North Korea available for nuclear disarmament

According to the government of Seoul, North Korea would be ready to start a process of denuclearization of the military sector of the country, without asking for the abandonment of American troops from the territory of South Cora. Seoul, at this stage, is interpreting very careful the role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang, having as main objective to defuse the danger of a conflict between the US and North Korea, which would see the southern part of the country as the main victim. If what was affirmed by Seoul was true, it would be the first time that North Korea did not place the departure of US troops in the counterparts for its nuclear disarmament. The US military stationed in South Korea is about 28,000 and has so far constituted the main obstacle to North Korean nuclear disarmament, precisely because the atomic weapon was used as a possible possibility of an eventual invasion. On the other hand, the American withdrawal would be an insurmountable obstacle in a negotiation on the disarming of Pyongyang. The North Korean novelty is explained by analysts through the request of the regime, which will require security guarantees for its survival; if this hypothesis is true, one can not think only of a form of pressure from China, but also the continuous informal meetings between the American and North Korean representatives. Kim Jong-Un would have prioritized the security of remaining in charge of the nation, a permanence threatened several times by the United States. However, to believe that this is the only reason does not seem real, one possibility could consist in the fear of triggering an escalation towards a more widespread atomic weapon endowment. Japan’s threats to equip themselves with a nuclear weapon are very concrete, given that Tokyo already has all the knowledge necessary to build the atomic weapon in a short time. Japan’s position is very critical of the possible concessions to North Korea and the American openings in Pyongyang; what is feared in Tokyo is that the collaborative behavior of North Korea is not sincere, but can hide a tactic aimed at protecting part of its military arsenal. The Japanese attitude is much feared by China, because it constitutes an alteration to the regional equilibrium and because there are always potentially dangerous disputes between the two countries. For Beijing, finding an opponent with an atomic weapon is very different from having one with only conventional armaments. The issue does not seem secondary in North Korean developments: the Chinese objective is to maintain a situation in the region under control, to preserve stability and commercial trafficking: in this perspective, Kim Jong-un’s request falls completely, as China would have previously operated to surrender the scheme. If the North Korean dictator agrees with the US, it must first have agreed with Beijing that could have guaranteed greater international availability. On the other hand, an equally important motivation for China is to avoid the meeting of the two Koreas, which would cause the American presence on its borders. All this can only be achieved with a détente between Washington and Pyongyang, which also satisfies Seoul. On the American side for Trump this would be a diplomatic victory, which not even Obama could boast: the nuclear disarmament of North Korea would represent a prominent point in the career of the President of the United States, which would bring his prestige back home on the international stage .

Europe wonders about sanctions against Iran for Syria

There is a conflict within European countries about the attitude to be taken with Iran. There are two issues, and even if they seem unrelated to each other, they are a problem on relations with Teheran, but also with Washington. Iranian involvement in the Syrian war alongside Assad, and therefore all of his misdeeds, requires European countries to give a strong diplomatic response to the Iranian country: the solution found would be to impose sanctions on Teheran, however, the reason for the discussion is how serious these measures should be. The question is related to the nuclear agreement that Iran has also stipulated with the European Union, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The fear is that, because of the sanctions for the presence in Syria, Teheran has a negative reaction also on the nuclear agreement, especially for the pressure coming from the USA, which, with President Trump, seems to want to withdraw from what agreed. What Europeans fear is that putting new sanctions on Iran could be a sort of excuse for Tehran to make the treaty ineffective and pave the way for Iranian atomic military development. This scenario would be the worst possible at this stage, characterized by tensions between Americans and Russians, because the Iranian front would open up officially. In fact, Trump’s behavior is influenced not only by the preconceptions of the White House, but also by the pressures of the Israelis and Sunni monarchies, traditional opponents of Tehran. The concrete risk is that of nuclear proliferation and a state of permanent tension, with Iran that could claim its right to nuclear research, also for military purposes and a dialectic consisting of threats of armed intervention, and adequate responses, such as it had already happened before the signature on the agreement was reached. In order to avoid the return of a balance of terror on a multipolar scale, and therefore more difficult to control, Berlini, Paris and London have proposed sanctions against Iran with a scheme of selective measures: the reason is not to cause a tightening of Tehran and, at the same time, demonstrate to Washington that, in this way, one can be strict with Iran without inducing him to withdraw from the treaty. Despite the disagreement with some European partners, the proposed measures concern not the Iranian state, but its officials believed to be directly involved in the Syrian conflict. If, on the one hand, it is clearly an operation carried out demonstrating all the goodwill possible towards a country that has in any case been responsible for massacres against civilians, on the other hand, precisely this caution could be mistaken for weakness from Trump and, therefore, provide him with the opportunity to continue the project to boycott the nuclear treaty. The real danger is that, in addition to the US president, even the Iranian government take advantage of these sanctions to renounce the treaty, considering, too, that the expected benefits in the economic field have been hitherto greatly reduced. In other words, Teheran could judge that it is more convenient to move towards becoming an atomic power and, at the same time, reinforce political and commercial relations with the enemy countries of the Americans like Russia, but also China, considered more advantageous in a strategic sense. anhe at the expense of the possible economic benefits, for now not arrived, that the end of the sanctions by Europeans and Americans should have guaranteed. It will be necessary to wait what the Teheran government will consider more important: if the geopolitical or economic aspects, certainly without tangible benefits, it seems obvious that Iran favors its international ambitions.

The variables of the Syrian scenario

The reason why the conflict in Syria risks becoming a sort of world war is the presence of armed forces from different countries on Syrian territory, with clearly different objectives; a scenario that presents a variability of situations in a strongly precarious equilibrium. Making an analysis of the forces in the field we must start from the main interpreter of the conflict: the dictator of Damascus Bashar Al Assad. After seven years of war, with half a million motions and half the population of the country displaced abroad, the Damascus government controls about two thirds of the territory and, nominally, it appears as the winner of the war; nevertheless, it is a victory achieved only thanks to the intervention of the Russian and Iranian allies, without which it would presumably have been defeated three years ago. Assad is a figure reduced to a head of state strongly controlled by the allies, kept in power only to favor the geopolitical interests of Moscow and Tehran. Russia initially had the main objective of maintaining control over the only naval base in the Mediterranean Sea, located right on the Syrian coast; Putin, however, was able to exploit the vacuum left by the US, first with Obama and later with Trump, making Moscow the role of super power that he had promised to an increasingly nationalist population. From a military point of view, Russia has legitimized its influence on the Syrian country with the employment of about 50,000 soldiers and, above all, with the installation of an anti-aircraft system based on Russian technology. For Iran, as well as the geopolitical aspect of the religious: the goal of Tehran is to create a territorial band, which, starting from Iran, through Iraq, Syria and arrive in Lebanon, to unite the Shiite population; it is a fundamental question for the Islamic republic, especially in the current phase, which sees an increasingly compact union among the Sunni states, led by the historic enemies of Iran: Saudi Arabia. Beyond these two countries there is Turkey, which is characterized by a behavior that is not always linear, depending on the convenience of the moment: if at the beginning, probably, Ankara has helped to finance the Sunni extremists, who would later become the troops of the Caliphate, with the developments of the conflict has approached Assad, framing it as a potential ally for the containment of Kurdish ambitions to create its own sovereign entity. Currently the Turkish army is guarding a strip of Syrian territory located on its own border and lately has again changed its attitude on Assad hoping for the fall, after the Syrian regular forces have lined up to protect the Kurds. The US, after making the assessment that the Islamic State had been defeated, had to return home the approximately 4,000 people present on Syrian soil, the bombing with chemical weapons is changing Washington’s plans. This sudden and unexpected turnaround may have been dictated by reasons of domestic and international opportunities due to Israeli reminders for the presence of Iranians on the borders of their country. For Tel Aviv, in fact, the proximity of Tehran’s troops is not acceptable, also because it also means a material support for Hezbollah. However, Tel Aviv maintains good relations with Moscow and this represents a variable that can not be readily understood in the Kremlin’s relations with the Iranians. Finally, we need to consider other armed forces present on the scenario, which are not the expression of state entities, but militias of groups uprooted from their positions, as in the Syrian north and in the Aleppo area there are members of Al Qaeda, while in the desert between Syria and Iraq there are several groups belonging to the Islamic State, which could be the reservoir for new radical militias. A separate argument must be made for the Kurds, who without American support could approach the Russians, creating a new reason for embarrassment in the relationship between Moscow and Iran. This framework gives back to a very complicated situation, rich in variables, that with a military development, such as the possible American attack on Assad, risks to have strong repercussions on a global scale. The future scenarios seem difficult to predict, even if a direct confrontation between the US and Russia does not seem likely, the two powers would have the way to wage war on other plans, first of all the commercial and European stability. Not to mention that consolidated aspects such as the Iranian nuclear deal would surely be canceled. Now is the time for diplomacy to take action and set off a negative phase for the whole world.

The implications of probable US intervention in Syria

After the proclamations against Assad, for the chemical bombardment of civilians, Trump seems to have assumed a more reflective attitude about the times and the ways of retaliation against Syria. If it is true that a naval unit travels to the Syrian coast, it is equally true that the US administration is seeking coordination with allied countries willing to support Washington. To make an effective action the timing and speed of execution are the main factors for success, but the American president seems to take time threatening a harsh response, which, however, does not come. The allies, while supporting the US in words, are tied to national assessments, as France is doing or awaiting parliamentary provisions, such as Great Britain. Outside of Europe, Saudi Arabia, which had said it was willing to participate in an action against Syria, arrived at the time to move, seems to have become more hesitant. On the other hand, the American public opinion and, above all, the one that usually supports Trump, seems opposed to engaging the American armed forces in a clash that announces risky and that could also become certainly not short. From a technical point of view it must be considered that Syria now has very effective anti-missile weapons, because it is supplied directly by Russia. Then there is the part of public opinion that opposes the American president, who believes that the action against Syria serves to divert attention from the problems that Trump has with justice. All these considerations are certainly true, but it might be equally probable that Trump awaits, before taking action against Assad, the absolute security of the actual responsibility of the Damascus regime for using chemical weapons. Also because the American president perceives a clear decrease in American prestige in the international field and, as far as Syria is concerned, he believes that the responsibility of the decrease in the US political weight was due to the attitude of Obama, who refused to punish Assad for the use of chemical weapons; on that occasion the Syrian dictator was allowed to go beyond the limits imposed by the White House without taking any sanctions, which probably would have changed the course of the story, without starting the long period of war and also the development of a substantial part of the State Islamic. On the international level, then, having allowed Assad to remain in power has given Russia back a leading role on the world theater: a role that Moscow had lost for a long time. For these reasons Trump does not want to run the risk of being compared to his predecessor for how he managed the Syrian affair. In addition, the attitude of Israel that has changed towards Damascus should also be considered: if before Assad could guarantee a certain stability to the region, the presence on the Syrian territory of Russians and Iranians is, without a doubt, a factor that has already altered the relationships of force and provoked very dangerous conflict episodes. That said, even if Trump’s retaliation, as is very likely, it is not credible that the Syrian regime may be close to the end; for the US it is important to return to play the role of the past, as a nation capable of exercising the figure of the world gendarme, able to punish those who transgress to precise rules, such as the use of chemical weapons, also in projection of the reports that they want to establish with North Korea. It will be important to check how the Russian reaction can be, with implications that could go from the equilibrium of the Middle Eastern region, to the relationship between the two states, both from a political and commercial point of view (let’s think about the sanctions still present against Moscow), until to get to the Pyongyang nuclear issue. At this moment Syria is at the center of the world and not just for its war.

The need to reform the Security Council

One of the main issues related to the war in Syria is that of control over the use of chemical weapons and those who must enforce these limitations. The scenario is the international one, therefore regulated by laws that too often are not respected; in this context the supranational subject with greater responsibility should be represented by the United Nations, however, of the three organs from which they are composed, the Secretary General, the Assembly and the Security Council, only the latter would have the possibility to enforce the resolutions decided by the assembly. The legal mechanism studied at the end of the Second World War, however, expressed a system based on cross votes, which gave permanent members too high a power, compared to other countries of the United Nations. This has produced a substantial inadequacy of the only organ of world government, remained a prisoner of special interests, ahead of the general ones. The Syrian case is only the latest, most recent, example of the substantial uselessness of an organization, which, like the one that preceded it, is heading towards failure. Of course the lack of proper means to enforce the decided treaties or the bans imposed on weapons, is a major obstacle, but even worse is the regulatory situation that allows permanent members to exercise, even individually, their right to vote only in function of their national interests. Several countries have repeatedly called for the need for reform, always denied by the selfishness of permanent members. Nor has it been possible to introduce corrective measures in the presence of particularly serious humanitarian situations, fearing that, in the near future, these exceptions could violate any conflicting state interests, for example with possible humanitarian aid. Unfortunately in history there will always be dictators like Assad, who will not be afraid to use the worst weapons, even against civilians, as they will always be ready to use these dictators to achieve their goals. However, a modification of the Security Council would be sufficient to try to introduce legal case studies that could prevent massacres and suffering, even without inserting new rules for the Assembly and for the functions of the Secretary General. Without change, the prestige of the Security Council, and, above all, of its permanent members is likely to decline considerably, but this could only be the first step in a progressive loss of the functions of the UN, which would register a substantial weakening, such as to endanger multilateral relations between states and that system which seeks to guarantee international security. Considering less and less serious certain crimes, such as, indeed, the use of chemical weapons, because seen with a view to normalizing the problem, can cause the loss of effectiveness of the fear of international sanctions and, therefore, give way to a system general with less and less rules, because those in force do not ensure the guarantee of repression and punishment of the perpetrators of crimes. The system of crossed vetoes, which is now the basis of the functioning of the United Nations, must be overcome by new regulations, which seek only to protect the minimum guarantees of the life of civilian populations, even in contrast with the interests of individual states. The insurance of the punishment of those who commit serious violations against the civilian population, even if in the role of head of state, must represent the first step to reaffirm the supranational task of protecting the general interest, which must be pursued by the United Nations the decay of international relations understood as a form of multilateralism, which in a global context should represent the common rule.

Israel could have hit Syria

The response to the bombing of Assad was not long in coming, after the threats of Trump and the meetings between the US and France to find solutions against the Syrian regime, once again guilty of having used chemical weapons, the Syrian base in Homs is been hit by an air attack. Damascus immediately accused the Americans, but the Pentagon denied having used its military assets, despite the threats of the American president. The most probable hypothesis is that the military action was carried out by Israel, with the dual purpose of hitting Syria and its Iranian ally, which would have its own armed contingent and an arms depot in the base. The attack could also have a double preventive purpose: to discourage a too-large presence of the Iranian army or militia in a position too close to Israel and also to damage armaments that could be transferred to Lebanon to reinforce Hezbollah’s Shia militias. Also according to Russia, the country that is the author of the action is Israel, but contacts are still taking place between Moscow and El Avi to prevent the Russian military from being accidently hit; in this regard, the Kremlin army spokesman said that there were no Russian victims in the action. Israel would also hit Syria to sanction it against the use of chemical weapons and to warn the Damascus regime not to attempt a similar solution against its territory. Unlike the Russians, who have kept a low profile, the Iranians have accused the Israelis of collaborating with terrorism by attacking the Syrian base, a declaration that fits into the normal dialectic between the two traditionally hostile states. It should be stressed, however, that the Syrian action took place after the summit between Russians, Iranians and Turks in which a peaceful solution was sought to the Syrian conflict: the impression is that Assad acted against the rebels, to anticipate a diplomatic solution, in fact, the intention of Damascus is to gain as much ground as possible. Assad’s strategy has not changed since the beginning of the conflict, when it can strike for gains it seems to go against the interests of its allies. Even this time having provoked Israel, or at least a retaliation to the bombing with chemical weapons, seems to be in contrast with the interests of the allies, especially those of the Iranians, who were hit on this occasion because of Damascus’ behavior. However, Israel’s action could also be framed within the tensions that Tel Aviv has under way with Gaza; the stance of Erdogan, an ally of Syria and Iran in favor of the Palestinians could be part of the reasons for Israeli retaliation, aimed also at those who intend to influence the Palestinian protest to attempt radicalization and win it for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism. Lastly, we must remember the difficulties in the management of the Gaza Strip by the government of Tel Aviv and the repercussions on internal politics: a demonstration of force against Iran could distract the public opinion and allow to gain consensus to the executive.

On Syria, Trump accuses Putin

The attack of Assad, with chemical weapons, against the defenseless population, living in the area near Damascus controlled by the rebels, once again highlighted the violence of Damascus, perpetrated outside the international conventions. On the political level the most important consequence is represented by the reaction of the American president, Trump, who has explicitly accused Putin, and therefore Russia, of being responsible for the massacre because he protected the dictator of Damascus. This is the first time Trump attacks in a personal way, which until now has never happened. The accusation directly addressed to the head of the Kremlin is a novelty in the relations between the two political figures, who, despite the certainly not excellent relations between Russia and the United States, have always avoided being involved directly in political skirmishes. Even if such incidents had already, unfortunately, occurred, Trump had always preserved Putin from direct attacks, an attitude that had been explained by analysts with the affinities that the two characters have in common. Trump’s direct attack can mean that the US president has been forced by the US diplomatic and military world to point out a distance from Putin, both for the methods used, and to prepare the world public opinion for a confrontation in which the United States they could be committed in the first person. However it seems difficult that this eventuality becomes concrete: Trump does not want to be involved in a dangerous conflict and could make these statements to prevent a failure to take a position on the incident could harm American prestige. It is no accident that the current White House tenant blamed the situation on Obama’s management, which did not act against Assad, when he used the chemical weapons, already at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Trump has threatened to hit Syria in response to the use of chemical weapons, it would be the second case, after what happened in April 2017, precisely as a result of the use of chemical weapons against civilians. For now, as confirmed by the US military, each option is being evaluated. There is, however, a possible other reason, not necessarily an alternative to that previously illustrated, but complementary to it, about the causes of the direct attack on President Putin. The severity of the attack and its methods justify the frontal attack on Putin, which also occurs in a moment of difficulty for Trump for possible Russian involvement in his election. Given that relations between the US and Russia are difficult to improve and it is certainly impossible that they can come to a collaboration as advocated by Trump and Putin, before and immediately after Trump’s election, the head of the White House could have definitively sacrificed relations with his Russian counterpart, to conquer a position of conflict that makes him less vulnerable, on the political level, by the federal investigation on the Russian interference during the presidential elections. If the hypothesis were true, it would be a sign that Trump could be in great difficulty, but also that he could use every opportunity from international politics to his advantage; on the other hand, the relationship with Putin seems irremediably compromised and exalting the opposition between the two could also allow for gaining consensus within the administration of the White House, even in those sectors that have been so far more reluctant.

The commercial war between the USA and China

The war of duties initiated by Trump could not be limited to the action of the White house alone. After the European threats came the Chinese warnings, much heavier and with future implications able to affect the entire world economy. The measures proposed by Trump concern the introduction of duties of 25% on the importation of goods from China, worth approximately fifty billion dollars. If these measures were implemented, this would involve 1300 products manufactured in China, including telecommunications equipment and industrial automation; according to Washington, the reason is the violation of US intellectual property, that is, the USA would accuse China of producing part of its technological assets, including the most sophisticated and advanced, copying, with some variation, the American patents. The question, seen from this point of view, is difficult to solve because different American industries have moved the material production of their own products in China and it was inevitable that this has generated a productive inducement able to grow on the basis of what has been learned from collaboration with American industries. From the point of view of competition, Chinese goods cost less for the lower cost of labor, a topic commonly used by US companies, and not only, to justify the relocation. Trump has used the protection of American labor in the electoral campaign, and the only way to do so, keeping wages unaltered, is to raise customs barriers that cause a higher price for Chinese goods. The justification for the violation of intellectual property for the application of duties appears, in this context, as an excuse for the introduction of customs barriers intended, both as a functional instrument to domestic policy, and as an instrument of economic policy placed, intentionally, out of the current model of globalization, which Trump only opposes when it suits him. In the framework of international politics, it is clear that the introduction of customs duties is not only an economic maneuver, but also covers, and perhaps above all, supranational aspects of conflict. Precisely for this reason the Chinese answer is obligatory: both as protection of its products, and as an interpretation of the role of the great power in front of the international audience. Beijing’s intention is to contrast similar measures with American products, but in a targeted way to strike those states that have most provided their electoral support for the election of Trump as president of the United States. According to this scheme, the states that base their economy on livestock and agricultural crops will be affected, ie those states that are part of the central band of the US federation. Outside these objectives will also include California, although it has not contributed to the election of Trump, because it is the most important US state economically and because in this territory are the main technological companies of the USA. We understand how the tension between the two countries goes beyond the economic factor and focuses on the conflictual approach Trump wanted to counter China’s advance, coupled with the need to gain internal consensus. However, it will be interesting to verify how the consequences of these initiatives, first of all the fall in stock markets, will produce negative reactions, which could exceed those expected as positive. The Chinese attitude appears, however, more marked to remain, at least in these early stages, within the official context: Beijing’s intention to rival the US in the face of the World Trade Organization, to challenge itself against Washington for violating the fundamental principles of the organization. The impression is that we are only witnessing the first episodes of the conflict, they are still interlocutor phases, which, however, announce the likely very dangerous developments for the world economic hold and for the general geopolitical balances.

France sides with Syrian Kurds

The story of the poisoning of the former Russian spy, which took place in English territory, provoked an almost unanimous response in the western part. The US, despite President Trump’s feelings toward Putin, expelled the largest amount of Russian diplomatic staff, sixty people, and closed the Seattle consulate, because it was too close to American industries of national interest. This attitude shows how, despite the many changes in the US government, the powers that remain in their position against the Kremlin are still important in the US political landscape. For the time being, the Russian response has remained limited to the threats of a symmetrical response, which should not be long in coming, against all those states that used the expulsions of Moscow’s diplomatic staff. The Russian government has repeatedly stated that the Western attitude reveals a deep sentiment against Russia and that the risk of toning in the Cold War is increasingly concrete. On the other hand it was from the period of the invasion of Crimea that Russia was not subjected to such a diplomatic offensive. One of the aspects that surely Putin did not expect and that reveals, for his part, the great errors of evaluation, was a response so uniform by the Western countries. However, there are two nations that have not joined the diplomatic response to the poisoning of London: Austria, a member of the European Union and Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance. These are two defections that need to be carefully assessed for the relative political implications that they may cause. In the government of Vienna there is a nationalist formation that has very close ties with Putin’s party; the motivation is not to interrupt a relationship of friendship between the two countries, which could be an important channel to reopen the dialogue between Russia and the West: this motivation does not convince analysts, who see in the proximity between the political formations of the two countries a sort of bond due to the proximity of the ideals of control of society and of restricted democracy. It is a dangerous precedent within the European Union, which could favor a similar attitude of other states governed by forms that were said to be close to Putin’s policy. At the same time, the Austrian government seems to lend itself to becoming a sort of privileged place for Putin’s action against Europe, an action marked by the will to aim to divide Brussels members as much as possible. The story once again points to the need for a common action in European foreign policy, which should not admit defections by member states. As for Turkey, the failure to sanction Russia is a further sign of how far Ankara is away from the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for Turkish behavior lie in the closeness that the Ankara government has established with Moscow, for its mutual interests in Syria, a factor that has contributed to further worsening relations with the United States. The attitude of Turkey, not only in this specific case, is an element to be assessed on Erdogan’s true loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and leads to questioning what are now the reasons of convenience for the other member states on the Turkish permanence. within the Alliance. In both cases, both for the European Union and for the Atlantic Alliance, the time seems to come to introduce reforms capable of sanctioning those who remain within a supranational organization only for reasons of interest and do not adapt to common policies. Countries like Putin’s Russia have focused a lot on these weaknesses to divide Western countries for their geopolitical interests and this type of actions could increase if this lack of common defense remains.

Austria and Turkey do not adhere to sanctions against Russia

The story of the poisoning of the former Russian spy, which took place in English territory, provoked an almost unanimous response in the western part. The US, despite President Trump’s feelings toward Putin, expelled the largest amount of Russian diplomatic staff, sixty people, and closed the Seattle consulate, because it was too close to American industries of national interest. This attitude shows how, despite the many changes in the US government, the powers that remain in their position against the Kremlin are still important in the US political landscape. For the time being, the Russian response has remained limited to the threats of a symmetrical response, which should not be long in coming, against all those states that used the expulsions of Moscow’s diplomatic staff. The Russian government has repeatedly stated that the Western attitude reveals a deep sentiment against Russia and that the risk of toning in the Cold War is increasingly concrete. On the other hand it was from the period of the invasion of Crimea that Russia was not subjected to such a diplomatic offensive. One of the aspects that surely Putin did not expect and that reveals, for his part, the great errors of evaluation, was a response so uniform by the Western countries. However, there are two nations that have not joined the diplomatic response to the poisoning of London: Austria, a member of the European Union and Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance. These are two defections that need to be carefully assessed for the relative political implications that they may cause. In the government of Vienna there is a nationalist formation that has very close ties with Putin’s party; the motivation is not to interrupt a relationship of friendship between the two countries, which could be an important channel to reopen the dialogue between Russia and the West: this motivation does not convince analysts, who see in the proximity between the political formations of the two countries a sort of bond due to the proximity of the ideals of control of society and of restricted democracy. It is a dangerous precedent within the European Union, which could favor a similar attitude of other states governed by forms that were said to be close to Putin’s policy. At the same time, the Austrian government seems to lend itself to becoming a sort of privileged place for Putin’s action against Europe, an action marked by the will to aim to divide Brussels members as much as possible. The story once again points to the need for a common action in European foreign policy, which should not admit defections by member states. As for Turkey, the failure to sanction Russia is a further sign of how far Ankara is away from the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for Turkish behavior lie in the closeness that the Ankara government has established with Moscow, for its mutual interests in Syria, a factor that has contributed to further worsening relations with the United States. The attitude of Turkey, not only in this specific case, is an element to be assessed on Erdogan’s true loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and leads to questioning what are now the reasons of convenience for the other member states on the Turkish permanence. within the Alliance. In both cases, both for the European Union and for the Atlantic Alliance, the time seems to come to introduce reforms capable of sanctioning those who remain within a supranational organization only for reasons of interest and do not adapt to common policies. Countries like Putin’s Russia have focused a lot on these weaknesses to divide Western countries for their geopolitical interests and this type of actions could increase if this lack of common defense remains.