers of the Union, visit which led to the postponement of one day of the scheduled meeting with the Russian foreign minister. The unscheduled presence in Europe of the American Secretary of State in such a particular context could be read as the desire to try to exert more direct pressure on the attitude of the Union, also in view of possible military developments. Trump has repeatedly threatened Iran and the occurrence of sabotage or disturbing actions against ships from allied countries could authorize the US to produce non-diplomatic responses, partly because Washington sent its own naval fleet to the Persian Gulf. The European position is of great concern but remains unmovable on the question of the treaty: Brussels could take advantage of this opportunity to finally exercise a leading role to resolve the potential crisis in a diplomatic manner and reaffirm the absolute political autonomy with respect to an increasingly reckless American president .
One of Trump’s most sought-after goals, to convince European countries within the Atlantic Alliance to increase military spending, could be achieved, but with effects opposite to those desired by the American president. In his view of defending the West, the White House tenant has argued and supports a gradual decrease in the US commitment to greater European engagement. Trump has taken for granted two objectives: the first, in fact, a less direct commitment of the US armed force and the second a greater sale of arms manufactured in the United States. But the two things do not necessarily mean that they can be realized together: in fact the European Union is proceeding in its intention to form an autonomous military force, capable of developing its own weapons systems, both as a project and as a realization. Such a development would exclude the American war industry from a substantial market and could create significant problems also for the employment aspect, going to hit a substantial share of the president’s electorate. The US grievances towards Brussels relate to the real risk of endangering integration and military cooperation, carried out within the Atlantic Alliance; but the question should not be posed in these terms, given that the solution of a European military autonomy is accelerated precisely because of the disengagement announced by Trump’s will. In reality it is natural to think that the American president has not considered this eventuality and has taken his vision for granted, highlighting his poor ability to read foreign policy: the equation between greater spending on arms and strategic independence of the Europe was not included in the White House scheme. In the plans of the European Union there is the allocation of 13 billion euros for the development of 34 projects in the field of armaments for the period between 201 and 2027. The participation regulation also provides for the presence of non-EU companies, but without these being able to boast the intellectual property of the projects and with strict controls on the possibility of exporting the products produced, the participation in these projects will also include the unanimous vote of the 25 countries of the Union. It is clear that these restrictions can severely limit the activity of the American war industry and allow the departure of an autonomy of European forces, increasingly detached from the tactical and strategic monopoly of American weapons systems. In fact, the risk of duplication of military systems and even a possible decrease in the integration between the armed forces, due to different armament arrangements, seems concrete, however, masking the irritation for potential lost profits with tactical motivations does not seem to be consistent and consistent with the behavior of the American president, in particular, and with the need to create a European military autonomy, in general, due to the present historical phase. The threats of political and commercial retaliation that come from the United States signal the nervousness of the Washington government for not understanding the developments they themselves have caused and once again highlighting a bad management of foreign policy: US interests are not protected from impositions, especially towards allies, but they must take into account the costs and benefits induced generated by questionable decisions, to which we must add contingent facts such as the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union, which constitutes the loss of a strong ally towards Washington within Europe. On the other hand, Trump has tried to endanger European unity precisely by supporting Brexit. The defense argument threatens to push the two parties even further and worsen an already deeply deteriorated relationship, as well as turning into a personal defeat for Trump, whose effects must not be underestimated: if from a political point of view, even if between many difficulties, it is unthinkable to reach a break between the USA and Europe, this situation could favor even greater openings in Brussels towards China, especially in the economic and financial field, leading to a subtraction of American influence on the Union, with consequent increase in difficulties in the reports also on issues other than military.
Parallel to the issue of Venezuela, a confrontation is taking place between the USA and Russia which is taking on increasingly exasperated tones. Within the crisis of the South American country, Washington and Moscow face off in an attempt to gain positions in the geopolitical scenario that could take shape. The Caracas government is supported by Russia and China, which, however, is keeping a more secluded profile; the Kremlin’s intention is to interrupt US hegemony over South America, while the White house seeks to regain positions by supporting the Venezuelan opposition. In the past few days there has been an amateurish conduct by the actors involved: the opposition has tried to implement a clumsy coup, judged too reckless by the Americans themselves, declaring that they were only protests, the government has assured that it will lead to prison the protagonists of the protest, highlighting that they do not know how to handle the situation: this is part of a tragic dialectic within the Venezuelan country, where profound uncertainty reigns, and at the expense is a population with no more points of reference and at the end due to the lack of food and medicines. Even on the international level, however, the USA and Russia have abandoned the necessary caution that would be necessary to guarantee a prudent management of the crisis. The United States has threatened a force action within the Venezuelan country, officially to restore democracy, in reality to accelerate the defeat of the incumbent government and return to influence the South American country. It was a rash move and probably only a threat without a follow-up, if one has to see the reluctance shown by the Trump administration to engage American soldiers directly on the ground outside the USA. Certainly Venezuela is closer to the United States than Syria or the territory invaded by the Islamic State and it is also a strategic country due to its oil resources, but the American threat seems only such because of the trend demonstrated so far by Trump. However, such a blatant threat could not but arouse the Russian reaction and represented an opportunity not to be wasted on the Kremlin, to confront Washington on the ground of threats. What makes Moscow’s reaction equally unlikely was to appeal to a violation of international law by a country that broke it several times. In any case, the two superpowers are experiencing a period of the most tense, so much so that some analysts have spoken openly about a cold war climate. To the possible serious consequences threatened by the Russian foreign minister, the response of the American counterpart was just as harsh, warning Moscow to stop the activities Russia is carrying out to support the Caracas government, but the heaviest criticism was that of endanger bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington precisely because of the actions that Russia is putting into practice in Venezuela. The clue is clear: the White House believes that South America is a sort of area of its own exclusive influence and intends to recover Venezuela by favoring the opposition and the discontent of the country for an administration incapable of managing the economic and political crisis. If the solution is a democratic election capable of bringing clarity, the outcome is far from obvious: the opposition gains support, but the government still has a substantial part of the electorate on its side and, above all, holds power over the bureaucracy and administrative centers in the country. This evaluation could be part of the option of an American military intervention, based above all on the Venezuelan government’s ability to alter the conduct and the election results. However, even just threatening this eventuality has created a very strong tension that should favor international management where diplomacy should have the greatest role. The Russian reaction must also be explained by the irritation over American action that could be responsible for the economic disaster in the country, which could lead to the fall of the Caracas government, an impossible capacity for Moscow, which must highlight its threats, as a sort of compensation for the scarce capacity to counter American pressure on the Venezuelan economy.
The meeting between Putin and Kim Jong-un represents an evolution of the North Korean question. For Seoul, after the meetings with the USA, it means breaking the isolation with which North Korea had characterized its foreign policy, so much to deserve the nickname of a hermit nation. China, therefore, no longer represents the only diplomatic interlocutor, although it remains the privileged one. For Russia the meaning is to enter the question of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, taking advantage of the space left by the failed attempts of the United States. Even for Moscow there is an interest in eliminating the nuclear danger so close to its territory, but even more, there is the intention to play a leading role in the matter, an alternative and competitive role with the USA. It must be specified that if the American attempt to reach an agreement with North Korea was not entirely acceptable to Beijing, China towards Russia has a more positive attitude, because it does not consider Moscow a threat to Washington’s level in the geopolitical order of the Korean peninsula; indeed, a still divided Korea would also be an advantage for Russia, as well as for China, because a single nation on the Korean peninsula would fall within the area of American influence. Obviously for Beijing it would be impossible to tolerate the US presence on its borders, but also for Russia, a few kilometers away from North Korea, it would be to have dangerously close Americans. It is thus understood that China and Russia have common interests in relation to North Korea: both have a vested interest that the state of Pyongyang continues to exist. Certainly the best question to have relations with North Koreans is that of the denuclearization of the country and through this motivation to find a field of dialogue, which can go beyond the specific question. One of Kim Jong-Un’s main fears is to fear for his own safety and to have the assurances of remaining in power, arguments that Trump had assured, but which had not been sufficient to reach an agreement. Putin enters into dialogue with the North Korean dictator starting from the nuclear issue, knowing full well that it will remain a topic without a solution, because it is the only means of pressure available to Pyongyang; but the Russian president was at the game of Kim Jong-Un to achieve the result of restoring the Kremlin diplomacy, penalized after the invasion of Crimea, to world importance. Russia could intercede in the Security Council of the United Nations, supported by China, for a reduction of sanctions towards Pyongyang, a solution which is also favorable to Seoul, which always hopes for a detente towards North Korea, which could open a phase of greater stability on the Korean peninsula. From an economic point of view, Russia has offered grain supplies to the North Korean country, the construction of a methane pipeline and a railway, which would target South Korea, which needs alternative routes to the sea for its products; however, these infrastructures could also be an impetus for the North Korean economy, starting from tolls to cross its territory, estimated at around two hundred million dollars a year. According to Russian diplomats, the North Korean nuclear issue is still open because the American presidents who tried to manage it, both Obama and Trump, were not up to the task; this judgment is understandable because it wants to diminish US diplomacy, however it does not seem possible that even the Russian one can resolve the situation: the bilateral meeting and the eventual vertices that will come, are functional to both sides to obtain great advantages of image with little effort and without any official commitment and can lead to some economic advantage, above all for the disastrous North Korean economy, but they cannot cancel the North Korean atomic weapon because, as already said, it represents the only political weapon capable of bringing Pyongyang to the center of attention international, with all the advantages that follow. Moreover, as long as China has an interest in the reunification of the peninsula, the situation will remain almost the same.
The US administration’s intention to increase pressure on Iran, through the interruption of the exemption from the sanctions for the purchase of crude oil from Tehran, which was valid only for some countries, risks having very significant political and economic consequences. Meanwhile, the notice given is very limited, in fact the exceptions will have to cease from the next two May. The reason for this acceleration is identified in the need to limit the geopolitical action of the Islamic republic in the Middle Eastern region in favor of the Shiites and also to reduce Iranian influence in Syria. For these objectives, the White House believes that considerable financial efforts have been made, deriving precisely from the sale of crude oil. However, the US must limit that the decrease in available crude oil causes an increase per barrel, in an international context that has already registered a price increase of three percent on the total price of the barrel. Who can support the maneuver is only Saudi Arabia, with the collaboration of the United Arab Emirates, which have pledged to put on the market the quantity of crude oil needed to offset the Iranian one. The interest of the Sunni monarchies is double, on the one hand the increase in economic income should be recorded, but above all, to satisfy the functional geostrategic aspects of these countries, traditionally enemies of Iran, while in the background there will also be the satisfaction of Israel, now on the side of the Sunni countries against Tehran. The countries affected by the US maneuver are Japan, South Korea, Turkey, China, India, Italy, Greece and Taiwan. The American threat is to sanction the goods of these countries to the United States, if they continue to buy Iranian crude. The official reason is the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear treaty, never disregarded by European and European Union countries, which participated in the difficult negotiations. Trump fears that the Iranian country could equip itself with an atomic weapon and, through it, alter the regional balance and threaten Israel; however, this form of pressure affects an economy already in great difficulty due to the sanctions already in place and which strongly influences the life of the population of the country; but if Trump’s hope is to get rebellions from the population towards the regime, it does not seem possible that it will come true: Iranian citizens seem to turn their resentment towards the eternal American enemies, the Sunni countries and Israel, which they believe responsible for the failure to comply with the nuclear agreement, which caused the sanctions and the compression of the national economy. Towards the USA there is also resentment of those states that had entered into contracts with Iran and are now faced with a practically forced choice. A central issue is the intrusion into the economy of sovereign states that Washington uses as a tool to achieve its goals in foreign policy: that is, it sets up a perspective substantially not shared by those states that suffer the blackmail of the interruption of relations with the Iranian country. The argument is not even valid, that Iran is a liberticidal regime, which suppresses the opposition and does not guarantee the rights of its citizens, which is certainly true, because Saudi Arabia is an equally liberticidal dictatorship. So there remains only the obligation to adapt to the American reasons. This strategy is part of the Trump doctrine and its way of relating to enemies and allies interpreted only in a single direction and which represents one of the major reasons for the alienation from the USA by Europe and the growing distrust of the American president. If the question of duties between China and the United States seems to be moving towards a positive solution, the fact of the purchase of Iranian oil could become even more dangerous from a political point of view, because it involves an aspect where the US is not directly involved and on the which exercise arbitrariness.
If the European Commission makes the sanctions against the United States operational, the trade battle between Washington and Brussels will increase and will invest even more in the political aspects and relations between the two parties. In Europe it is believed that the US has provided state aid to the Boing company and the controversy is already before the World Trade Organization, the European Union has demanded compensation that must take place through sanctions against US goods for an amount equivalent to twelve billion dollars, which could be increased to twenty billion US dollars to widen the potential number of producers to hit. This scheme is part of the contrast that the American president has inaugurated with his trade policy, based on the introduction of duties also on goods and services from allied countries. The merchandise sectors that the European Union wants to hit belong to the production areas in which the Trump voters are present in greater numbers. This fact shows how the contrast has become strong and also how the two parties are proceeding in a reciprocal and progressive distancing. If the European intention were to materialize it would have the significance of a declaration of war on the United States; moreover the maneuver is justified by the American attitude, until now insensitive to a negotiated resolution of the commercial question. Trump has come to terms with China, with mutual benefit, but with Europe there is a tightening up due to the fact that the White House believes that Europe is in debt to the United States, both on the trade side and from that of military defense contributions. Trump has already thought of some retaliation, such as that of exacerbating the specular struggle with the European one on the air sector, accusing Brussels of helping its aeronautical industry and, on this basis, of inserting duties for about eleven billion dollars on European products, which will go to hit above all foodstuffs. That on agricultural products is a battle that has a very political value precisely because the sanctions are applied in both directions: Trump sees his electorate hit and protects it in a similar way, however it is not the same type of products and this comparison risks provide only damage to the two parties, without the gains that a trade war should also provide. Undoubtedly the initial mistake was Trump, but Europe has adapted, even if after useless attempts to try to change the mind of the Americans, and now the escalation of the commercial war seems irresolvable. Transatlantic relations are at historic lows and this cannot favor any of the two contenders: bad relationships do not favor collaborations both in commercial, military or foreign policy; that is, one assists, that is, in a reciprocal decoupling from the respective duties of an alliance, which can go as far as to justify a dialectic in constructive deterioration. It should be considered that this state of affairs, besides weighing on the respective advantages of a relationship between international subjects, favors the adversaries, whether they are called China or Russia. The lesser western cohesion favors policies contrary to both the US and Europe and the rapprochement between Brussels and Beijing is a direct consequence of it. The European limit is well known: too much concentration on the economic aspect to the detriment of foreign and defense policy: the evaluation is beyond myopic, as the three themes are complementary and cannot be separated. Looking only at the commercial result in the short or medium term does not shelter Europe from possible conquest, on the other hand if we want to face Trump on his plan, in the long run, we must have political and military autonomy: a condition now necessary , also in function of the progressive isolationism imposed by Trump. Europe must therefore organize itself and not wait for the election of a new president in favor of it.
The permanence in power of Al Sisi, in Egypt, is destined to last until 2030; a proposal made by deputies particularly loyal to the current Egyptian president, foresees an extension of the mandate from four to six years and the possibility of applying to a third mandate, an eventuality expressly not envisaged by the current constitution. The approval of the proposal by the People’s Assembly is sure, the members of the opposition forces are just fifteen, subsequently the constitutional reform will have to be approved also through a popular referendum, whose outcome should not represent concern for Al Sisi and the its political strength. Initially the period of potential permanence in the office of president should have been up to 2034, but the Legal Commission limited this possibility until 2030, making a fake legality exercise, which allows the president’s party to present this reform as legitimate (which can however be changed later). The reform also contains the possibility for the president to have greater powers over the appointment of magistrates, going to undermine, as well as practically, even formally the independence of the Egyptian judges and the introduction of a second representative chamber, the Senate, and the creation of quotas in the popular representatives in favor of the women and the Copts, Egyptian Cristrian religious minority. They are concessions to democracy that seem to be only formal and that are functional to divert attention from the concentration of power in the hands of the Egyptian dictator. The political situation of the country is in line with that of a nation where the armed forces have seized power with a coup, initially directed against the religious dictatorship imposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has then invested all forms of dissent, even who was against Islamism in power and wanted a secular democracy. According to some estimates, there are about 40,000 political prisoners in Egypt, while repression is constantly evolving and also controls dissent via the web. According to the supporters of the president, the reform is necessary to allow Al Sisi to complete his cycle of reforms and tries to include in the institutions the popular classes trying to broaden the consensus, a signal that 98% of the votes with which he was elected to Sisi last year is not considered reliable even by the dictator’s own apparatus. As has been repeatedly emphasized, Egypt is the main example of the failure of the process towards the democracies of the popular revolts: the country, in fact, passed from Mubarak to the Muslim Brothers and then returned to a dictatorship of the type of the miit. Meanwhile, international attitudes and sensitivity have varied greatly: Trump appreciates Al Sisi, so much to call him a great president and countries like Israel and the Sunni monarchies consider him a strategic ally in the region. More generally, Al Sisi falls into the category of strong men who are enjoying worldwide success, like Trump himself, Putin or the Chinese president. The difference of the American president is that the US system does not allow institutional drifts like in other countries, but his permanence in power is a clear indication of the current democratic sensitivity that is present in the USA. Moreover, even in European countries the cult of personality represents a dangerous drift for some time and in any case a character like Al Sisi in command in a crucial nation such as Egypt offers far greater guarantees that an unstable and unsupported democratic system cannot guarantee; certainly, then, because Al Sisi continues to be an ally of the West must be adequately funded.
If, during the Arab springs, Western governments proved more involved and even interested in a development of the situation that could evolve the systems of government of the southern Mediterranean countries in a democracy, currently the upheavals, albeit different in their form, which concern Algeria, Libya and Sudan are observed with detachment. One of the reasons is a general one: the expectations of an evolution in a democratic system close to the Western ones have been disappointed by the poor attitude of large parts of the population to political systems never practiced and viewed with suspicion by the only movements capable of orienting the people, those of a religious nature. The Egyptian case is more explanatory: the Muslim Brothers who went to the government thanks to the democratic vote have assumed every form of power, relegating minorities to the margins and trying to impose Islamic law, the consegunete reversal of this executive has materialized thanks to the intervention of the armed forces that have re-established a different but always dictatorial regime. The American isolationist attitude, clearly changed compared to the Obama presidency, causes the lack of a leading country in the field of Western democratic institutions, causing the lack of a towing effect for other Western countries. Finally, Europe, torn apart from within, shows all possible concern for a new wave of migration, caused by the Libyan conflict, which cannot be managed by Italy, both because of the aversion of the Rome government and the refusal of the others countries to take on the problem of irregular immigrants. A further danger is represented by the potential presence of elements linked to Islamic terrorism, ready to embark to arrive in Europe. The issues are not secondary, if Rome continues to keep the Italian ports closed it will be necessary to see what the attitude of the other European countries and of the Union itself will be: without a common agreement the tensions already present within Brussels are likely to explode; it is necessary, then, to keep in mind how the European parliament that will come out of the May elections will be composed. Moreover, the European elections and the issue of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union represent political factors that distract the concentration necessary to deal with African issues, both directly and as an element of pressure at the United Nations. If we can at least partly understand this detachment, we certainly cannot share it: the stability of neighboring states, which are also suppliers of energy raw materials, is an element that cannot be ignored and this should require a greater commitment on the part of Brussels, which seems to have little presence. Certainly the means that would allow effective action do not belong to the Union: the absence of a foreign policy and of its own armed forces unrelated to national logic, greatly limit the scope of Community action. Furthermore, the national interests of European countries are often at odds and the underground maneuvers functional to individual interests do not help the necessary leading role that Brussels should interpret. The action is thus left to states that move in a way that is not too hidden and that have interests that are contrary to those of the Union. Without the help of the United States, which has not yet understood that their isolationism damages first of all themselves, Europe is in a position of excessive weakness, but this is not a surprise, since the lack of tools to make up for the American absence was already well known.